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ABSTRACT

NOT QUITE UP TO SCRATCH: AN EXAMINATION OF FAILURE, PERSISTENCE,
AND ‘LIVING DEAD’ OUTCOMES FOR WIRELESS START-UPS
Anindya Ghosh
Johannes Pennings

This dissertation analyzes why some VC-funded high-tech firms do not generate
harvesting events for investors through a lucrative sale, either to another company or on
the stock exchange. In other words, I seek to understand two performance outcomes:
failure and persistence. Building on the technology strategy and imprinting literatures, I
investigate the effects of three signals of quality on failure and persistence. In the first
essay, hypotheses are developed on the unintended consequences of patenting.
Disclosure, through patents, exposes new firms to undesired spillovers that harm their
survival chances. The second essay exploits asymmetric effects of factors on success and
failure to expose start-up persistence. It analyzes another signal of quality—technology
breadth, the applicability of inventions across domains—and suggests that the hazards of
disclosure also varies with this breadth. Finally, in the third essay I hypothesize on the
effects of signals of quality related to founding team on a third outcome, ‘living dead’—a
transitory state to which a start-up shifts when it persists beyond the norm without harvest
or failure. I tested these hypotheses on a hand-collected longitudinal dataset on 428 US
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VC-backed wireless firms founded between 1990 and 2009 using event history analysis
and matched case-control study.
I find that a start-up’s failure rate increases as its inventions are cited at a higher
rate by others; in addition the failure rate increases when the citing firms have a track
record of litigiousness. I show that the effect of signaling a specific, rather than general,
technology while experiencing high rate of knowledge diffusion diminishes both the
likelihood of failure and success; uncovering persistence through negative effects on
success and failure. Loss of members in founding teams comprised of entrepreneurs with
prior founding experience is found to be a shock that increases the odds of marginal
performance. Intriguingly, a team size of two increases the likelihood of ‘living dead’,
signaling underlying coordination costs. Overall, this dissertation enriches our
understanding of new venture performance by adding to existing theory, conceptualizing
a third performance outcome, providing empirical evidence for persistence and
unintended consequences of signaling, and indicating future research paths.
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Chapter 1:

Introduction

This dissertation examines performance of new ventures, particularly why VCbacked high-tech firms do not experience harvest outcomes (or “success”) through a sale,
either on the stock market or to another company.1 I focus on factors that are considered
signals, broadly defined, by both the firm and their evaluators that may contribute to the
lack of success of these firms. Thus, by “non-success” I imply two outcomes, either
outright failure via bankruptcy, distressed sale, and dissolution, or persistence without
harvest beyond a reasonable time horizon. Persistence results in what are called as
‘living dead’ firms by venture capitalists, as they generate no liquidity or liquidating
events for investors, and hence are a drag on their resources.
My reasons for studying non-success are three-fold. First, although performance
is a central concept in entrepreneurship, strategy, and organization theory, research to
date has focused more on success than outright failure, and even less on the middle
ground of persistence between these two extremes. Enduring above-normal returns, the
stated goal of strategy research, assumes a distribution of firms and implies the presence
of consistent middle of the road performers too.

Thus understanding failure and

persistence in addition to success can provide us important insights into a facet of
performance hitherto pushed to the background.
Second, making the important distinction that many start-ups neither achieve
successful outcomes for investors nor fail allows me to demonstrate asymmetry between
1

The scratch in the title refers to this expectation of achieving success through a lucrative sale when VC’s
and entrepreneurs unite. This success event is very much like a line or mark drawn as an indication of a
boundary or starting-point in sports such as cricket and boxing and from where the phrase ‘up to scratch’
originated in 19th century England.
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factors predicting success and failure. Asymmetric effects imply that a factor has the
equivalent directional effect on both success and failure, which is the opposite of what is
expected in a binary framing of performance outcomes. Current studies in
entrepreneurship and organization theory often treat either failure or success as binary
outcomes when analyzing new-venture performance (see Figure 1), thus implicitly
assuming symmetric effects between the two2. Consequently, results on failure inform us
about survival, that is, both persistence without liquidity events and success. Similarly,
results on success enlighten us on failure and persistence together. Analyzing success and
failure together therefore provides a useful empirical tool by exposing persistence and
enabling the examination of how a variety of factors influence these three outcomes.
Figure 1. Performance Outcomes of Start-ups
Non-Success
Persistence
Survival
Failure
Bankruptcy

Out of Business

Outcome
Success
Failure

Non-Success
Survival
‘Living
Dead'

2

Distressed Sale

‘Living Dead’

Success

Persistence > n years

IPO

Trade
Sale

Negation
Non-Success
Survival

Failure + Persistence
Persistence + Success
Persistence > n years

By symmetric effects I mean that if factor X increases the likelihood of success, its effect on failure will
just be the opposite. In a binary framing where success is equal to not failing, such symmetric effects hold.

3
Finally, current studies have not paid much attention to those firms that persist
without closure to investor expectations on harvest, the aforementioned middle-ground of
performance. By conceptually and empirically defining a third outcome that is highly
relevant to important stakeholders of new ventures, this dissertation tries to chart new
territory, explored sparsely till now due to the conceptual, methodological and statistical
difficulty of analyzing non-events such as persistence. By addressing these gaps, I
contribute to understanding high-tech start-up performance as a phenomenon while also
developing theoretical arguments that have broader consequence.
To explain the lack of success in new ventures I draw from two distinct streams of
literature: intellectual property rights (IPR) strategy emerging from the broader
technology strategy literature, and imprinting effects of founding teams originating in
Stinchcombe’s (1965) seminal work. The knot that ties these disparate bodies of work in
this dissertation is their use as signals of quality (Podolny, 2005; Spence, 1973) to
overcome classic adversities such as asymmetric information (Akerlof, 1970) and the
liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965). Accumulated IPR, technology breadth as
discovered by peers and prior experience and composition of founding team members are
powerful signals that new ventures and their evaluators take advantage of as proxies for
underlying quality. An important contribution of this study is to shed light on the
unintended consequences these signals create besides the putative benefits underscored in
the current literature.
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New Venture Performance – Literature Review
Performance is a central concept in management. As the role of the manager is to
plan, coordinate and appraise, any assessment needs some measure of performance
(Chandler, 1962). Scholars in entrepreneurship, organization theory and strategy have
extensively used performance as a key dependent variable in their research. Despite an
impressive body of research reviewed briefly below, significant gaps in the understanding
of new venture performance remain. First, there are relatively few studies on new firm
performance and most of them model success or survival as a binary outcome. Research
would be well served by recognizing and modeling the asymmetry that underlies different
performance mechanisms. Another important contribution would be to understand
survivors that persist in spite of unmet expectations. Second, while there are many studies
on intellectual property, they usually focus on cooperative strategies with incumbents and
knowledge flows in sectors characterized by high appropriability, namely the
biotechnology industry. They also do not explicitly model the direct effects on
performance, especially non-success. Third, an important source of imprinting, presence
of entrepreneurs or managers with prior startup experience at founding, and its impact on
performance has not been given much attention.
Within strategy both the Industrial Organization (IO) school, which links structure
and conduct (strategy) to performance (Caves, 1980; Caves & Porter, 1977; Porter,
1980), and the Resource Based View (RBV) / Dynamic Capabilities school, which
concerns achieving above normal rents from unique resources (Barney, 1991b;
Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Penrose, 1995; Peteraf, 1993; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997;
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Wernerfelt, 1984; Winter, 2003), embrace equilibrium and profit seeking assumptions
and use continuous financial measures such as return on assets, return on equity and
Tobin’s q to proxy performance. However, for new ventures such data is rarely available
such that use of firm survival and exit surface as the dominant measure of performance3
among the few studies about startups with this framing (Acs & Audretsch, 1989; Gilbert,
Audretsch, & McDougall, 2004; cf. Wetter, 2009).
Evolutionary theories, particularly population ecology and industry lifecycle
perspectives, have contributed extensively to understand the phenomenon of new firms at
an aggregate field level. Population ecology mainly deals with entry and exit of firms
with environmental and inertial forces shaping competition and selection in populations
of organizations (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Mortality rates as captured through failures
and acquisitions are the key events that are modeled to study survival within this body of
literature (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Baum & Oliver, 1996; Brüderl & Schüssler, 1990;
Carroll, Bigelow, Seidel, & Tsai, 1996; Delacroix & Carroll, 1983). Industry lifecycle
theories also look at entry and exit patterns of firms; however the fundamental
assumption is that knowledge as manifested in technology and technology cycles are the
drivers of performance which is again mainly survival as in population ecology
(Anderson & Tushman, 2001; Audretsch, 1991; Bayus & Agarwal, 2007; Christensen &
Bower, 1996; Dosi, 1982; Dowell & Swaminathan, 2006; Jovanovic & MacDonald,
1994; Klepper & Graddy, 1990; Nerkar & Shane, 2003; Shane, 2001b, 2001a; Suarez &
Utterback, 1995). The common thread in all the above research is causal symmetry with

3

Few non-US studies in this category use sales growth as a measure of performance apart from survival.
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survival a proxy for success, which is also prevalent in the literature specific to
entrepreneurship.
Apart from the application of these general theories in strategy and organization
theory, there is a long line of research in entrepreneurship which is germane to this
dissertation. Assembling resources, human, financial, and network, are critical for a
fledgling company. Literature on human resource assembly include studies on human
resource practices (Baron, Burton, & Hannan, 1996, 1999a; Baron, Hannan, & Burton,
1999b, 2001; Henderson & Cockburn, 1994) and mobility of knowledge workers
(Corredoira & Rosenkopf, 2010; Groysberg, Nanda, & Nohria, 2004; Marx, Strumsky, &
Fleming, 2009). While these studies have important implications for firm performance
they don’t directly theorize about those outcomes.
The focal point in the literature on financial resources of start-ups emphasizes the
extra-financial role of venture capitalists (VCs) (Gompers & Lerner, 2004; Hellman &
Puri, 2000; Hellmann & Puri, 2002; Hsu, 2006b). While a stream of research originating
in finance has drawn attention to the use of stringent contracts to screen entrepreneurial
firms (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2004), another grounded in sociological theories has
emphasized the importance of endorsements as signals of quality and legitimacy (Gulati
& Higgins, 2003; Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999).

Hsu

(2004) also suggests that these certifications have associated costs, finding that
entrepreneurs may willingly forego offers with higher valuation to affiliate with more
reputed VC’s. Other studies in this tradition have underscored the importance of network
resources on startup performance (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000b; Baum &
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Silverman, 2004; Brüderl, Preisendörfer, & Ziegler, 1992; Lee, Lee, & Pennings, 2001;
Stuart et al., 1999) with a focus primarily on success or survival.
Another fruitful avenue of research on new venture origins has been on a startup’s
initial technological endowment. A stream of literature in this vein exploits the variation
in initial stock of knowledge to examine its impact on organizational behavior (Beckman,
2006; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). A second stream focuses on the local nature of
search for knowledge and the mechanisms used to overcome the barrier (Hsu & Lim,
2008; Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Rosenkopf &
Almeida, 2003; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). A third stream following Cohen and
Levinthal (1990) investigates effects of knowledge spillover due to imperfect nature of
appropriablity (Breschi, Malerba, & Orsenigo, 2000; Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 1990;
Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & Henderson, 1993; Zucker, Darby, & Armstrong, 1998). Finally an
extensive literature exists on intellectual property, especially licensing by startups and the
benefits to both owners and licensees (Arora, Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2004; Gans, Hsu,
& Stern, 2002b; Nerkar & Shane, 2003; Rothaermel & Thursby, 2005; Shane, 2002;
Shane & Stuart, 2002). A number of these studies are either based on the biotechnology
sector, where patenting is the most important source of value appropriation, or
investigates university based entrepreneurship.
Stinchcombe’s (1965) analysis of organizational forms pointed to the salience of
initial imprinting for the structure of an organization. Following this seminal piece
scholars have investigated the prehistory of startups, especially the effect of established
firms through spin-offs and prior experience (Boeker, 1989; Boeker & Karichalil, 2002;
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Hannan, Burton, & Baron, 1996; Romanelli, 1989). Although mostly focused on the
motivations of entrepreneurs to enter an industry and on transfer of “genetic” materials
from established firms (Agarwal, Sarkar, & Echamebadi, 2002; Bhide, 1994; Burton,
Sorensen, & Beckman, 2002; Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, Scharfstein, & Field, 2006;
Phillips, 2002), a few studies highlight impact on performance through the distinction
between de-novo and de-alio entrants (Klepper, 2002; Klepper & Simons, 2000). While
Hsu (2007) finds that “serial entrepreneurs” help in speeding up financing and lower
valuation received, the impact of serial entrepreneurs or founding executives, through the
lens of imprinting, on performance is not explicitly investigated in the literature.
Signaling & Entrepreneurial Outcomes – Literature Review
Undertaking entrepreneurial venture requires mobilizing resources from scratch
and is laden with uncertainty and unforeseen hazards (Stinchcombe, 1965). Start-ups
need to attract financing, employees and partners. Thus external resource providers have
to evaluate the quality of new ventures under considerable uncertainty across different
criteria such as technology characteristic and economic viability. Furthermore, that
quality is unknown ex-ante with considerable doubts about the venture’s intrinsic value
both at founding and through their infancy to adolescence (Brüderl & Schüssler, 1990).
Besides, the information available to the start-up and evaluators are not distributed
equally, not unlike the knowledge available to sellers and buyers of used cars in
Akerlof’s (1970) famous example of market for lemons. This information asymmetry can
drive high quality firms out of the markets unless the new venture can signal their
underlying quality to forestall this market failure. Thus mechanisms to signal start-up
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quality to overcome information asymmetry using different indicators have received a lot
of attention in the entrepreneurship literature. We can classify this literature into two
complementary streams, one grounded in economics and the other in sociology. In the
following paragraphs I elaborate on the two perspectives and demonstrate their
usefulness in this dissertation.
The economic perspective, exemplified by Hsu & Ziedonis (2008), is grounded in
Spence’s (1973) seminal piece on job market signaling. Analyzing the market for hiring
employees, Spence defines signals as observable, unalterable characteristics attached to a
jobseeking individual that can be manipulated by him. Using observable characteristics
such as education as an indicator of productive capability, prospective employers can sort
different applicants when making their hiring decision. The critical assumption is that
costs to the individual to obtain the indicator are negatively correlated with productive
capability. This concept of signal has been widely used in the economics and finance
literature. Some notable examples germane to this dissertation include, Leland & Pyle
(1977) examining insider information signals as manifested through investments by
entrepreneurs, Megginson & Weiss (1991) demonstrating the positive effect of VC
certification on IPO outcomes, and Hsu & Ziedonis (2008) using patents as signals of
technological capability.
The sociological perspective, exemplified by Stuart et al., (1999), draws on the
work by Podolny (2005) on status as signal of quality under uncertainty. Podolny argues
that third party deference and association serve as useful indicators of underlying quality
because high status partners may be subject to status leakage and have the incentive to
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associate with higher status alters. Building on this insight Stuart et al., (1999) show that
characteristics of affiliates in inter-organizational exchange relationship are important
indicators of underlying quality. Nascent firms that have been evaluated by prominent
players send positive signals of their quality that increase the likelihood of IPO.
In this dissertation I examine both types of signals with the view that resource
providers evaluate distinct aspects of quality with different indicators. First, patents, as
argued by Hsu & Ziedonis (2008), closely adhere to the Spencian definition of signal, and
provide information on the technological capabilities of the new venture. Further, besides
solving the information asymmetry problem, patents are also an attempt to solve what has
been termed as Arrow’s information paradox (Arrow, 1962). This paradox states that
products with strong information content such as a technology require a potential
purchaser to know the technology and its working in sufficient detail to understand its
capabilities and make the decision. Unfortunately, disseminating that knowledge reduces
its value thus resulting in market failure. Patent protection avoids such market failures.
However, patent enforcement is imperfect, especially in weak appropriability regimes
leading to unintended hazards from such disclosures (Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2000).
Start-ups signaling their capabilities to investors due to such imperfections cannot
exclude competitors from accessing the information disclosed while signaling thus
exposing them to hazards such as designing around inventions.
Second, in the spirit of relational signals (Podolny, 2005; Stuart et al., 1999) I
introduce a second signal based on technological capabilities, the possible opportunity set
available to the start-up. Instead of using the prominence or status of the partner, I use the
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technological domains associated with the partners’ inventions as an indicator of the
applicability of a start-ups inventions to different technological areas. These domains
may be scattered or clustered and by implication, become very informative to the
entrepreneurs and outsiders alike since the applicability of technology is often unknown
ex ante (Basalla, 1988). Further, the specificity of a technology and the magnitude of its
diffusion indicate diminishing opportunities for strategic differentiation and could inform
about a venture’s “permanent failure” (Meyer & Zucker, 1989).
Finally, I examine founding team characteristics as signals. Prior experiences of
founders are endowments disclosing information on the start-ups’ entrepreneurial,
managerial and industry related capabilities. This signal also conforms to the definition
laid down by Spence (1973). While signals related to human capital and demography
have been widely studied in the organization, strategy and economics literature (Baker,
1992; Baron et al., 1996; Baron et al., 2001; Beckman, 2006; Beckman & Burton, 2008;
Beckman, Burton, & O'Reilly, 2007; Crutchley, Garner, & Marshall, 2002; Higgins &
Gulati, 2006; Loderer & Sheehan, 1989; Pennings & Wezel, 2010; Zhang & Wiersema,
2009), there are few studies examining serial entrepreneurship (Gompers et al., 2006) and
marginal performance (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 1997). I therefore focus on prior
founding experience of teams as an indicator of entrepreneurial capability and their effect
on marginal performance. Besides teams at founding I investigate loss of members in
those teams as a signal of underlying changes in shareholder expectations.
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Dissertation Outline
My dissertation comprises three papers probing into entrepreneurial performance
and indicators of a start-up’s quality. On the one hand, I differentiate the new venture’s
outcome much further than mere failure or its opposite, by defining a transitory realm
between success and failure, which I label “living dead.” On the other hand, while the
venture’s quality is deemed essential for performance, quality is typically unobserved and
surrounded by uncertainty. Therefore, I examine three ways through which entrepreneurs
signal quality to external resource providers such as VCs: (1) intellectual property rights
(patents), (2) the breadth of the venture’s technological domain and (3) initial capabilities
endowment as revealed by the founders’ experience. The three papers that correspond to
these three signals of quality provide fresh insights in to a startup’s performance,
including unintended negative consequences of using these signals that might lead to
neither success nor failure.
Quality is regarded as multi-dimensional and hence a repertoire of signal is
available to evaluators based on the dimension of quality under scrutiny. My concept of
signal of quality is broad in that the signals examined encompass both endowments of the
firm as well as its position with respect to others. In the former case, the signals strictly
adhere to the definition espoused by Spence (1973). Patents and founding team
characteristics are indicators that are partly manipulable by the actor and the difficulty of
obtaining these indicators are inversely correlated to the firm’s quality level in the aspect
being evaluated.

In the latter case, signals are more akin to the relational concept

invoked by Podolny (2005) to conceptualize status as a quality signal. Technology
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breadth is therefore a signal similar, in the relational aspect, to status. However, it also
satisfies the two criteria laid down by Spence. Therefore, the three indicators used in this
dissertation are argued to represent signals of underlying quality under uncertainty for
three different aspects: 1) technology capabilities, 2) technology opportunity set, and 3)
start-up viability.
I start by analyzing failure due to concomitant risks of disclosure arising in
conjunction with the role of patents as signals.

In the next essay, I explore the

phenomenon of persistence without liquidity events. To do so, I examine the effects of
another patent related signal (technology breadth as revealed over time) on failure and
success simultaneously.

Finally, the third essay investigates persistence directly by

analyzing the effects of another key signal, founding team characteristics, on a new
venture’s likelihood to persist without harvest or dissolution (‘living dead’).
Chapter 2: Unintended Hazards of Signaling: Patenting and Start-up Failure

High-technology new ventures employ patents to overcome adverse selection,
signaling their underlying quality in the presence of uncertainty and information gap
between them and investors (Hsu & Ziedonis, 2008). Hsu & Ziedonis (2008) argue that
patents closely resemble Spence’s (1973) original conceptualization of signals; they are
costly to obtain and provide a mechanism to identify and sort a start-up’s innovative
capability. Furthermore, they show the benefits of signaling through increased chances of
VC financing and higher IPO possibility. I build on their work to expose the possible
hazards of patenting. Disclosure via patents provides information no only to investors but
also to rivals. I contend that patents provide information about the technological position
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of the new venture along with proprietary knowledge that invite designing around and
litigation threats as other firms use these inventions as building blocks of their own R&D
program.
I test these assertions using all US wireless start-ups funded by venture capital
between 1990 and 2009. I find that the failure rate of these firms increases as a function
of the prior-art citations that their patents receive prior to failure. I further probe the
mechanisms by examining the reputation of litigation of the firms that acknowledge the
focal start-up’s patents in their own inventions. Prior-art citations received from firms
that have a reputation to enforce their intellectual property by initiating litigation are
found to increase failure rates. Assuming that this reputation indicates a propensity of the
citing firm to compete fiercely, resorting to designing around or even litigation, I
conclude that patent disclosure erodes the benefits of secrecy and harms the prospects of
a new venture.
The findings of this chapter contribute to the literature in the following ways.
First, it highlights a counterintuitive mechanism of failure due to threats of designing
around and litigation. Receiving citations to one’s patents is usually deemed beneficial,
providing licensing opportunity or implying deference. However, this view in the current
literature may not be universally true as the results in this essay show; the benefits are
eroded especially when contentious firms use the inventions. Second, I conceptually
separate the stock (i.e., the endowment) and flow (i.e., the recent information) of the
patents that a start-up receives. In this setting, the signaling benefits hold for the recent
information (flow) while the knowledge stock translates to increased failure rate, again
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providing evidence of the hazards of disclosure. Finally, from a managerial point of view,
this essay reinforces the significance of secrecy as well as technology conformity in
settings akin to the wireless sector.
Chapter 3: A Glimpse at Persistence without Liquidity Events: Asymmetric Effects on

Success and Failure
Findings in Chapter 2 show significant hazards to patent disclosure through its
effect on failure. Disclosing one’s inventions also provides additional information on the
breadth of domains to which the patents are applicable, as revealed by their use by thirdparties over time (Hall & Trajtenberg, 2004). Conceptualizing technology breadth as a
signal of quality, I investigate its effect on success and failure simultaneously. Most of
the research on new venture performance either analyzes failure or success. The framing
is usually binary and symmetric with failure informing about survival and success
focusing only on the likelihood of an IPO. By categorizing entrepreneurial performance
consequences into success, failure and the continuum of non-events in between (see
Figure 1) and examining the effects of the same factor on success and failure
simultaneously, I am able to discover systematic, asymmetric forces that cause
persistence.
I theorize that a signal of high technology breadth, conveying the presence of an
underlying general purpose technology, is beneficial for survival; however it does not
inform us much about success. To achieve success start-ups have to surmount two
significant challenges: 1) Rent dissipation due to knowledge diffusion that comes with
patent disclosure, and 2) commercialization of the technology through collaborations in a
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high growth market. I theorize that possessing a very specific technology (i.e., low
technology breadth) while at the same time experiencing high knowledge spillover, as
captured through citations received, increase survival chances; however, it also reduces
success probability due to the limited growth possibilities of such technologies when
compared to general technologies that can potentially be applied to many markets. I also
hypothesize that a collaboration strategy that involves partners from diverse markets
benefits both survival and success when the venture is endowed with a general
technology (i.e., high technology breadth).
I test the theory in a sub-sample of VC-backed US wireless firms that patent their
technology during the years 1990-2009. Findings suggest strong asymmetry in the effects
on success and failure. Firms whose inventions signal specific (rather than general)
technology and at the same time are highly cited as prior art, demonstrate a propensity to
persist, i.e., survive without liquidity or liquidation events. Other systematic forces that
inhibit both success (i.e., harvest possibilities) and failures are also uncovered. For
example, longer gestation periods as measured through the time taken to receive first
round of venture financing increases the likelihood of persistence, indicating inertia due
to established routines and capabilities that help survival but impede harvest. In addition,
alliance rate of start-ups have asymmetric effects on the two outcomes, i.e., it decreases
failure as well as success, perhaps indicating the substitutability of alliance with
acquisition.
The major contribution of this essay is to provide an empirical tool to reveal
persistence. It provides compelling evidence on systematic forces that inhibit success and
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failure at the same time, leading us to the ‘living dead’ firms, the focus of Chapter 4.
Other contributions include the usefulness of technology breadth as a signal of quality
and some empirical clarification on patent citations as measures of knowledge diffusion,
deference and competition (Jaffe et al., 1993; Podolny & Stuart, 1995; Podolny, Stuart, &
Hannan, 1996).
Chapter 4: Neither Success nor Failure: Effects of Founding team Imprinting and

Subsequent Disruption on the ‘Living Dead’ Outcome
In Chapter 3, I uncovered the presence of systematic forces that drive start-ups to
persist. A subset of such firms, identified in the literature and practice as ‘living dead’
firms, is the subject of the third essay. ‘Living dead’ firms are marginal performers,
between the two extremes of success and failure, who experience no liquidity events for
“extended” periods of time, i.e., much beyond putative expectations (see Figure 1).
Following clues from the existing literature on the phenomenon I investigate the effect of
still another set of signals of quality—founding team characteristics. I hypothesize
beneficial effects of founders’ prior experience as entrepreneurs, predicting a lower
likelihood of entering this transitory state of ‘living dead.’ Founding team comprising
two members are speculated to indicate an inability to manage the paradoxical needs of
fast but rigorous and consensual decision making that set successful firms apart from
‘living dead’ firms (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1987). I further argue that turnovers in
founding team with entrepreneurial experience, whether voluntary or imposed, is a shock
that increases the odds of the new firm experiencing the transitory state of ‘living dead’
due to loss of high-level routines and capabilities or aggravating an already bad situation.
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I test the theory using a matched case-control approach on the same population of
US wireless ventures as in Chapter 2. A case-control approach is called for because cases
are identified using the dependent variable. These cases are matched to similar firms
from a control group that includes successful and failed firms. Results indicate that prior
entrepreneurial experience, a signal of quality that is frequently used by investors,
decreases the likelihood of ending up as a ‘living dead’ firm. The odds of finding a team
with two founders are indeed higher in ‘living dead’ firms when compared to successful
firms, probably signifying two leadership foci or decision making deadlocks that increase
coordination costs. Finally, the odds of ending up as a ‘living dead’ are highly increased
when founding teams with previous start-up experience lose members.
This study contributes to the understanding of marginally performing new
ventures. It conceptually defines ‘living dead’ as a transitory state when persistence lasts
beyond a threshold defined by industry expectations on time to exit and investment
horizons of venture capitalists. Theoretically, it helps understand underlying mechanisms
involving founding team characteristics as signals of venture quality. Having
entrepreneurs with previous founding experience suggests the presence of higher-order
start-up related routines and capabilities acquired through founding multiple ventures that
help decrease the chances of persistence and increases the chances of dissolution. On
practical insights, the findings suggest that teams with habitual entrepreneurs present a
good bet if closure on investments through liquidity or liquidation events is desired. In
addition, they suggest that VC interventions to team composition can be
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counterproductive, especially when founding teams are endowed with entrepreneurial
experience.
Empirical Setting and Data
This dissertation is set in the wireless industry which presents three conditions
that are especially suitable to test the theories developed in the three essays. First, it is
characterized by a weak appropriability regime. Therefore it provides a contrasting
setting, where unanticipated costs of disclosing one’s proprietary information are
significantly higher. Second, this sector has witnessed rapid technological changes
managed by large generalist incumbents typically over a ten-year period. Niche
partitioning along the periphery of the core technology markets presented entrepreneurial
opportunities that spurred VC investments over the past two decades. Finally, the product
cycles are short enough to provide start-ups with growth and “harvest” opportunities. In
fact the average time to produce such exits in the population of start-ups is less than six
years. Therefore, wireless provides a novel setting that contrasts with the biotechnology
setting, which has been a major focus in much of extant research on start-ups and is
characterized by a strong appropriability regime and long product development cycles.
Using VentureXpert (Thomson Financial) as the primary source of information on
VC funding, I assembled a rich longitudinal dataset on 428 VC-backed wireless firms
based in the US and founded between 1990 and 2009. Patent data were sourced from
Derwent and the USPTO, while the Intellectual Property Litigation Clearinghouse (IPLC)
database (also called Lex Machina) provided all intellectual property related litigations in
the US. Alliance data was collected using three sources, SDC Platinum, Factiva, and the
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websites

of

start-ups

accessed

through

the

Wayback

machine

(http://web.archive.org). Product market related data came from Compustat, Hoovers,
Corptech and Orbis. Mergers & Acquisitions and IPO events were obtained from SDC
Platinum and Zephyr. Finally, historical information on management teams and changes
in them was gathered using the Wayback machine and executive search websites such as
LinkedIn and ZoomInfo.
Scope and Limitations
The scope of concepts and theory developed are defined by three important
factors. First, the performance concepts are specific to the VC context. As such they do
not apply to new ventures founded with objectives other than high-growth and eventual
sale. Parallels could be drawn to other settings, however, where organizations persist in
spite of unmet expectations of key stakeholders4. Second, Chapters 2 and 3 pertain
mostly to high technology firms in environments where patent-seeking is prevalent. In
contexts that discourage patenting, our findings may not be applicable. However, the
general signaling mechanisms involved with disclosing proprietary knowledge might still
hold. Finally, the conceptualization of marginal performance is driven by a lack of
accounting related financial data, quite common with new ventures and more generally
with private firms. In situations where data on sales, revenues and profits are available a
more appropriate definition of marginal performance using their distribution would make
sense.

4

Examples include family-owned firms with mixed ownership, banks that are funded from institutional
source rather than capital markets, and many non-profit organizations such as educational institutions.

21
In the following chapters I elaborate on the essays outlined above and finally
conclude with a chapter that integrates the findings and provides a road-map for future
research opportunities arising from this dissertation.
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Chapter 2:

Unintended Hazards of Signaling: Patenting and Start-up Failure

‘Intellectual property portfolios are the lifeblood of many wireless
tech firms. But patent disputes can cost millions of dollars to
defend and take years to resolve.’5
New ventures face significant challenges when securing resources (Stinchcombe,
1965). They have neither an established track record nor tangible assets. But while they
possess more information about their technology, products, and people than their
potential investors, customers, and employees, they lack the incentives to reveal their true
quality because of risks of increased competition and imitation (Amit, Brander, & Zott,
1998; Shane & Cable, 2002; Shane & Stuart, 2002; Stuart et al., 1999). The asymmetric
difference in available information between new ventures and potential external
stakeholders may lead to adverse selection and market failure. The effects of this
information asymmetry have been well-described by Akerlof (1970) in the ‘market for
lemons,’ where uncertainty regarding underlying quality drives superior products out of
the market.
Prior studies have investigated a variety of signaling mechanisms to bridge this
information gap, including founders’ demographic backgrounds (Burton et al., 2002;
Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990), endorsements by reputable third parties (Baron et al.,
1999b; Fitza, Matusik, & Mosakowski, 2009; Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Hsu, 2004;
Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Stuart et al., 1999), and patents (Hsu & Ziedonis, 2008). For
example, Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1990) established the positive effects of
demographic factors such as founding team size, joint experience, and functional
Healing the Patent Process (cover story) by Sue Marek in Wireless Week, August 15,
2005, Vol. 11, Issue 17, pp. 6-7
5
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heterogeneity on growth in a sample of semiconductor firms. Other studies have
documented the effect of prior experience of founders in prominent companies resulting
in increased likelihood of VC funding (Burton et al., 2002), in financial success (Hsu,
2004), and in working with venture capitalists (Shane & Stuart, 2002). Researchers have
also found that endorsement by prestigious alliance partners in the biotechnology sector
boosts performance of start-ups (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000a; Stuart et al.,
1999).

Likewise, securing early round financing from a prominent VC with

representation on the venture’s board, increases the venture’s odds of survival (Hochberg,
Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2007), successful product development (Hellmann & Puri, 2002), and
higher IPO valuation (Gulati & Higgins, 2003). Finally, increased odds of IPO are
observed when start-ups have a large number of patent applications (Hsu & Ziedonis,
2008; Mann & Sager, 2007; Stuart et al., 1999).
While the literature has extensively covered the benefits of these signals, both for
entrepreneurial (Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Higgins & Gulati, 2006; Hsu & Ziedonis, 2008;
Stuart et al., 1999) and established firms (Arikan & Capron, 2010; Levitas & McFadyen,
2009; Zhang & Wiersema, 2009), their hazards have been largely ignored. Indeed, studies
to date have been slanted towards explaining successful outcomes such as raising finance,
achieving IPO, or getting acquired. We believe it is important to study failure in order to
avoid biases in learning that result from an over-abundance of success-centered
investigations (Denrell, 2003).
Start-ups utilize patents to signal their quality to current and potential resource
providers (Hsu & Ziedonis, 2008). The mere act of filing a patent inevitably results in
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simultaneous disclosure of proprietary knowledge to competitors. Hence, new firms must
manage the strong need to signal their worth to resource providers while at the same time
avoid revealing too much to competitors. Signaling is a double-edged sword with both
benefits and hazards. We specifically address some of these hazards in a setting where
patenting is fraught with dangers of value appropriation (Burgelman & Hitt, 2007).
We develop a simple framework to theorize about the benefits and hazards of
patenting. We argue that the annual count of patents granted to a start-up serves as signal
of underlying and possibly changing quality under uncertainty to resource providers such
as VC firms and thus positively affects their prospects of survival. However, patenting is
also harmful because it not only reveals information about inventions but also about the
technological position of a firm vis-à-vis its peers. It also exposes their technologies to
existing firms competing in the same arena. While the acknowledgement of inventions of
new ventures

by

other firms is potentially beneficial due to possible licensing

opportunities as well as implied deference legitimizing the start-ups activities, there is
also a downside, especially if done by firms with a history of initiating lawsuits
(Agarwal, Ganco, & Ziedonis, 2009). We assume that this history implies an underlying
propensity to compete aggressively, including designing around inventions.
We test our framework using the population of U.S. VC–funded wireless new
ventures founded in the period 1990-2009. Unlike discrete product industries such as
chemical and pharmaceuticals (Cohen et al., 2000), appropriating gains from patents in
the wireless industry is often challenging because of the complex nature of wireless
innovations that involve both products and processes. The threats of ‘inventing around’
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and patent litigations are much stronger in such contexts (Cohen et al., 2000), leading to
increased hazards to signaling using patents. Our setting is novel in that the majority of
prior research on entrepreneurial firms has been conducted on the biotechnology and
semiconductor industries, thus allowing us to triangulate some of these earlier findings in
a different context.
We contribute to the literature in the following ways. First, we conceptually
differentiate between the stock and the flow of patents and consider the episodic
disclosure—the flow—to be the relevant signal of quality. Arguably, the existing stock
of patents contains older inventions whose quality is less uncertain and which are less
relevant in assessing current innovation efforts. While benefits from the stock of patents
in raising finance, attracting prestigious investors, and achieving IPO are well established
(Hsu & Ziedonis, 2008), the marginal benefit of receiving an additional patent has not
been investigated. Therefore, we contend that recent patents carry more weight as signals
to resource providers such as VC firms. Second, we highlight failure, a vastly underresearched aspect of entrepreneurship. Extant entrepreneurship research has indirectly
studied failure by centering on survival. In this paper, we theorize directly about failure
rather than survival. Third, we provide a fresh perspective on the tension and strategic
balance between conformity and differentiation (Deephouse, 1999). Conformity is
evident through similarity in technological platforms as revealed by shared technologies,
while crowding through overlap in prior art challenges niche occupants to stand out. Last
and most important, we show that a patent’s forward citations, often conceptualized as
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‘deference’ with positive connotations, are harmful rather than beneficial to the owner of
the invention, especially if citations originate from contentious firms.
Finally, this paper has important managerial implications. First of all, our study
reinforces the importance of secrecy. Second, while the benefits of patents as signals
outweigh the costs, entrepreneurs must manage the dilemma of disclosure. Our research
shows that excessive patenting is counterproductive and entrepreneurs should be
judicious in selecting which of their valuable inventions to patent. Furthermore, they
should monitor not only on the acknowledgements their patents receive, but also on the
propensity of these acknowledging firms to litigate.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Benefits of using patents as signal of quality
‘Start-ups aggressively seek patent awards so that they can present
‘a bouquet of roses’ to existing or future investors to prove their
technological mettle.’6
The markets where start-ups acquire vital resources for survival and growth such
as financing are characterized by uncertainty and asymmetric information (Amit et al.,
1998; Gompers & Lerner, 2004). These markets very much resemble the ‘market for
lemons’ (Akerlof, 1970) as resource providers lack the ability to sort new ventures
according to their quality in the absence of established past performance or valuable
tangible assets, creating the problem of adverse selection. To overcome such adversity
and bridge this information gap, start-ups signal their quality to potential investors and
other resource providers.
6

The Relentless Pursuit of Patents. By Margo McCall, Wireless Week, October 14, 2002,
p. 20.
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Hsu and Ziedonis (2008) conceptualize patents as one of the many signals used by
new ventures and examine the relative efficacy of different signals across the life of a
new firm. In their semiconductor industry study, they show that the stock of patents
significantly determines venture valuations, ceteris paribus, and fosters the likelihood of
sourcing from a prominent VC in the first funding round. Their findings also highlight
sector-specific practices, because endorsements in their industry are not associated with
higher IPO probabilities, unlike the positive endorsement effects observed in
biotechnology (Stuart et al., 1999).

Like the wireless sector in this study, the

semiconductor sector exhibits an unfavorable appropriability regime where lead-times
and secrecy trump patenting as mechanisms for protecting and appropriating gains from
innovation. If the filing and granting of patents confers such positive signaling benefits in
the semiconductor setting, we should expect, likewise, patents to perform an important
signaling function in the wireless sector to attract new investors and convince existing
promoters of the firm’s viability. We go further, however, and ask whether there are
limits to these benefits.
Limits to the benefits of signaling: Stock versus flow
We build on Hsu and Ziedonis (2008), making the important distinction between
the stock and flow of patents in order to isolate endowment effects from signaling effects
respectively. In other words, a firm’s accumulation of patents during the course of its
history can be viewed as the aggregate or stock, while the current increment represents
the flow increasing that stock of knowledge. Using this distinction, we investigate the
marginal benefits of receiving an additional patent as signal. We contend that this
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periodic addition is a powerful signal to distinguish between novel and existing
information. Furthermore, this reasoning reinforces the relevance of recent over
temporally distant and potentially outdated information.
New information might reduce existing uncertainty about the quality of the focal
firm; however, since firms face the dilemma of revealing too much, the benefit of
additional signaling cannot be monotonically increasing. Thus, while stock (endowment)
is associated with positive outcomes, flow (signal) may be associated with decreasing
returns. In other words, the benefits of the signal might decrease with increasing number
of patents. Investors and other stakeholders update their evaluation of quality as start-ups
are granted more patents. Additional patents could be superfluous in contributing to
quality evaluation, if not counterproductive, in revealing the firm’s technology
endowment and ultimately its survival prospects. Resource providers might even interpret
excessive patenting as a smokescreen or as exploitation of technology rather than
innovation.
Therefore:
H1. The yearly flow of patents granted to a start-up has a curvilinear relationship
to its failure rate.
As highlighted above, existing literature has paid considerable attention to the
benefits of signaling without addressing its negative effects. Since the act of patenting not
only confers benefits but also exposes the start-up to costs or liabilities, we next
hypothesize about the harmful effects of disclosure through patenting. We argue that
start-ups are exposed to two kinds of hazards when they patent— 1) revealing their
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position in the technology arena, and 2) negative spillovers, especially designing around
and threats of litigation.
Hazards of using patents as signal of quality
In the following sections we analyze the two hazards that patenting entails. In
order to capture the hazards of revealing the start-ups technology position we theorize
about the new ventures location in two networks formed as they receive patents. First, the
network formed through similarity in technology functions, i.e., ties defined through
patents belonging to the same technology domains. Second, the network formed through
a start-up using other new firms’ inventions, a finer measure of similarity through shared
technological inputs.

Negative spillovers through disclosure are indirectly tracked

through the acknowledgement of the focal start-up’s inventions by other firms. Further,
the reputation of litigation of the firms citing the start-up’s patents is used tease out the
competitive mechanism of designing around.
Nonconformity in start-up technology space
Start-ups face ‘the liability of newness’ (Stinchcombe, 1965). Because of their
novelty and distinctiveness (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994), new ventures confront costs due to
the lack of both legitimacy (Low & Abrahamson, 1997) as well as external validation
(Stone & Brush, 1996). Start-ups that are considered legitimate get access to both firmspecific resource capital and institutional-level capital (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001).
Conformity gives access to institutional-level capital and comprises three components:
industry legitimacy, industry norms and rules, and industry infrastructure (Lounsbury &
Glynn, 2001; Oliver, 1997).
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Industry legitimacy refers to the degree to which the products and services offered
by a firm are accepted as appropriate and useful by the consumer (Hannan & Freeman,
1984; Scott, 1995; Suchman, 1995). Industry norms and rules demarcate the kinds of
economic behaviors that are socially appropriate (Scott, 1995). Industry infrastructure
encompasses the broader set of generalized industry resources, as well as market
opportunities that allow incumbents and entrants to develop and grow their businesses.
The hazards of nonconformity in our case refer to this third component, industry
infrastructure, specifically the broad technological activities that are considered
legitimate and incur diminished demand uncertainty. We use the concept of the industry’s
technology space to investigate that institutional-level capital.
Technology space comprises the arena where an organization invents and
develops new technologies (Pontikes, 2009). To capture the hazards of nonconformity,
we conceptualize the start-up’s technology space as the cumulative network formed
among new firms (nodes) through sharing general technology activities (ties), that is the
functional domains to which a patent is attached, over the course of the sector’s history
(here called the start-up technology activity network). We define the network ties at a
broad technology activity level and use a single cumulative network to define this space
because the pressures to conform to technologies sanctioned by the industry only unfold
over time, as new ventures with both legitimate and unsanctioned technologies enter the
technology space and build on each other’s inventions. As an analogy, we can compare
the start-up technology activity network to the trajectories of smaller planetary objects
such as asteroids, which are strongly influenced by the gravitational pulls of larger
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planets. Asteroids can orbit without being destroyed only in specific locations determined
by the forces exerted by larger planetary objects.
The context where this technology activity network evolves is marked by two
salient characteristics: managed standardization of technologies and their life cycles, and
control of complementary assets by incumbents. Industry incumbents control the
technology trajectory through managed evolution approximately over a ten-year cycle.
Powerful telecom vendors such as Nokia and Qualcomm and telecom carriers such as
Verizon and T-Mobile dominate standards bodies. Carriers also own the most important
complementary asset, access to customers with mobile devices, which drive demand.
This vice-like grip is further strengthened through the ownership by incumbent carriers of
critical scarce resources, frequency spectrum in this case (Sabat, 2002) and by high
investments in infrastructure. While carriers control that scarce resource and act as
gatekeepers to customers, vendors control the technology development by exploiting
established resources, capabilities, and market power (Leiponen, 2008).
The threats from powerful incumbents are multiplied when a start-up’s
technology deviates from established standards as they seek to maintain the status quo.
These factors are especially detrimental to small firms, which exhibit a particularly strong
need for access to the industry infrastructure. Therefore start-ups have a strong incentive
to innovate in technology domains that are sanctioned by the incumbents, placing them
along a core-periphery continuum. Firms attempting nonconforming innovations reside at
the periphery, while those which are technologically proximate to major incumbents or
congruent with their standards will occupy central positions. A space characterized by a
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core-periphery structure rewards start-ups that innovate in the core technologies of the
sector through access to complementary assets, increased legitimacy, and increased
demand.
Nonconformity to sanctioned technologies and standards, as denoted by the firm’s
peripheral position, could be fatal, as illustrated by the case of ComSpace Corp, a Texasbased company that received $26 million in equity financing from such prestigious
sources as Sevin Rosen Funds and Noro-Moseley Partners. ComSpace owned about 20
patents on a technology that allowed an eightfold amount of traffic to be carried over
existing radio channels. Called Digital Multicarrier Architecture—DCMA for short—the
technology also handled data, meaning it could be used for wireless access of the
Internet, short-text messaging, e-mail, and video. However, DCMA, despite sharing a
nearly identical acronym with Code Division Multiplex Access (CDMA), one of the core
technologies standardized by industry incumbents, quickly vanished from the sector
because it did not conform to existing industry standards and thus could not access the
markets controlled by incumbent carriers.
Hence, the second hypothesis:
H2. The closer to the core of the start-up technology activity network a firm is, the
lower its failure rate.
Having reviewed the similarity of start-ups at the broad technology-activity level
to hypothesize about their need for legitimacy, we next consider the pressures to ‘stand
out’ in order to compete in the technology space, consistent with previous research on
strategic balance between conformity and differentiation (Deephouse, 1999; Porac,
Thomas, & Baden-Fuller, 1989).
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Competitive crowding in the start-up technology space
Similarity (or difference) among firms is an important issue both in strategic
management and organization theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Hannan & Freeman,
1977; Porter, 1980; Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1994). By being similar, a firm gains
legitimacy benefits (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978; Suchman, 1995), while by being different, it can build a competitive
advantage (Barney, 1991a; Baum & Mezias, 1992; Porter, 1991). Scholars have pointed
out the need to balance these conflicting requirements, showing the benefits of moderate
levels of similarity in the market space demonstrated by Deephouse (1999) in his study of
U.S. banks. By recasting the technology space at a more granular level of resolution, we
parse the location of new entrants in terms of their technological distinctiveness.
Whereas the start-up technology activity network defined above is an attempt to
infer conformity pressures, shifting the network tie to a more fine-grained level through
the actual inventions on which new firms build their patents, that is, backward citations,
can be viewed as an attempt to infer differentiation amongst start-ups. We therefore
define another time-evolving technological network using patent citations (here called the
start-up technology citation network) to capture this strategic imperative to stand apart
amid competition
Podolny, Stuart, and Hannan (1996) define organizational niche in terms of
technological ties among firms, where a tie forms a link between an antecedent and
consequent invention between two organizations. The tie reflects the points of contact in
research and development between them. We capture the competitive crowding that a
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firm faces consistent with this concept of niche overlap (Podolny et al., 1996). Niche
overlap entails the common dependence of two organizations on a finite resource, in our
case the set of prior inventions that have already been disclosed. These overlaps are
asymmetric and greater the dependence, the stronger the competitive effect of one firm
over the other. That is, one firm’s pursuit of technology possibilities (specific inventions
it owns that become antecedents to others’ inventions) affects the ability of the other
organization to pursue its opportunities. Greater niche overlap implies similarity and even
redundancy in technological efforts. Consequently, the market opportunities of an entryseeking firm are inversely proportional to the extent of its overlap with all other entrants,
all else equal.
Technological crowding around a focal new firm (a node in the network) is the
aggregate of all its niche overlaps with all other start-ups. Crowded technology areas
often imply continuous duplication of effort as undifferentiated firms invest in
development of closely related technologies (Stuart, 1998). The implication of similarity
and even redundancy in technological sourcing implies increased probability of failure
given similar demand on the output side. We therefore posit our third hypothesis:
H3. The greater the technological crowding of a firm in the start-up technology
citation network, the higher its failure rate.
We now transition our theorizing from the start-up technology activity and startup technology citation networks—collectively the start-up technology space—to the
technology space that comprises both start-ups and other established firms in the sector,
broadly defined. We theorize about the hazards to start-ups as they disclose their newly
developed technology and as other firms build on these inventions.
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Disclosure: Negative spillovers and litigation reputation
The effectiveness of patent protection varies across industries. In their survey of
R&D managers, Cohen et al. (2000) highlighted the perils of patenting, including the
difficulty in demonstrating an invention’s novelty, the risk of disclosing too much
information in a patent, the cost of applying, the cost of defending a patent in court, and
the ease of legally inventing around a patent for competitors. The most common reasons
given for not filing a patent were ease of inventing around it and concerns over
disclosure. Smaller firms were also dissuaded from patenting by the cost of litigation.
Cohen et al. (2000) distinguish between ‘discrete’ and ‘complex’ product
industries. Complex product industries are those where products and processes are
protected by numerous patents (for example, computers and communications equipment).
Discrete product industries are those where a product is typically protected by relatively
few patents (for example, drugs and chemicals). Discrete product industries, compared to
complex ones, enjoy far more favorable appropriability conditions. The wireless
telecommunication industry, with mostly complex products is known for the preferential
use of secrecy and rapid time-to-market over patents (Bekkers, Duysters, & Verspagen,
2002; Bekkers & West, 2009; Leiponen, 2008). Patenting as a signal has unwanted side
effects, including harmful spillovers and imitation, not to mention the threat of litigation,
as captured by the opening quote of this paper.
The hazards of disclosure and negative spillovers for a focal firm cannot be
directly observed. However, other firms that build on the start-up’s inventions can be
tracked using prior-art citations (forward citations) received by the focal firm’s patents.
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Further, we can characterize the behavior of these citing firms in enforcing their patents
through litigations. For example, extant research finds that firms which aggressively
protect their intellectual property build a reputation that deters employees who move to
other companies from disclosing valuable knowledge (Agarwal et al., 2009). We
therefore combine forward citations with the litigation reputation of those firms that
acknowledge the R&D output of the start-up to conjecture about the hazards of
disclosure.
Forward citations have been conceptualized by researchers in a number of ways.
The cumulative forward citations received over time are often imputed as a patent’s
value. (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2005). Moreover, forward citations have been used as
paper trail for knowledge spillover (Jaffe et al., 1993) and as indicators of likelihood of
patent litigation (Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2001). As flows, they have been construed
as direct ties between organizations revealing the reliance on the focal invention for the
citing firm’s proprietary research (Podolny & Stuart, 1995; Podolny et al., 1996; Stuart &
Podolny, 1996). Forward citations as direct ties have been conventionally interpreted as
‘deference’ or respect to the cited firm’s contributions (Podolny & Stuart, 1995; Podolny
et al., 1996; Stuart, 1998). While acknowledging that such direct ties could harm the
firm’s prospects because they signal increased competition resulting from similarity of
inventions, existing literature has mostly shown the benefits of forward cites, both with or
without considering the status of the firm that expresses implied deference (Podolny et
al., 1996; Stuart, 1998; Stuart et al., 1999). The net effect of the forward citation as a
direct tie on average remains an empirical question. We therefore, examine the firms
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citing the start-up’s patents and their litigiousness to hypothesize about negative
spillovers.
Given that entrepreneurial firms are typically small, fledgling organizations, and
therefore extremely vulnerable to the litigious threats of large incumbents, we further
extend the hypothesized argument by considering the patent litigation record of firms that
build on their inventions. We distinguish between the reputation to initiate lawsuits and to
receive them. We contend that a firm competes aggressively if on average it initiates
more litigations than it receives. In other words, these firms actively enforce their
intellectual property rather than just defend. We argue that such firms display a higher
propensity to aggressively contest start-ups that encroach into their technology niche.
Instead of expressing deference, we contend that these competitors may choose to invent
around and leverage their reputation as tough litigators. Such a threat may be a powerful
deterrent to small firms as litigations are costly, undesirable, if not outright hazardous
(Koen, 1991; Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2004; Lerner, 1995). Ceteris paribus, the more
litigious the firm that builds on the start-up’s patents, the lower the survival prospects of
the start-up. Thus:
H4. The greater the reputation of enforcing patent litigations of forward-citing
firms, the higher the start-up’s failure rate.
EMPIRICAL SETTING AND METHODOLOGY
Industry Context
Our study is based in the wireless sector during the period 1990-2009. We
selected this context because wireless is a ‘complex product’ industry with both product
and process innovation, which results in a stronger concern regarding the hazards of
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patenting (He, Lim, & Wong, 2006). Further, access to complementary assets such as
manufacturing capability, distribution, branding, and marketing is of paramount
importance in this setting (He et al., 2006; Teece, 2006).

During the period of

investigation, the sector is marked by successive generations of standards-based
technologies, starting with the second-generation (2G) voice-based technologies and
followed by the data-oriented third-generation and fourth-generation (3G & 4G)
technologies (Ansari & Garud, 2009).
The wireless sector exhibits a very complex ‘ecosystem’ with a variety of players,
as illustrated in Figure 2 (Camponovo & Pigneur, 2003). This implies that the industry
cannot be conceived using a simple SIC code classification. This vertically disaggregated
industry ‘value network’ is dominated by firms that are vendors of equipment and
handsets (for example, Nokia, Ericsson, Apple, Qualcomm, Samsung, and Motorola) and
network operators (or carriers) (for example, T-Mobile, Verizon, and Vodafone) through
control of important complementary assets. Costly infrastructure and technologies
together with ownership of important complementary assets exert strong conformity
pressures on new entrants seeking a foothold. For example, a start-up with a novel
antenna technology that improves the capacity of mobile networks needs to be
compatible with the incumbent technologies already deployed. Without conforming to
prevailing technology standards, new firms can neither license nor implement their
innovations. Further, the evolution of the wireless sector is marked with several instances
of challenges to existing standards – for example, Wi-Fi (Christensen & Raynor, 2003)
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and more recently WiMax (Teece & Pisano, 2007) as substitutes for third generation (3G)
technologies, that have so far succumbed to conformity pressures.
Figure 2. Wireless Actors Map
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The influence of powerful incumbents, however, has not been a deterrent to
venture capital funding. High growth potential and a variety of opportunities resulting
from deregulation and technological discontinuities have spurred entrepreneurial activity.
New firms not only introduced new wireless technologies such as Wi-Fi, WiMax,
Bluetooth, ultra-wideband (UWB), ZigBee, global positioning system (GPS), and radiofrequency identification (RFID), but have also spawned new software, applications, and
content. The gradual shift in emphasis from voice to data has also been a key determinant
in opening up these opportunities. For example, push e-mail (popularized by Research in
Motion [RIM] through its Blackberry device and service) has diffused widely as wireless
data technologies have increased in speed, creating opportunities in smart-phone devices,
service management, servers, software applications, and peripherals.
Data and Sample
We test our hypotheses using the population of all VC-funded firms in the U.S.
wireless sector that were founded between the years 1990 and 2009. We include those
new firms that received at least one round of early-stage VC funding, consistent with our
earlier discussion regarding the problem of information asymmetry (Gompers, 1995).
Firms that seek venture capital must signal their quality, making the use of secrecy
difficult. We limit ourselves to U.S.-based ventures for three reasons. First, the majority
of the start-up activity was concentrated in the United States (53% of all start-ups,
compared to 9% in Sweden, the next ranking country). Second, the venture capital
segment of private equity is more developed in the United States, both in numbers and in
terms of well-established practices that encourage entrepreneurs to choose this financing

41
route over alternatives (Jeng & Wells, 2000). Third, it allows us to hold constant
idiosyncratic country-level factors including government subsidies and political risk,
among others. Although we confine the start-up sample to U.S. firms, we investigate their
inventions in the global technological environment.
Our sample consists of 428 firms as documented by VentureXpert, the leading
source of information about venture capital from Thomson Research, commonly viewed
as the most comprehensive and widely used database for research on venture-funded
companies (Kaplan & Schoar, 2005). We classify start-ups as wireless firms using the
Venture Economics Industry Classification (VEIC) (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005) system
of Thomson. We consider new ventures assigned to primary VEIC codes in the range of
1300 to 1399 as wireless firms. We supplement these codes with Standard Industry
Classification (SIC) codes from SDC Platinum, Hoovers, Orbis, and CorpTech.
A major source of data on the sampled firms’ patents is Derwent, a database of
global patents maintained by Thomson since 1969 and frequently used in strategic
management research (Eggers, 2008; Henderson & Cockburn, 1994).

The Derwent

database provided higher coverage for our sample of firms because of its global reach.
Since wireless is a global industry, firms also seek intellectual property protection outside
the United States, thus making Derwent a better choice for our inquiry.
We collected patent litigation data using the Intellectual Property Litigation
Clearinghouse (IPLC) database (also called Lex Machina) at Stanford University. It was
created by the Stanford Program in Law, Science and Technology to make intellectual
property litigation data more widely available. It covers all (1) patent infringement, (2)
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manifest copyright, (3) manifest trademark, (4) manifest antitrust, and (5) certain trade
secret lawsuits filed in the U.S. District Courts from January 1, 2000, to the present. We
obtained all patent-related cases involving our focal firms as well as firms that cite their
patents for the ten-year period available.
Data related to alliances were collected from three sources: SDC Platinum,
Factiva, and the historical Web sites of firms in our sample using the Wayback machine
(http://web.archive.org).7 For merger and acquisition and IPO information we relied on
SDC, Zephyr, Factiva, and Hoovers. Finally, COMPUSTAT was accessed for segment
data on publicly listed wireless firms.
Dependent Variable and Estimation Method
Table 1 provides definitions of the variables used in our analysis. We conduct an
event history study of failure rate. We categorize failed firms as those that were
liquidated due to outright bankruptcy or those that were acquired in a distressed sale.
These modes of dissolution were primarily determined through VentureXpert, which
maintains this information in the ‘Company Current Situation’ field. For those firms
involved in a distressed sale, the information came from SDC and Zephyr, which
captures this status in the deal description. Failure, the dependent variable, is set to 1 in
the year that the focal firm failed and 0 in all other years from founding. We identified
109 failed outcomes and created firm-year spells from founding to failure or to the end of
2009 when the data are censored. Firms that achieve Initial Public Offerings (IPO) and
firms that are acquired were also identified and added to the dataset. All the remaining

7

We used three sources to ensure completeness of data. Standard sources like SDC and Factiva under
report alliances from smaller firms; therefore we used multiple sources and triangulated the information.
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firm-observations were censored at the end of the study period. We model the hazard rate
using the time to failure experienced by the firm from birth.
Right-censoring and the presence of both time-varying and time-invariant
covariates make the choice of the Cox proportional hazard model appropriate for this
study (Allison, 1984). The main set of regressions estimates the hazard rate of failure h(t)
using the following equation:
log (h(t)) = α(t) + β1*(Patent Grant Flow(t)) + β2* (Patent Grant Flow(t))2 + β3*
(Closeness Centrality in Technology Activity Network) + β4*(Crowding in Technology
Citation Network(t)) + β5* (Patent Cite Flow by Firms(t)) + β6* (Reputation Patent
(1)
Litigation of Citing Firms) + β7* (Controls) + ε
Using this equation the test of H1—that is, the diminishing rate of returns to
patent flow—consists of verifying if β1 < 0 and β2 > 0. The nonconformity hypothesis,
H2, is tested by estimating whether β3 < 0, while the crowding or technological overlap
hypothesis, H3, is deemed valid if β4.>0. For the competing hypotheses, H4, we use β5 to
determine which of the two prevails. H5 is tested using β6 (>0) and additional analysis
described below. The regressions were computed using the stcox procedure of Stata.
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Table 1. Variable Definitions (Chapter 2)
Variables
Dependent Variables
(1) Failure
Independent Variables
(2) Patent Grant Flow
(3)
Closeness
Centrality
in
Technology Activity Network
(4) Crowding in Technology
Citation Network
(5) Patent Cite Flow by Firms
(6) Cumulative Litigation Initiated
(7) Cumulative Litigation Received
Control Variables
Patenting Related
(8) Self-Citations
(9) Patent Grant Stock at t-1
(10) Total Forward Cite Stock at t-1
Exit Market Conditions
(11) IPO Heat
(12) Number of Targets in SIC
Investor Characteristics
(13) Total Number of Investors
(14) Number of Investors Investing
in All Rounds
(15) Prominent Investor
Financing Related
(16) Number of Rounds Received
(17) Time to First Round
Initial Firm Quality
(18) Founding Team Start-up
Experience
Firm Strategic Action
(19) Number of Alliances
(20) Number of Acquisitions
Others
(21) Business Segment Sales in
Wireless
(22) Number of Public Competitors
(23) Entry Year

Description
A dummy indicating that the firm had experienced a distressed sale
or had become defunct in a given year
Number of new patents granted to the firm in a given year
Closeness centrality of the firm in the network defined through
shared IPC
Sum of niche overlap in the network defined by backward citations
Number of new cites received from other organizations by the firm
in a year
Forward cite flow weighted by count of lawsuits initiated
Forward cite flow weighted by count of lawsuits received

Total number of self-cites received by the firm in a year
Stock of the firm’s patents at the start of a year
Stock of forward cites received by the firm at the start of a year
Intensity of IPO activity in the firm’s primary SIC code in a given
year
Number of targets acquired in the SIC in a given year
Number of distinct investors that invested in the firm over all
rounds
Number of investors that invest in all rounds
Indicator of presence of investor that was in the Forbes Midas list
Number of rounds of funding received by the firm till the end of
study
Time in days from founding to receiving first round
Sum of wireless start-ups founding team worked in prior to the
focal firm
Number of alliances by the firm in a year
Number of acquisitions by the firm in a year
Total sales of all public wireless companies in a given SIC code
Number of public competitors
Year of entry of the firm in the risk set
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We perform robustness checks using a shared frailty model to allay concerns of
unobserved heterogeneity (Gutierrez, 2002) and further address endogeneity concerns in
the Results section below. Frailty models assume that the dependence is created by
unobserved heterogeneity, and correct for bias in both coefficient estimates and standard
error estimates by treating the unobserved heterogeneity term as a random variable with a
specified probability distribution (gamma-distributed in our case) using an equation of
the following type:
log (hi (t )) =α (t ) + β*xi(t) + εi,

(2)

Here hi(t) is the hazard for the i-th firm and εi represents the unobserved heterogeneity of
the i-th firm.
Independent Variables
Benefits of Signaling
Patent Grant Flow
We distinguish between the stock and flow of the patents granted to a start-up.
Patent Grant Flow captures the number of patents granted to a firm in a given year. We
use the grant year to construct the stock and flow because patent grant is arguably a more
powerful signal to resource providers than the mere act of applying.8 This time-varying
flow of new patents allows us to distinguish between fresh information, that is, the signal,
and the endowment, that is, the stock accumulated up to the start of a given year. It
ranges from 0 to 41 with a mean of 1.

8

Robustness checks using application dates are also performed and give consistent results
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Hazards of Signaling
Start-up Technology Activity Network: Nonconformity
The technology activity network is the affiliation network formed among start-ups
through sharing broad technology activities. We use the International Patent
Classification (IPC) subclass (4 alphanumeric symbols denoting the third hierarchical
level of the classification) to proxy technology activity. For example, the IPC subclass
G06F, which refers to all activities related to electronic digital processing, is shared by
193 of our focal firms, while G06E, which covers optical computing devices, is present in
the patents of only one company. Thus the two sets of vertices in our affiliation network
are the focal new ventures and the IPC subclass to which their patents belong.
Following our theory, we construct a single affiliation network spanning 19902009 to capture the prevailing conformity pressures that incumbents exert, especially in
the start-up technology space. The assumption is that incumbents shape the incentives to
innovate in their preferred activities, as reflected in the network formed among new
ventures through shared IPC subclasses. Using the start-ups as nodes, we transform this
bipartite graph into a 1-mode network to define similarities in technology activity
between start-ups as revealed by shared IPC subclasses (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). This
start-up network (Figure 3) displays an expected core-peripheral structure.
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Figure 3. Wireless Start-up Technology Activity Network, 1990-2009

To measure the degree to which firms conform, we calculate the closeness
centrality in this network. Essentially, we seek to ascertain how close a start-up is to its
peers along the core-periphery continuum (Freeman, 1979). The variable Closeness
Centrality in Technology Activity Network (C(ni)) which measures this closeness between
a start-up and other new ventures is defined by the following formula:
C(ni) = (n-1)/[Σj d(ni,nj)]

(3)

where nj is the jth node and n is the total number of nodes. The function d(x,y) is a
distance function measuring the number of hops in the shortest path linking nodes ni and
nj. The closeness centrality variable ranges between 0 and 1, with unity indicating that a
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firm is maximally close to all other firms. The higher this value, the closer a start-up is to
the core. It ranges from 0 to 0.02 with average value 0.01.

Start-up Technology Citation Network: Competitive Crowding
Consistent with existing literature, the start-up technology citation network is
constructed as a time-variant network of all the patents that the focal start-ups cite, using
a five-year moving window, prior to and including the year in consideration (Podolny et
al., 1996). Thus, each prior art that firms cite in their inventions is construed to form a tie
between firms. Following Podolny et al. (1996), we first define the niche overlap,
Ov(nijt), for a focal firm i with another start-up, j, as the proportion of the common
backward citations between the two firms to the total number of backward citations
(BC(nit)) of the focal firm at a given time t, over the window t-4 to t.
Ov(nijt) = (BC(nit ) ∩ BC(njt) / BC(nit)

(4)

Ov(njit) = (BC(nit ) ∩ BC(njt) / BC(njt)

(5)

Ov(nijt) ≠ Ov(njit)

(6)

We thus create an asymmetric matrix of these niche overlaps for each firm pair
and then create the variable Crowding in Technology Citation Network, Cr(nit ), for each
start-up, as the sum of all such niche overlaps across the set of other start-up firms.
Cr(nit ) = Σj Ov(nijt)

(7)

This construct that measures similarities of ties based on actual inventions, is
conceptually similar to structural equivalence and represents the competitive costs due to
crowding. The more start-ups cluster together, the more they experience competitive
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pressure. This variable takes on values from 0 to 9 with a mean of 0.12. It’s correlation
with the closeness centrality in start-up activity network is 0.14.
Disclosure: Negative Spillovers and Litigation
To calibrate the costs of disclosure, we use the yearly flow of forward citations
(as prior art) that the focal start-up receives from other firms (excluding self-citations).
We calculate this variable annually from the focal firm’s founding till either failure or
censoring. This variable, Patent Cite Flow by Firms, thus measures ‘deference’ by
calculating the annual, unweighted forward citations from peer organizations in a given
year.
We create two additional variables, Cumulative Litigation Initiated and
Cumulative Litigation Received, by weighting the flow of forward citations by the patent
litigation reputation of the citing firms. To measure this reputation, we obtained 27,457
patent-related cases from the Lex Machina database during the time frame 2000-2009.9
We matched the names of start-ups in our sample and the names of all the organizations
that cite the focal new ventures to the names of firms that either initiate patent lawsuits or
act as defendants in such cases.10 The reputations were constructed by cumulating the
count of lawsuits in which firms were involved in these roles over the ten-year period that
the database covers. Cumulative Litigation Initiated is the forward citation flow weighted
by the reputation of the citing firm as plaintiff, while Cumulative Litigation Received is
the forward citation flow weighted by the reputation of the citing firm as defendant. For
example, if focal start-up i receives citations FCjit and FCkit from firms j and k at time t,
Lex Machina starts coverage in 2000, so we do not have data on patent litigation from 1990-99.
We used a combination of automated and manual matching. As a first step we matched the names using
Soundex and then manually went through the list to get the exact matches.
9

10
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and the reputations for litigation as plaintiff and defendant are RLIj (and RLIk ) and RLDj,
(RLDk ), then:
Patent Cite Flow by Firms it = FCjit + FCkit

(8)

Cumulative Litigation Initiated it = FCjit * RLIj + FCkit * RLIk

(9)

Cumulative Litigation Received it = FCjit * RLDj + FCkit * RLDk

(10)

Since these two measures are highly correlated (those who sue are likely to be
counter-sued), in our analysis we use the net effect obtained through the residuals of
regressing Cumulative Litigation Initiated over Cumulative Litigation Received.
Control Variables
Prior studies have identified many factors that influence new venture survival. We
therefore include controls in seven broad categories. In the first category, related to
patents, we include the stock of patents granted (Hsu & Ziedonis, 2008) as well as the
stock of forward citations received (to capture the value of the patents (Hall et al., 2005))
in the previous years. Prior studies have also shown significant positive effects for selfcitation (Hall et al., 2005); we therefore use self-citation flow as a control. These could
signify attempts by firms to create patent thickets or a technology trajectory that might be
beneficial for survival.
The second category controls for market conditions that are important drivers for
liquidity events (Sorenson & Stuart, 2008; Stuart & Sorenson, 2003). The intensity of
annual IPO activity in a start-up’s four-digit SIC industry and the annual incidence of
merger and acquisition activity in that industry are both computed as yearly counts and
included as controls in the models. The third group of variables controls for investor
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characteristics. We include a measure of investor quality (Hochberg et al., 2007) using
the count of VCs that invest in a start-up and that were also featured in the Forbes Midas
list between 2000 and 2009. The Midas list provides an annual ranking by Forbes
Magazine, of the best dealmakers in high-technology and life sciences venture capital.
We also control for investor confidence and expectations in the start-up using two
variables: the count of all the VCs that invest, and the count of investors who commit
funds in all rounds of financing (Sorenson & Stuart, 2008).
Fourth, new ventures need resources to survive (Lee et al., 2001). Therefore we
control for the number of rounds of financing received and time from founding to the first
VC financing. In the fifth group, we include the start-up experience of the founding team
- another signal of quality - to account for variations in initial quality among the start-ups
(Burton et al., 2002; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). The sixth category includes
corporate development actions, that is, strategic alliances and acquisitions. We thus
control for endorsement effects that have been shown to be significant predictors of a
new venture’s success (Stuart et al., 1999). Last, we include product market competition
and growth at the sector level (Covin & Slevin, 1989), using the number of public
companies and total sales per year in all business segments in which publicly quoted
wireless operators (SIC 4812) and vendors (SIC 3663) operate. Finally, we include the
start-up entry year to account for potential violation of the non-informative censoring
assumption.
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Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents the correlations and descriptive statistics for the variables in the
analysis. Given the high correlations between some of our variables, we performed
diagnostics for multicollinearity using the Variance Inflation Factor (vif) procedure after
running an OLS regression in Stata. No significant issues were found (Allison, 1984).
On average, a start-up receives four rounds of financing, with an average of
roughly one million dollars invested per round. It takes six years on average to generate
an exit via IPO, while acquisition events take five and a half years, similar to the time it
takes to become defunct. A new venture is granted a mean of 12 patents, with
considerable variation between firms (ranging from 0 to 143). This translates into a
yearly flow of one patent, again with substantial heterogeneity (0 to 41). These patents
cover 146 IPC subclasses. The top ten IPC subclasses are responsible for 60% of the ties
between firms (Table 3).

Interestingly, the IPC subclass specifically dedicated to

wireless communication (H04W) occupies only the tenth position. The firms in our
sample receive about four forward citations per year, but again there is a large dispersion
in this statistic. Table 4 lists the top ten firms that build on the patents of the focal new
ventures.
Regarding patent infringements, we found that only 15 out of the 428 new
ventures were involved in any lawsuit (8 initiated litigation, while 11 were defendants).
Of the 15, only 3 firms experienced an IPO or acquisition, and in those cases the lawsuits
occurred after the liquidity event. Table 5 lists the count of litigations initiated and
received by the top 10 firms which cite patents owned by the ventures in our sample.
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Many of these firms are well-known organizations; they are the targets of litigation more
often than plaintiffs–the two counts are highly correlated.
Table 2. Summary Statistics and Correlations (Chapter 2)
Mean
S.D.
Min
Max
(1)
(2)
(1)
0.04
0.19
0.00
1.00 1.000
(2)
0.98
3.14
0.00
41.00 -0.005 1.000
(3)
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.02 -0.057 0.223
(4)
0.12
0.42
0.00
9.00 0.039 0.071
(5)
3.52
11.41
0.00
155.00 0.061 0.527
(6)
23.43
114.46
0.00 2203.00 0.021 0.226
(7)
102.90
506.01
0.00 8312.00 0.010 0.195
(8)
0.21
1.07
0.00
23.00 0.013 0.693
(9)
2.69
8.83
0.00
112.00 0.043 0.414
(10)
12.36
64.76
0.00 1364.00 0.014 0.216
(11)
0.04
0.05
0.00
0.28 -0.060 -0.057
(12) 125.85
186.67
0.00
662.00 -0.029 -0.037
(13)
6.11
4.72
1.00
29.00 -0.040 0.165
(14)
0.92
1.00
0.00
8.00 0.042 -0.045
(15)
0.62
0.49
0.00
1.00 -0.042 0.119
(16)
4.28
3.02
1.00
20.00 -0.058 0.063
(17) 680.27
769.08
0.00 4496.00 -0.037 -0.049
(18)
0.53
1.13
0.00
8.00 -0.067 0.024
(19)
0.34
0.94
0.00
13.00 -0.055 0.089
(20)
0.04
0.23
0.00
5.00 -0.023 -0.010
(21) 1.89e+06 3.24e+06
0.00 1.06e+07 0.006 0.099
(22) 138.59
149.10
0.00
600.00 -0.026 -0.011
(23) 1999.19
3.89 1990.00 2009.00 -0.042 -0.020

(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)

(11)
1.000
0.752
0.096
-0.018
0.055
0.037
-0.029
-0.042
0.056
-0.008
-0.204
0.806
-0.069

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

1.000
0.141
0.225
0.147
0.146
0.150
0.213
0.139
0.000
0.025
0.249
-0.091
0.192
0.123
-0.074
0.083
0.089
-0.005
0.095
0.051
0.057

1.000
0.128
0.064
0.062
0.056
0.070
0.061
-0.052
-0.007
0.041
-0.025
0.039
0.017
-0.075
0.056
0.024
-0.001
0.036
-0.023
0.008

1.000
0.606
0.556
0.645
0.584
0.559
-0.058
-0.025
0.270
-0.055
0.084
0.127
-0.037
-0.049
0.117
0.012
0.158
-0.006
-0.143

1.000
0.962
0.375
0.739
0.956
-0.043
-0.020
0.243
-0.060
0.023
0.115
0.006
-0.052
0.141
0.021
0.097
-0.039
-0.130

1.000
0.315
0.664
0.882
-0.037
-0.003
0.281
-0.055
0.035
0.128
-0.005
-0.052
0.158
0.040
0.070
-0.046
-0.123

1.000
0.411
0.367
-0.039
-0.040
0.142
-0.028
0.049
0.060
-0.023
-0.008
0.087
-0.021
0.157
-0.001
-0.078

1.000
0.764
-0.067
-0.052
0.218
-0.079
0.087
0.118
-0.016
-0.022
0.121
0.002
0.099
-0.053
-0.087

1.000
-0.052
-0.038
0.192
-0.057
0.016
0.082
0.032
-0.052
0.116
0.022
0.093
-0.043
-0.135

(20)

(21)

(22)

(23)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

(19)

1.000
0.058
0.020
0.071
0.017
-0.077
0.029
0.149
0.031
-0.222
0.836
0.096

1.000
-0.286
0.419
0.685
-0.209
-0.008
0.170
0.090
0.124
0.076
-0.258

1.000
-0.068
-0.450
0.004
0.071
-0.019
-0.066
-0.068
-0.013
0.259

1.000
0.276
-0.233
0.156
0.147
0.031
-0.001
0.070
0.035

1.000
-0.195
0.037
0.087
0.054
0.123
0.047
-0.228

1.000
-0.110
-0.099
-0.027
-0.005
-0.059
-0.444

1.000
0.054
0.002
0.021
-0.037
0.315

1.000
0.056
-0.001
0.069
0.058

Absolute correlations above 0.03 are significant at p < .10.

1.000
0.015 1.000
0.017 -0.076 1.000
-0.029 -0.148 -0.046 1.000
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Table 3. Top 10 IPC subclasses shared by new ventures
IPC Class

Number of Ties

IPC Description

G06F
H04L
H04Q
H04B
H04M
H04J
H04K
H04N
G06Q
H04W

193
166
162
138
137
86
51
50
43
43

Electric digital data processing
Transmission of digital information
Selecting (switches, relays, etc.)
Transmission information-carrying signals
Telephonic communication
Multiplex communication
Secret communication; jamming of communication
Pictorial communication, e.g., television
Data processing for commercial and financial purposes
Wireless communication

Table 4. Top 10 firms citing new venture patents
Forward-Citing Firms
Nokia

504

Motorola

501

Ericsson

466

Qualcomm

403

Samsung

393

IBM

381

Intel

322

Microsoft

318

Cisco

272

Sony

272

Table 5. Top 10 litigation counts in 2000-2010 of firms citing new venture patents
Litigations Initiated

Litigations Received

Hewlett-Packard

15

Microsoft

94

Yahoo

14

Google

62

Broadcom

10

Sony

54

Medtronic

10

Apple

51

Sony

10

Yahoo

48

Intel

9

Motorola

42

Microsoft

9

Medtronic

38

3M

9

Hewlett-Packard

37

Motorola

9

Amazon

31

Sandisk

9

Hitachi

30
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RESULTS
The hypotheses were tested by fitting a Cox proportional hazard model to the
data, as elaborated above. Table 6 presents the results for five different models, starting
with a baseline model that includes only the controls and the Patent Grant Flow variable.
Models 2 to 4 cover intermediate estimations wherein we successively add the
explanatory variables corresponding to our hypotheses. Model 5 is the full model that is
central to our analysis.
Hypothesis 1 posited a diminishing return of the flow of patents granted with the
failure hazard rate. This is strongly supported in models 2 to 5, with a negative main
effect and a positive effect for the quadratic term. The grant of a single patent from a
baseline of zero patents decreases the hazard of failure by 28%. Thus our hypothesis
about the value of patents as a signal is corroborated. Figure 4 plots the effect of the
annual flow of patents that a start-up obtains on failure, illustrating the curvilinear effect
due to diminishing returns. For high values of the flow of received patents, (which is rare
since only 16 of the firms have more than 15 patents granted in any single year), the
increased hazard reflects the potential costs of investors viewing the new venture as
neglecting commercial objectives.
Hypothesis H2 regarding the cost of nonconformity is also supported in all
models in Table 6, suggesting that start-ups that are central within the wireless start-up
technology activity network fare better, while those located in the periphery face early
exit. However, hypothesis H3 that discusses the costs of competitive crowding finds very
weak support. The coefficient in the full model is not statistically significant, with a pvalue of 13%.
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Table 6. Cox Proportional Hazard Model for Failure: Results for H1-3 (Chapter 2)
Variables
Patent Grant Flow

Models

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.107
(0.0700)

-0.261***
(0.0952)
0.00644**
(0.00251)

-0.229**
(0.0952)
0.00571**
(0.00253)
-18.84*
(11.18)

-0.224**
(0.0951)
0.00559**
(0.00253)
-21.80*
(11.44)
0.251*
(0.142)

(5)

-0.261***
(0.0978)
Patent Grant Flow Square
0.00664**
(0.00276)
Closeness Centrality in
-25.04**
Technology Activity Network
(11.58)
Crowding in Technology
0.227
Citation Network
(0.151)
Patent Cite Flow by Firms
0.0337***
(0.0116)
Self-Citations
0.160
0.0439
0.0333
0.0326
-0.145
(0.145)
(0.116)
(0.118)
(0.118)
(0.140)
Patent Grant Stock at t-1
0.0247** 0.0289** 0.0307*** 0.0311*** 0.0280**
(0.0119) (0.0116)
(0.0115)
(0.0115)
(0.0123)
Total Forward Cite Stock at t-1
-0.00188 -0.00176
-0.00138
-0.00152
-0.00437
(0.00263) (0.00249) (0.00242) (0.00244) (0.00341)
IPO Heat
-19.58*** -19.73*** -19.69*** -19.56*** -18.90***
(5.497)
(5.523)
(5.502)
(5.485)
(5.472)
Number of Targets in SIC
0.000863 0.000574 0.000678 0.000656 0.000575
(0.00122) (0.00124) (0.00123) (0.00124) (0.00125)
Total Number of Investors
0.00627 0.0159
0.0269
0.0261
-0.00164
(0.0361) (0.0373)
(0.0378)
(0.0375)
(0.0371)
Number of Investors Investing
0.142 0.142
0.124
0.129
0.112
in All Rounds
(0.103)
(0.102)
(0.103)
(0.103)
(0.105)
Prominent Investor
-0.266
-0.273
-0.278
-0.276
-0.275
(0.222)
(0.222)
(0.221)
(0.221)
(0.223)
Number of Rounds Received
-0.177*** -0.181*** -0.186*** -0.181*** -0.167***
(0.0626) (0.0636)
(0.0638)
(0.0637)
(0.0622)
Time to First Round
-0.001*** -0.00098***-0.00096***-0.00093***-0.00092***
(0.000206) (0.000206) (0.000207) (0.000207) (0.000206)
Founding Team Start-up Experience-0.469** -0.446**
-0.451**
-0.525**
-0.500**
(0.206)
(0.206)
(0.209)
(0.221)
(0.219)
Number of Alliances
-0.872*** -0.838*** -0.822*** -0.814*** -0.854***
(0.312)
(0.311)
(0.310)
(0.310)
(0.312)
Number of Acquisitions
-1.038
-1.056
-1.074
-1.049
-1.023
(0.942)
(0.941)
(0.943)
(0.943)
(0.939)
Business Segment Sales in Wireless -2.85e-08 -2.72e-08 -1.70e-08 -1.67e-08 -1.75e-08
(3.18e-08) (3.24e-08) (3.30e-08) (3.30e-08) (3.33e-08)
Number of Public Competitors
0.00278 0.00325* 0.00316* 0.00318* 0.00318*
(0.00173) (0.00173) (0.00172) (0.00172) (0.00173)
Entry Year
-0.101*** -0.0970*** -0.0847** -0.0812** -0.0747**
(0.0360) (0.0360)
(0.0361)
(0.0363)
(0.0366)
Observations
2958
2958
2958
2958
2958
Chi-square
115.5
122.2
125.1
127.3
136.4
Number of firms
428
428
428
428
428
Log likelihood
-350.4
-347.0
-345.6
-344.4
-339.9
Number of failures
109
109
109
109
109
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 4. Diminishing Returns to Patent Grant Flow
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We find strong evidence that the net costs of disclosure (measured through
forward citations) dominate the net benefits. We had argued that the effects of such
‘deference’ could be two-sided and therefore not hypothesized about the effect of forward
citations received annually. An additional forward citation from other firms increases the
hazard of failure by 3.4% implying that deference may in fact be harmful to small
entrepreneurial firms. The stock of patents granted prior to the current year (Patent Grant
Stock at t-1, a control variable) has a positive and significant coefficient in all models,
further bolstering our thesis regarding disclosure costs; patents granted in previous years
that reflect old information are a net cost to the firm instead of serving as beneficial
signals.
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Finally, Table 7 presents the models for testing hypotheses 4 regarding the
contentious role of incumbent firms and their defensive posture regarding possible
encroachment into proprietary technological domains. The forward citation received
weighted by cumulative count of lawsuits initiated by incumbent firms that cite the
patents of focal ventures in our sample is significant (model 7). However, in model 6,
which differs from model 7 in that it does not include the cumulative count of litigations
received, the effect of the litigation-initiated variable is statistically insignificant. Since
these two variables are highly correlated, the result could be thus spurious. To present a
more robust test, we created a new variable by regressing Cumulative Litigation Initiated
on Cumulative Litigation Received and then use the residuals shown in model 8.
Theoretically this is the more accurate model, because by netting out the effects of being
sued from the effects of suing for patent infringement, we account for the litigious
reputation of incumbents.

Again the coefficients are positive and significant at 5%,

implying that being cited by incumbents with a history of legal enforcement harms
entrepreneurial survival chances, accounting for an increase of 1.6% of failure rate for
every unit of litigation-reputation weighted forward citation. We thus conclude that H4 is
also supported.
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Table 7. Cox Proportional Hazard Analysis for Failure: Results for H4 (Chapter 2)
Variables

Models(6)

Patent Grant Flow
Patent Grant Flow Square
Closeness Centrality in Technology Activity Network
Crowding in Technology Citation Network
Cumulative Litigation Initiated
Cumulative Litigation Received
Residual Cumulative Litigation Initiated Over Received

-0.238**
(0.0961)
0.00597**
(0.00253)
-21.48*
(11.45)
0.248*
(0.141)
0.00506
(0.00308)

(7)

(8)

-0.228**
(0.0959)
0.00590**
(0.00247)
-21.30*
(11.45)
0.248*
(0.142)
0.0150**
(0.00649)
-0.00226
(0.00160)

-0.221**
(0.0951)
0.00573**
(0.00247)
-21.54*
(11.43)
0.253*
(0.141)

0.0163**
(0.00747)
Self-Citations
0.0320
-0.00304
-0.0194
(0.118)
(0.116)
(0.115)
Patent Grant Stock at t-1
0.0325*** 0.0300**
0.0286**
(0.0116)
(0.0120)
(0.0118)
Total Forward Cite Stock at t-1
-0.0106
-0.0134*
-0.00666*
(0.00699)
(0.00775)
(0.00398)
IPO Heat
-20.01***
-19.94***
-19.85***
(5.555)
(5.525)
(5.502)
Number of Targets in SIC
0.000465
0.000750
0.000834
(0.00125)
(0.00123)
(0.00123)
Total Number of Investors
0.0131
0.0321
0.0377
(0.0381)
(0.0401)
(0.0395)
Number of Investors Investing in All Rounds
0.128
0.120
0.116
(0.104)
(0.104)
(0.104)
Prominent Investor
-0.250
-0.277
-0.287
(0.222)
(0.223)
(0.223)
Number of Rounds Received
-0.180***
-0.199***
-0.194***
(0.0629)
(0.0653)
(0.0645)
Time to First Round
-0.000924***-0.000916***-0.000897***
(0.000207) (0.000206) (0.000204)
Founding Team Start-up Experience
-0.521**
-0.521**
-0.529**
(0.222)
(0.222)
(0.222)
Number of Alliances
-0.806***
-0.771**
-0.772**
(0.308)
(0.309)
(0.308)
Number of Acquisitions
-1.043
-0.999
-1.017
(0.942)
(0.937)
(0.940)
Business Segment Sales in Wireless
-1.71e-08
-2.23e-08
-2.18e-08
(3.31e-08) (3.34e-08) (3.32e-08)
Number of Public Competitors
0.00343** 0.00303*
0.00295*
(0.00173)
(0.00174)
(0.00173)
Entry Year
-0.0835**
-0.0834**
-0.0812**
(0.0362)
(0.0362)
(0.0361)
Observations
2958
2958
2958
Number of firms
428
428
428
Chi-square
130.2
133.9
132.4
Number of failures
109
109
109
Log likelihood
-343.0
-341.1
-341.9
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The results obtained must be seen in the light of the limitations of the method. We
tested for the violation of the proportionality assumption of the Cox model. The
proportionality test passed for all the variables except one control variable (Time to First
Round). According to the literature, violation of proportionality is usually not a cause for
concern, though it does call for further robustness checks (Allison, 1984). We first
assessed the robustness by dropping the problematic variable – this did not change the
results. We then performed likelihood ratio tests between models to check for spurious
effects. Further robustness checks for unobserved heterogeneity were performed by
fitting a shared frailty model with a gamma distribution. There were no significant
changes to the coefficients or to the p-values that resulted from these additional tests.
Finally, we address two endogeneity-related issues. First, given the risk of
disclosure, firms may choose to not patent. We address this issue in the following ways.
Firms in our sample seek venture funding and hence have to prove their worth and as the
quote from Wireless Week in the beginning of our theory section hints, they are likely to
file for patents if inventions promise value creation. The decision to not patent may be
influenced by two other factors. First, firms may innovate in a domain of the wireless
sector where patenting is at best difficult—for example, network services and software
applications. Therefore, the industry code that a firm assigns itself and patenting in those
activities may provide some clue (see Table 8). Second, some unobserved characteristic
of the founders might condition the firm’s propensity towards patent protection, most
notably their experiences with knowledge spillover and predatory industry conduct.
While this propensity remains, we can explore the effect of their demographic
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characteristics, for example their prior entrepreneurial experience in the wireless sector,
prompting us towards the following analysis which also takes care of the first propensity.
Table 8. Top 10 4 digit SIC code in sample and percentage of firms with patents
4 Digit Primary SIC

Total Firms

% with Patents

7372

84

74%

4812

56

50%

3663

38

89%

7371

32

63%

7375

26

46%

4813

25

56%

4899

22

45%

7373

22

59%

3661

16

88%

We create a binary variable that flags whether a firm patents during its lifetime.
This we call the treatment variable. Those firms which receive patents are in the
treatment group and those which do not in the control group. For firm i, i = 1, . . . , N,
with all firms assumed exchangeable, let {Yi(0),Yi(1)} denote two potential outcomes:
Yi(1) is the outcome of venture i when exposed to the treatment, and Yi(0) is the outcome
of venture i when not exposed to the treatment. If a new venture experiences both
outcomes, then the treatment’s effect on firm i would be directly observable as Yi (1) − Yi
(0). However, one of the outcomes is the counterfactual that in this case we obtain by
matching to one or more similar firms in the control group. The average treatment effect
is then calculated for all firms similarly paired.
Assuming that systematic differences in outcomes between treated and control
units with the same values for relevant covariates can be attributed to the treatment
(Abadie, Drukker, Herr, & Imbens, 2004; Imbens, 2004), we estimate the effect of
receiving patents on start-up dissolution by matching them on two variables, that is, their
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primary SIC code and the previous experience of its founders. The Stata module nnmatch
(Abadie et al., 2004) is used to estimate the average treatment effects for the sample, the
treated group versus the control group. No significant differences in the average
treatment effects were found for the three groups: the full sample (-0.14), the treated (0.14), and the control group (-0.13). This robustness check should allay selection
concerns based on the two identified attributes that might influence the propensity of a
firm to patent.
Finally, we address the concern that forward citations may be premeditated
because citing firms may have the strategic incentive to mention as prior art the
inventions of those firms that are likely to fail. Our response to that concern is twofold.
First, we look at the mean value for the variable Patent Cite Flow by Firms for both
successful (mean = 3.6) and failed firms (mean = 3.7) and perform a t-test to compare
those means. The t-test for difference is not significant. Second, we defer to the literature
on patents (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2001; Hall et al., 2005) that highlights the
differences in academic citation, which is often strategic and totally at the discretion of
the authors. In addition to the firm, the patent examiner typically adds two-thirds of the
citations to an average patent (Alcacer & Gittelman, 2006). Moreover, 40% of all patents
have all their citations added by the examiner (Alcacer & Gittelman, 2006). In the light of
these striking patterns, concerns for strategic or ulterior motivations for prior art citations
should definitely be allayed.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
‘The patent system provides incentives for innovation. Its benefits
far outweigh the problems. But there’s definitely some bias against
small companies.’11
While patents have putative benefits for start-ups, far less is known about their
hazards. This study shows the hazards of revealing information to rivals by measuring the
impact of patenting on new venture failure. The hazard of failure increases by 3.4% for
each additional forward citation received in a year. In doing so, we shed new light on the
high costs that new ventures potentially incur when signaling their worth. Drawing on a
novel and rich database of patents, patent citations, patent lawsuits, and corporate data of
start-ups in the U.S. wireless sector over two decades, we do find initial support for the
positive effect of patents as signals in line with current findings (Hsu & Ziedonis, 2008).
However, the distinction of stock and flow adds an important nuance to our
understanding of signals, both conceptually and empirically. We find that signals,
conceptualized as patent flows, are beneficial but subject to diminishing returns. In fact,
at very high levels we encounter almost a 90% reduction in the benefits of signaling,
suggesting that more may indeed be less for new ventures with regard to patenting.
Indeed, high levels of patenting are more harmful than beneficial, consistent with our
hypothesis on the hazards of disclosure.
Those hazards are particularly salient in industries with comparative complex
products as opposed to discrete or stand-alone product industries such as chemicals and
pharmaceuticals (Cohen et al., 2000; Levin et al., 1987). In these industries, when new
11

Lee Bromberg, founder, senior partner, head of litigation at the law firm of Bromberg and Sunstein (Healing the Patent Process.
(cover story), by Sue Marek,Wireless Week, August 15, 2005, Vol. 11 Issue 17, p6-7).
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ventures disclose their technology, they very much risk dissolution from designing
around or litigations. If we factor in the reputational toughness of firms (compare
Agarwal, et al, 2009) that publicly acknowledge the start-ups’ inventions, these hazards
are even more accentuated. This insight stands in sharp contrast to existing studies where
effects of forward citations—often deemed to be reverent if not obsequious—are
generally not considered or observed to be negative (Podolny et al., 1996; Stuart, 1998;
Stuart et al., 1999). Perhaps the specificity of our sector, with its weak appropriability
regime, might partially account for the harmful effects of disclosures. This was strongly
alluded to in Hsu and Ziedonis (2008), which also called for additional studies in other
contexts to better understand these effects. Akin to our study, other researchers have also
recently begun to question the supposed benefits of deference (compare Jensen, Kim and
Kim, 2010). In any event, the level of disclosure by nascent firms in a ‘market for
lemons’ remains a challenging problem.
We also shed light on how start-ups manage to accommodate the competing but
simultaneous pressures of conformity and differentiation (compare Deephouse, 1999) by
defining the technology space as a network based on two conceptions of technological
ties. Start-ups need to fit in, as shown by their technological similarity, yet at the same
time they must also differentiate their technology from their peers. To capture this
dilemma we constructed two different networks: (1) start-up technology activity network
and (2) start-up citation network. Similarity, inferred from the activity network, conveys
conformity to the dominant standards of the wireless sector. Differences in the citation
network reveal their relative proximity to other start-ups.
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Our results highlight the importance of conformity in a setting where incumbents
have the edge. While much attention has been paid to radical innovations and the
attacker’s advantage in fast-changing environments (Anderson & Tushman, 2001;
Christensen & Bower, 1996; Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995; Tushman & Anderson,
1986), incumbents might not always be at a disadvantage in such environments,
especially when complementary assets are under incumbent control and the
appropriability conditions are typically not favorable (Teece, 1986; Tripsas, 1997).
Limitations and Future Research
Our study provides important directions for future research on technological
entrepreneurship. First, like several prior studies, our study focuses on a single industry
and is therefore subject to generalizability concerns. However, although the setting is
unique, the wireless sector does share many characteristics with other industries,
especially around the creation, accumulation, and appropriability of intellectual property
(for example, semiconductors, information technology, and imaging). Second, while we
argue that the hazards of disclosures arise because of the dangers of designing around and
litigation, we do not directly observe the phenomenon of designing around. Future
research could explicitly investigate designing around by examining the content of
patents in greater detail.
Third, we rely on the start-up network properties to test the conformity and
crowding hypotheses. We assume that incumbents shape these network structures but we
have remained agnostic about the actual boundaries and the vertical and horizontal
configuration of the wireless sector. An interesting, albeit challenging future project
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could test these assumptions using the full network of industry players across all areas of
the wireless sector (as alluded to in Figure 2). Challenges relate to bounding the sector
and its network as well as collecting data on them. Fourth, our distinction of stock and
flow is only an approximation for distinguishing the signaling and endowment effects.
While we include other signals of quality, an interesting avenue of research could explore
any negative consequences of other complementary signals, such as founders’ experience
or third-party endorsements. Finally, we have investigated only failure. Investigating the
effect of signaling on other performance measures—especially ‘non-success’ outcomes,
that is, neither achieving liquidity events for investors nor failing outright—present
exciting lines of future enquiry as well.
Conclusion
While not without limitations, this study contributes to our understanding of the
entrepreneurship as well as to the broader strategy and organizations literature. We pay
attention to a neglected aspect of performance— failure. We provide an example of a
high-tech environment where perceived radical innovations do not necessarily pan out
and new ventures are rewarded when they conform to the broad areas of technological
activities. We provide new evidence on the limits of patents as signals and the dangers of
disclosure in a setting hitherto not analyzed, extending our understanding of new
ventures’ need to signal their quality to obtain resources and increase their life chances
(Gans, Hsu, & Stern, 2002a; Hsu & Ziedonis, 2008). Finally, we show that the litigation
reputation of firms that build on a start-up’s inventions increases the hazards of failure
under weak appropriability conditions, pointing indirectly to the threats of designing
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around and lawsuits, and providing us with interesting research avenues to explore in the
future.
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Chapter 3: A Glimpse at Persistence without Liquidity Events: Asymmetric
Effects on Success and Failure
Performance is a central concept in entrepreneurship, strategy and organization
theory. Extant large sample empirical research has extensively studied new venture
performance by examining mortality rates of start-ups (Audretsch, 1991; Brüderl et al.,
1992; Brüderl & Schüssler, 1990; Carroll et al., 1996; Delacroix & Carroll, 1983; Delmar
& Shane, 2003; Dowell & Swaminathan, 2006; Nerkar & Shane, 2003). These studies,
grounded primarily in the population ecology tradition, invariably define start-up failure
as exit from the industry either due to dissolution or acquisition. Survival, the negation of
failure, is assumed to proxy success in these studies as the liabilities of newness are
severe (Stinchcombe, 1965).
In contrast to these studies implying success as the opposite of exit, other studies
in the entrepreneurship literature have gone a step further and defined various other
success criteria, including IPO (Beckman et al., 2007; Giot & Schwienbacher, 2007;
Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Stuart et al., 1999), and high-valuation trade-sale (Aggarwal,
2009; Giot & Schwienbacher, 2007; Gompers & Lerner, 2004).12 Just as the population
ecology studies imputed success as the opposite of observable exits, these studies
imputed failure as the opposite of successful events.13 Consequently, new firm
performance that occupies the continuum between these two extreme events has received
scant attention. To our knowledge, only one study has explicitly analyzed marginally

12

Studies that use continuous measures such as sales growth are few and limited to non-US setting such as
Canada and Scandinavian countries. Majority of the papers treat success as harvest events because of easy
availability of such data.
13
This observation does not apply to the few studies that use continuous measures of start-up performance.
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performing new ventures by incorporating survival with different growth levels as key
dependent variables (Gimeno et al., 1997).
As reviewed above, the vast majority of studies on new venture performance
either analyze success or failure as the key outcome—ignoring firms that persist without
events such as experiencing an Initial Public Offering (IPO) or termination due to
dissolution or merger and acquisition, primarily because it is conceptually easier to
measure events such as exit than non-events such as staying in business. In addition, a
binary framing of outcomes assumes symmetric effects, implying factors predicting
success to prevent failure and vice-versa. This underlying assumption precludes the
possibility of exposing persistence through simultaneous analysis of successful and
failing ventures. By investigating both success and failure in the same population of
entrepreneurial firms, we show that many start-ups neither achieve a successful outcome
(defined as achieving an IPO or a trade sale, providing harvest opportunity to investors)
nor fail (defined as dissolution due to bankruptcy, voluntary closure or a distressed sale).
Further, such an analysis reveals asymmetry in factors predicting success and failure.
Asymmetric effects are not uncommon in the social sciences and have been a
source of tantalizing interest in a variety of disciplines. For example, path-breaking
contributions in behavioral economics suggest that risk dispositions towards positive
payoffs do not mirror those involving negative pay-offs, as illustrated by the well-known
prospect theory of expected utility (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Thaler, 1985).
Political scientists (e.g. Lieberson, 1987) investigating social class and voting behavior
have shown that causes of class-induced voting are not the converse of non-class voting.
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In the management sciences, recent contribution by Fiss (2010), using set-theoretic
methodology pioneered by Ragin (2008), has likewise suggested that factors affecting an
outcome and its negation do not mirror each other. Specifically, analyzing a sample of
high-technology firms using the Miles and Snow typology (Miles & Snow, 1978, 2003;
Miles, Snow, Meyer, & Coleman, 1978), he shows that such typologies consist of
essential core elements that have causal relevance and other peripheral elements that are
causally irrelevant. The configuration of these elements within a particular type
determines whether the effects are asymmetric or not. Similarly, Lavie & Rosenkopf
(2006), reconcile the conflicting effects of the antecedents of exploration and exploitation
by separating these activities across domains and by conceptualizing them to be
interdependent—arising within a single continuum instead of separate distinct outcomes.
This paper follows the example of these studies to construct a more nuanced
categorization of entrepreneurial performance consequences—comprising success, failure
and the continuum of non-events in between (see Figure 1)—instead of a simple
dichotomous framing. This permits us to deduce persistence through asymmetric effects,
i.e., factors that diminish both success and failure at the same time, contrary to the usual
expectation that those factors preventing failure increase success chances and vice-versa.
We believe that explaining asymmetric effects of the same factor on success and
failure simultaneously is an important contribution of this paper and serves as a useful
empirical tool to unearth systematic forces that cause persistence. By asymmetry we
imply that a predicting factor has the same effect on both success and failure.
Conventional thinking would presume success as the opposite of failure and expect
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opposite effects of the same factor on these two outcomes. We construe as evidence of
persistence the fact that a given antecedent inhibits the occurrence of these two concrete
events within our conceptualization of new venture performance (Figure 1). We did not
find any study investigating success and failure separately with the same factor inhibiting
these binary outcomes. Therefore, the inference on persistence by simultaneously
modeling the two events in the same analysis is a novel contribution. Our inference is
based on the following logic (see Figure 5). First, a factor that prevents failure will not
necessarily predict success but just its complementary event, that is, survival (i.e., both
success and persistence without events are explained together). Second, an antecedent
that inhibits success will explain both non-events and failure. Thus effects that are
intersecting, in the language of set-theory, and inhibit these events would explain nonevents and consequently lead us to deduce persistence. A causal factor that diminishes
failure as well as success will thus expose forces of persistence, the third possibility.
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Figure 5. Exposing Persistence
Mutually Exclusive Start-up Outcomes
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We cast our attention on a signal of quality—the breadth of a start-ups’
underlying technology as revealed by third-party use of the new firm’s patents—because
by nature signals are equivocal and hence present the opportunity of possible negative
effects on failure and success. If the signal in question decreases both success and failure
likelihood then we can deduce the presence of systematic factors that predict non-events,
a sign of persistence. Evaluating quality of start-ups using signals by resource providers
under uncertainty and information-asymmetry is a much discussed topic (Hsu &
Ziedonis, 2008; Stuart et al., 1999). Quality information is delivered through signals such
as founders’ background (e.g. Burton et al., 2002), endorsements (Stuart et al., 1999) and
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granting of patents (Hsu & Ziedonis, 2008). We add to this repertoire of available signals
that help bridge the information gap between the start-up and others.
The signal of the breadth of a start-up’s technology (referred to as technology
breadth hereafter) conveys information on the generality or specificity of its applications
as discovered over time through application in different domains by others. Specifically,
we measure the dispersion across application domains of the future citations that a focal
venture’s patents receive every year. The number of forward citations that an invention
receives from others has been often used as a measure of its quality14—the more the
inventions are used by others, the higher the impact and derivatively the better the quality
(Hall et al., 2001; Hall & Trajtenberg, 2004). Our signal of interest pertains to another
aspect of quality, impact—whether the invention has broad applicability or is narrow in
scope. Accordingly, this quality signal provides information, both to the venture and
outsiders, on the potential opportunity set of applications.
We theorize about the possible pros and cons of possessing technologies with
broad or narrow applicability to examine the signals’ effects on success and failure.
Endowment of general technology, as inferred from the signal, is beneficial to the firm’s
survival prospects by increasing the odds of finding sustaining cash flow from a broader
set of possible applications and thus ensures at the very least some persistence. Yet,
possessing a technology with potential multiple applications is not sufficient for
achieving success. A start-up that patents its inventions, thereby disclosing its proprietary

14

We use quality in a broad sense. Quality is multi-dimensional and typically not observed directly and/or
ex-ante. Considerable uncertainty surrounds the quality of a new venture and information from a variety of
signals permit evaluators to sort start-ups using some criteria. We do not make any definite assertion about
the sorting mechanism using quality signal, just the ability to rank them.
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knowledge, contends with uncontrolled knowledge diffusion, with the concomitant risk
of dissipating its rent. In addition, the start-up has to commercialize its technologies,
which poses a separate set of challenges to achieve growth that leads to harvest for
investors. This motivates us to hypothesize about the interaction effect of knowledge
diffusion and technology breadth, expecting negative effects on success and failure. A
start-up that signals specificity in its technologies and experiences wide diffusion of its
knowledge is able to survive because of more opportunities; yet it does not have
sufficient growth prospects thus impeding success. In contrast, for commercial challenges
we hypothesize symmetrical effects, i.e. coefficients that are of opposite signs, on
performance for the interaction with the signal of technology breadth.
We test our hypotheses using a sample of U.S. VC–funded wireless new ventures
founded in the period 1990-2009 that invested in patenting their technologies. To
simultaneously model success and failure events we conduct an event history study
within a competing risk framework (Lee & Wang, 2003). We find evidence of
mechanisms that simultaneously improve life chances of some new ventures while
impeding the harvest prospects of others—giving us a glimpse of factors that might lead
to ‘living dead’ outcome, i.e., persistence at the edge of success and failure. High
knowledge diffusion of a start-up’s technology when the underlying inventions are
specific is one such mechanism. More such mechanisms are identified and the
implications discussed.
Our paper contributes to the literature on entrepreneurial performance, and more
generally to the organizations literature, by providing a nuanced description of outcomes
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rather than assuming the simplistic caricature of success or failure alone. The paper
represents one of the first studies that treat success and failure simultaneously and
exposes mechanisms that inhibit both these outcomes concurrently. Second, the paper
also contributes to the literature on signals of quality used by new ventures to overcome
the liability of information asymmetry. The technology breadth of a start-up is an
important signal for evaluators—it assists resource providers in assessing the nascent
company. Lastly, the signal is also beneficial to the focal start-up by helping them realize
applications not conceived by them but discovered by others.
A third contribution is to the patent literature. Forward citation flows have been
variously conceptualized as measuring knowledge diffusion, endorsement, and
competition (Jaffe et al., 1993; Podolny & Stuart, 1995; Podolny et al., 1996). Certainly
the treatment of annual forward citations as a paper trail of knowledge diffusing is not
controversial. Yet its frequent interpretation as either deference or competition is at best
equivocal and requires understanding its differential impact on different outcomes and
adequate conditioning factors to tease apart the two effects.
In line with our claim regarding asymmetry of performance antecedents, we show
forward citations to have uneven effects for positive and negative performance. We find
that for success outcomes, the effect of forward citations as direct ties between firms has
a net endorsement effect (i.e., more of it lead to higher success odds), in line with
existing finding (Podolny et al., 1996). In contrast, for failure outcomes, the effect on
survival is negative, i.e., the more the inventions of the new firms form the basis of other
firms’ R&D, the higher the failure rate, thus indicating a net competitive effect. Extant
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research, primarily predicting success, has not highlighted the harmful effects of forward
citations.
We also parse the (net) effects of forward citation flows through an interaction
effect of technology breadth and forward citation. This interaction reverses the net benefit
in case of successful outcome, and the net harmful effect, in case of failure outcome.
Thus, the technology breadth along with forward citations increases the understanding of
the mechanisms of endorsement and competition in the technology arena.
Our findings have important practical implications. Both entrepreneurs and their
resource providers should pay careful attention to the scope of their technology as
revealed by its use over distinct domains. The signal of technology breadth not only
provides substantive information to resource providers, peer firms and strategic partners
but also sheds light on new possibilities to the inventing startup. For investors, this signal
of technology specialization provides valuable clues that may limit the downside risk as
the start-ups move forward.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Our theoretical framework centers on an important signal of quality of start-ups—
technology breadth, as revealed over time through the diversity of the domains in which
its inventions constitute building blocks for other inventions. We analyze the possibilities
and promise the range of possible applications, as disclosed through the technology
breadth signal, holds for both the venture’s prospects as well as the challenges they pose
on their road to a liquidity event for investors. We theorize about these effects for both
success (defined as either achieving an IPO or a trade sale) and failure (defined as either
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dissolution or a distressed sale—see Fig 1). By theorizing about both success and failure
we can uncover mechanisms that work in the same direction to prevent success and
failure and thus deduce persistence. Therefore mechanisms that reveal this

causal

asymmetry, whereby factors that promote success do not predict failure and vice-versa,
are of special interest.. In the following sections we first define what we mean by the
signal of technology breadth, explain our motivation to focus on that signal and then
develop testable hypotheses.

Signal of Technology Breadth – Possibilities & Promises
The underlying quality of nascent ventures is not observable and surrounded by a
good deal of uncertainty. A variety of quality signals to evaluate the potential of a startup have been investigated; they include (1) founders’ demographic backgrounds (Burton
et al., 2002; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990), (2) endorsements by reputable third
parties (Baum et al., 2000a; Fitza et al., 2009; Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Hsu, 2004;
Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Stuart et al., 1999), and (3) patents (Hsu & Ziedonis, 2008).
We propose a fourth and important signal, mostly overlooked by the entrepreneurial
literature, the technology breadth as evidenced by its applicability in different domains.
Inventions often have more than one (profitable) application and a given application
might represent just one way it can be exploited (Teece, 1982 ; pg 45). Applications may
be anticipated a priori, but more crucially they might surface through peer inventors that
build on the venture’s technologies. As Bassalla (1988 ; pg 141) notes, the applications
of an invention may not be known to the firm ex ante, and many applications are never
revealed:
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‘When an invention is selected for development, we cannot assume that the initial
choice is a unique and obvious one dictated by the nature of the artifact. Each
invention offers a spectrum of opportunities, only a few of which will ever be
developed during its lifetime. The first uses are not always the ones for which the
invention will become best known.’
Therefore the information received through other organizations in disparate
domains building on the inventions of the start-up is an important signal of the underlying
technology and its possibilities both to outsiders and the new venture itself. Conceptually,
we treat the signal as new information on technology breadth revealed over time.
Technologies vary along a continuum of specificity—some are very unique and
idiosyncratic, while others display a very wide range of applications.

Scholars

distinguish between General Purpose Technology (GPT) and Specific Purpose
Technology (SPT), with applications in many versus one or a few domains respectively
(Bresnahan & Trajtenberg, 1995; Gambardella & Giarratana, 2009; Hall & Trajtenberg,
2004; Rosenberg, 1976). Obviously, these labels are very coarse but convey a sense of
the breadth of domains to which a technology might be applicable. The variety of
domains to which the inventions of a venture becomes attached through peer
acknowledgement provides information on an important aspect of quality—the breadth of
possible applications. The more heterogeneous the domains from which these
acknowledgements emanate, the greater the opportunity set of applications, and by
implication the greater the future potential. We next consider the effect of the signal of
technology breadth on failure and success.
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Effect on Failure
The generality of a firms’ technology derives from the diversity of domains to
which it serves as a foundation for other innovations (Hall & Trajtenberg, 2004). A more
general technology will likely have more applications compared to a specialized or
narrow range of technology (Arora et al., 2004; Bresnahan & Trajtenberg, 1995;
Helpman, 1998). An oft cited example of technology thriving outside the intended
domain of application is Viagra, originally developed for cardiovascular applications, but
actually more applicable to treatment of male sexual dysfunctions (Rosenkopf & Nerkar,
2001). Similarly, startups with more general technology could thrive or survive through
applications outside their originally intended application area.
Possessing a general technology may allow new ventures to either choose from a
broader menu of possible source of revenue generating applications, or stumble upon
unexpected applications that help them generate sufficient cash-flow to keep afloat. For
example, Wireless-Fidelity (Wi-Fi) was originally developed as a wireless Ethernet
switch to replace wired Local area networks (LAN). However, over time the technology
has been applied for many other purposes not originally envisioned, ranging from short
distance serial cable replacement to multi-media applications in video game consoles,
MP3 players, smartphones, printers, digital cameras, and laptops. Other unexpected
applications include cellular coverage extender, location services for navigation, portable
Electrocardiograph (ECG) device to monitor a heart patient at home, home security and
baby monitors. Therefore, a start-up commercializing Wi-Fi technology could potentially
either find a market that could make them self-sustaining or provide them the opportunity
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to reinvent by shifting to a different application. For example, Strix Systems, a company
founded with the vision of developing Wi-Fi Mesh networking technology for indoor use,
first reinvented itself as a provider of outdoor networks in the face of competition from
established incumbents, such as Cisco, and the hype of municipalities providing free WiFi access across cities. However, the promise of large-scale Wi-Fi networks have yet to
be realized leading Strix to transform yet again into a developer of Wi-Fi products
geared towards providing outdoor surveillance systems to enterprises.
Consequently, holding everything else constant, a firm’s failure odds decline if its
technology enjoys wider appeal, while a counterpart with more specialized technology is
more prone to failure. The technologically more general venture is surrounded by a
diverse set of opportunities, while the specialized venture faces a restricted set of
possibilities. It is therefore plausible to expect the former to outdo the latter in survival
prospects. We therefore hypothesize:
H1. Holding all else constant, the greater the domain concentration of forward
citation flow that a new firm receives, the higher its failure hazard rate.

Effect on Success
Entrepreneurial success, which translates to a “harvest” event for the shareholders
does not stem from just being endowed with a more GPT. Rather success will depend on
the technology being matched to a high growth area or exploiting numerous applications
which might require foresight, resources and capability development, a commensurate
commercial strategy, serendipity or luck (Gompers & Lerner, 2004; Hsu, 2006a). Thus,
although favoring the venture with respect to survival, no direct effect of this signal on
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success is expected. Therefore, we next explore the challenges of delivering on the
promise that a signal of GPT entails for a start-up.

Challenges of Delivering on the Promise
The endowment of a start-up with a particular breadth of technology presents two
significant challenges to realize the potential value implied. The first challenge relates to
the diffusion of proprietary knowledge after new ventures patent their inventions. As the
knowledge regarding the invention spreads, its rent-generating potential might diminish
(Grady & Alexander, 1992). The technology breadth may dictate the extent of rent
dissipation by imposing constraints limiting the value that a resource-strapped new
venture can appropriate.
The second challenge relates to commercializing the technology (Gans et al.,
2002a; Gans & Stern, 2003). The commercial value of an invention not only depends on
its possible applications, but also on factors external and internal to the owner. External
factors include growth in the application domain, which in turn might depend on a variety
of elements such as existence of necessary industry infrastructures, adoption by users,
network effects as well as luck and serendipity (Denrell, Fang, & Winter, 2003; Katz &
Shapiro, 1994; Teece, 1986; Thoma, 2009). Internal firm-level factors are intriguing
given that technology strategy is a strategic choice for the venture. It would be naïve to
assume that start-ups can develop many applications when in possession of a GPT.
However, with foresight, luck and more importantly, appropriate commercial strategy,
new firms might well benefit from growing markets. For technology start-ups,
collaboration is among the most viable modes of commercialization in view of the
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resource constraints they face and the need to move fast in a high-velocity environment
(Gans & Stern, 2003). We therefore analyze the moderating effects of knowledge
diffusion and start-up collaboration strategy respectively on the effect of signal of
technology breadth on start-up success and failure.
Knowledge Diffusion and Signal of Technology Breadth
When firms patent their inventions they reveal proprietary information that other
firms may co-opt while building their R&D programs. Organizations that use these
inventions cite them as prior art. These forward citations have been conceptualized by
researchers in a number of ways. In the spillover literature they have served as a paper
trail for tracking the diffusion of knowledge (Jaffe et al., 1993). In sociological framings,
they have been construed as direct ties between organizations, interpreted as ‘deference’
or respect to the cited firm’s contributions (Podolny & Stuart, 1995; Podolny et al., 1996;
Stuart & Podolny, 1996). While acknowledging that such direct ties could harm the
firm’s prospects through increased competition, existing literature has mostly shown net
benefits of forward cites (Podolny et al., 1996; Stuart, 1998; Stuart et al., 1999). The net
effect of a forward citation as a direct tie on average remains an empirical question.
However, the argument for decrease in rent potential as knowledge diffuses widely rests
on more solid ground.
The more others leverage a startup’s inventions, the thinner the rent-generating
potential (Grady & Alexander, 1992; Martin, 1992). Rent from an invention is the returns
over and above the opportunity costs of producing related products. Government
protection will create and maintain some rents while others may arise from either more
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efficient production of an existing product or from new products that yields benefits in
excess of costs. However, the prospects of rich pay-offs stimulate rent-seeking from both
the inventing firms and others, which causes rent dissipation for the start-up.
Grady & Alexander (1992) identify three rent-reducing mechanisms. First, rent
anticipation provokes patent races that lead to excess resource commitment. Second,
these inventions inform about the existence of follow-on improvements on the focal
invention with high expected value thus promoting excessive inventive behavior and
consequent resource commitments; again such reactions dissipate some of the rent.
Third, in sectors where secrecy is an important value appropriating mechanism and
threats of designing around and litigation abound, resources may be diverted to efforts to
unlock or engineer around the invention, not to mention the threats of possible litigations.
We believe that such rent dissipation scenarios in the wireless sector— the sector of this
study, endowed with a weak-appropriability regime—are particularly salient. How this
rent dissipation due to knowledge diffusion affects performance also depends on the
breadth of technology, i.e., the diversity of domains to which the knowledge diffuses.
Hence we develop arguments on this interaction for both failure and success next.
Effect on Failure
We hypothesized the main effects of GPT signal—i.e., low concentration of
application domains—on failure to be positive. However, that beneficial relationship is
conditional on the rate of knowledge diffusion (i.e., the flow of forward citations) that the
start-ups’ invention experiences. First, startups face considerably more resource
constraints when maintaining a wide array of applications, including requisite capabilities
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and resources for the development and commercialization of the technology, and to
monitor their patent portfolio for infringements. Second, although patents are taken to be
a scale-free resource similar to brands without capacity constraints to application in many
domains (Levinthal & Wu, 2010), imperfections in patent enforcement and
appropriability may limit the ability of cash strapped start-ups to effectively use them
across many product markets. Firm’s with many applications to exploit, considering
everything else equal, will consequently face higher costs in appropriating rents from
their intellectual properties than firms with few possible technology application in the
face of high knowledge diffusion.
Third, ventures with a general technology portfolio may face greater rent
dissipation due to their knowledge diffusing compared to their specialized counterparts
due to greater costs albeit potentially higher revenue generating potential. On the revenue
side, having a broader technology could imply more potential competitors leading to
higher dissipation

(Fosfuri, 2006). On the cost side, when developing commercial

capabilities, generalist new firms have to deal with multi-point competition, diminished
economies of scope due to the dissimilar nature of the partners, higher opportunity costs,
or perhaps partnering with firms having complementary knowledge that require
significant amounts of inter-firm social capital (e.g. Gulati, 1995) to coordinate the
pooling of complementary technology and other intangible assets. Start-ups whose
inventive output is associated with only one or a limited set of applications have to deal
with similar firms and accordingly may be better able to pool or leverage proximate
resources to commercialize their technology. They might also enjoy higher bargaining
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power when dealing with partners who presumably compete in the same market and are
dependent on the start-up’s technology. The higher rate of forward citations to a SPT
firm’s inventions reinforces this dependency indicating greater likelihood of survival
when endowed with specific technology widely diffused in a narrow domain. Therefore
the conjecture:
H2a. The interaction between the forward citations flow and its concentration is
negatively related to the focal firm’s failure hazard rate.
Effect on Success
Our reasoning for hypothesis 2a suggested that a signal of high technology
concentration (SPT) and high rate of knowledge diffusion may impede failure. Firms
with SPT might have discovered a niche technology that is useful to proximate suppliers
and competitors. Given the specific nature of the technology, the growth of the niche may
not fulfill the expectations that might lead to an IPO or a trade sale. However, the
dependency created as evidenced by high levels of forward citations from a handful of
domains might generate stable cash flow and positive economic profit. These arguments
also resonate with the theories of resource partitioning and niche width in population
ecology (Carroll, 1985; Hannan & Freeman, 1977). A sector with a core dominated by
generalist behemoths but with a periphery abundant in opportunities, much like the
industry under investigation, provides the ideal conditions required for market
partitioning. Firms with SPT in such a sector therefore might end up in niches that
present low growth prospects not attractive to investors and acquirers while firms with
GPT may have higher growth prospects conducive to IPO or acquisition.
Therefore our next hypothesis:
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H2b. The interaction between the forward citations flow and its concentration is
negatively related to the focal firm’s success hazard rate.

Start-up Collaboration Strategy – Alliance Diversity and Technology Breadth
Signal
All firms, whether big or small, face financial resource constraints (Schoonhoven,
Eisenhardt, & Lyman, 1990), preventing them from developing or commercializing a
technology simultaneously across multiple applications (Adner & Levinthal, 2008). This
constraint is especially high for start-ups. However, collaborative relationships may
enable start-ups to obtain resources necessary to commercialize new technologies,
develop links with suppliers and customers, and more generally access financial and
technological assets (e.g., Gans et al., 2002a). For those new ventures whose technologies
are geared towards multiple domains, alliances or joint ventures can provide
complementary resources as well as access to larger markets. Collaborations include joint
ventures, licensing as well as strategic alliances in marketing, manufacturing and R&D,
collectively termed as alliances henceforth. The greater the heterogeneity of strategic
partners, the more a venture will benefit, consistent with the learning and knowledge
acquisition literature (Baum et al., 2000a; Powell, 1990; Shan, Walker, & Kogut, 1994).
This learning and knowledge perspective is grounded in the network literature and
holds that having a large and diverse set of partners confers survival benefits. In highvelocity environments where knowledge and technology evolves at a fast pace, alliances
are common (Powell, 1990). Firms need the dynamic capability to increase their
advantage or in many cases to preserve it (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Since any one
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firm is unlikely to have all the resources and capabilities needed, they benefit from
partners to access the requisite knowledge (Powell, 1990). Bringing together the
capabilities and knowledge enables more ambitious innovations (Baum et al., 2000a;
Shan et al., 1994), not to mention increased innovation rates (Powell, Koput, & SmithDoerr, 1996). They also give access to a variety of network resources such as markets,
human resources and social capital (Gulati, 1999; Lavie, 2007).
Among entrepreneurial firms the benefits of having a diverse set of partners has
been repeatedly demonstrated. For example, when a start-up’s alliance network
comprises many partners with diverse knowledge and capabilities, its initial performance
significantly increases (Baum et al., 2000a). A larger set of partners provides more
opportunity to learn and grow (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996). Start-ups with
such inferred social capital enjoy access to a wider range of ideas and information
improving decision making (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002), not to mention capabilities
for alliance management (Baum et al., 2000a). In short, alliance diversity favors a startup
especially in the context of its technology endowments and we explore the moderating
effect of alliance diversity with the signal of technology breadth.
Effect on Failure
Ventures embracing a broad technology platform as shown through diversity of
citations might replicate their technology diversity with a broad base of strategic
alliances. Such bundling of technology and partnerships might further enhance their
survival prospects (Teece, 1996). By contrast, very focused niche players, whose patents
come with one or perhaps a few kindred applications are very much at risk in prematurely
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exiting the sector, and all the more so if their concentrated technology output is combined
with a heterogeneous set of strategic partner. Developing collaboration relationship is
costly; more so when they involve partners that are not very similar. Therefore if the firm
expends too much energy in such activities without necessarily needing them as indicated
by the signal of technology breadth then the survival prospects of the new venture will be
compromised. On the other hand, an SPT signal with low diversity in alliance would
imply a good fit between technological needs and alliance strategy and could improve
performance. Conversely, a GPT signal with low alliance diversity would be indicative of
firms not being able to develop relationship with a diverse set of partners thus reducing
their opportunity to learn and access much needed resources. Therefore we predict:
H3a. The interaction between alliance diversity and the concentration of forward
citations received is positively related to the focal firm’s failure hazard rate.

Effect on Success
In the case of this interaction we expect a symmetrical effect on success using a
similar logic as the effect on failure. Firms with GPT and a diverse alliance portfolio
might thrive because they have higher likelihood of tapping into a growth market when
compared to a firm with alliances only in specific markets. Further, they might have the
opportunity to learn and experiment with their technologies when they interact with
partners across a variety of partners market. In contrast, firms with SPT will not have
these opportunities and might be stuck in a market with lower growth prospect, the very
reason why they survive through creating dependence on a concentrated group of firms in
closely related technologies. Therefore our final hypothesis:
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H3b. The interaction between alliance diversity and the concentration of forward
citations received is negatively related to the focal firm’s success hazard rate.
EMPIRICAL SETTING AND METHODOLOGY
Industry Context
Our study is based in the wireless sector during the period 1990-2009. The sector
witnessed transitions from successive generations of standards-based technologies,
starting with the second-generation (2G) voice-based technologies and followed by the
data-oriented third-generation and fourth-generation (3G & 4G) technologies (Ansari &
Garud, 2009). The wireless sector exhibits a very complex ‘ecosystem’ that is dominated
by firms that are vendors of equipment and handsets through control of important
complementary assets. The influence of powerful generalist incumbents such as Ericsson,
Nokia, and Apple, who conduct R&D across the value chain, however, has not been a
deterrent to venture capital funding at the edges of the core controlled by them. New
firms not only introduced new wireless technologies, but also spawned new software,
applications, and content, both general and specific. Some examples include antenna
technology with applications across various domains such as radar, space exploration,
and medicine, and embedded systems and software specifically designed for handsets to
general purpose reprogrammable radio chips.
Data and Sample
We collected data on VC-funded firms in the U.S. wireless sector that were
founded between the years 1990 and 2009. We only include those new firms that engage
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in patenting its inventions because the signal of interest is applicable only to these firms.
Therefore our sample consists of 283 firms15.
Obtaining data on the alliances of private companies is extremely challenging.
SDC Platinum does not provide comprehensive coverage for such alliances (Schilling,
2009). We therefore used Factiva to supplement those alliances (Lavie, 2007). These two
combined sources also did not provide full coverage. Many of the press releases were not
captured by the major news agencies covered in Factiva. We therefore used the company
websites with the help of the Wayback machine (http://web.archive.org) to collect such
information. Once the alliance information was downloaded we collected information
about the industry affiliations of the partners using Hoovers, Zephyr and CorpTech.16
Other sources of data include Derwent, a database of global patents maintained by
Thomson since 1969 for patents. The historical Web sites of firms in our sample using
the Wayback machine were used to source management team information. SDC, Zephyr,
Factiva, and Hoovers provided merger and acquisition and IPO information. Finally,
COMPUSTAT was accessed for segment data on publicly listed wireless firms.
Dependent Variables and Empirical Strategy
We conduct an event history study of success and failure rate using a competing
risk framework. We categorize failed firms as those ventures that were liquidated due to
outright bankruptcy or that were acquired in a distressed sale. These modes of dissolution
15

Sample selection bias concerns are allayed by comparing firms that patent and firm that do not as
detailed in Chapter 2.
16
Alliances were identified using codes reported in Factiva and when the press release explicitly stated in
its body a strategic alliance, joint venture or licensing deal. Since we look at aggregate alliances, the main
effort was destined towards cleaning duplicates and triangulating the information. This was carried out by
two RA’s with overlapping data points to ensure reliability. We used a combination of manual and
automated methods to remove these duplicates.
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were primarily determined through VentureXpert, which maintains this information in
the ‘Company Current Situation’ field. For those firms involved in a distressed sale, the
information came from SDC and Zephyr, which captures this status in the deal
description. Failure, a dummy variable, is set to 1 in the year that the focal firm failed
and 0 in all other years from founding. Successful firms are those that achieve Initial
Public Offerings (IPO) or that are acquired. The information came from VentureXpert,
SDC and Zephyr. Success, a binary variable, is set to 1 in the year that the focal firm had
the IPO or sale event and 0 in all other years from founding. All the remaining firmobservations were censored at the end of the study period. We identified 56 failed
outcomes and 91 successful ones and created firm-year spells from founding to failure or
to the end of 2009 when the data are censored. We model the hazard rates for these two
events experienced by the firm.
We use a competing risk Cox proportional hazard model (Lee & Wang, 2003) of
the two start-up outcome events, success and failure. Prior studies investigating start-up
performance have primarily used either a Logit specification for a binary outcome or
conducted an event history study of a single event such as failure or IPO with the notable
exception of Giot & Schwienbacher (2007), who analyze determinants of exit options for
US venture capital funds. Since start-ups after birth face the risk of both failing as well as
succeeding, conducting an event history study under a competing risk framework is
appropriate, especially when the goal is to uncover asymmetric effects that could point
towards persistence tendencies. The idea of the competing risks model is to let the
hazard rate vary with the end state. In the framework of a competing risks model, the
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duration corresponding to the state not realized is truncated. From a methodological point
of view, this implies that the realized state will contribute to the likelihood function via
its density function, while the truncated state contributes to the likelihood function via its
survivor function. Competing risks models focus on both the kind of exits (success or
failure) and time to exit (duration) unlike event history studies of single events. It is also
superior to a Logit model, which besides not handling censoring, would only focus on
the type of exit (binary choice); the likelihood function of a Logit model also does not
take duration into account (Giot & Schwienbacher, 2007). The regressions are computed
using the stcox procedure of STATA.
Independent Variables
Forward Citation Flow
This is a count of the annual flow of citations that the firm receives from others
and captures the rate of knowledge diffusion of the focal venture’s inventions. On
average a start-up in our firm receives 5 citations every year with a range of 0 to 158.
Forward Citation Concentration
To operationalize the signal of technology breadth, our main independent
variable, we gather all the patents that cite the start-up firm’s inventions as prior-art, also
referred to as forward citations to the focal patents. We construct a herfindahl measure of
the concentration of the different four digit International Patent Classification (IPC)
subclass from which a start-up receives forward citation in a given year—the year the
citation was received as indicated by the application date. IPC subclasses capture the
functions and applications of an invention and hence indicate possible technical domains
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to which the invention maybe applicable (Hall, 2002; Hall et al., 2001; Hall &
Trajtenberg, 2004). By considering the ongoing addition of forward citation diversity,
such an index as signal becomes a time variant indicator of its technological
heterogeneity. This variable ranges between 0.07 and 1 with a mean of 0.17.
Alliance Concentration
The diversity of the firms alliance partners is captured using a herfindahl
concentration measure of the primary SIC code to which the partner belongs (Baum et al.,
2000a). Therefore, this variable, ranging from 0.06 to 1 with an average of 0.34,
measures the diversity of product markets that the start-up’s collaborative relations span.
The lower the value of this variable, the higher the product market heterogeneity of the
alliance partners.
Control Variables
We include controls in seven broad categories that effect firm performance. First,
we use patent related controls. These include annual patents received, the number of IPC
classes from which the firm receives forward citations (to control for the number of
technology domains a firm I associated with), the stock of patents granted (Hsu &
Ziedonis, 2008), and the stock of forward citations received in the previous years to
capture the value of the patents (Hall et al., 2005). The second category relates to market
conditions, the IPO and mergers and acquisition activity levels per year, that are
important drivers for liquidity events (Sorenson & Stuart, 2008; Stuart & Sorenson,
2003). The third group of controls variables pertain to investor characteristics, including
investor quality (Hochberg et al., 2007), using the count of VCs featured in the Forbes
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Midas list between 2000 and 2009 that invest in a start-up, investor confidence, using the
total number of VCs that invest, and investor expectations for the start-up, using the
count of investors who commit funds in all rounds of financing (Sorenson & Stuart,
2008).
Fourth, we control for the number of rounds of financing received and time from
founding to the first VC financing as new ventures need resources to survive (Lee et al.,
2001). In the fifth group, we include the start-up experience of the founding team to
account for variations in initial quality among the start-ups (Burton et al., 2002;
Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). The sixth category includes corporate development
actions that account for endorsement effects that have been shown to be significant
predictors of a new venture’s success (Stuart et al., 1999). Last, we include product
market growth at the sector level (Covin & Slevin, 1989), using the total sales per year in
all business segments in which publicly quoted wireless operators (SIC 4812) and
vendors (SIC 3663) operate. Finally, we include the start-up entry year to account for
potential violation of the non-informative censoring assumption. Table 9 below provides
definitions of all variables used, and Table 10 provides summary statistics and
correlations.
RESULTS
We report the results for both success and failure from a competing risk Cox
regression in Table 11. A glance through the table provides interesting insights on
asymmetric effects of factors on outcomes. In our case asymmetry implies that the
coefficients for a given factor have the same signs for both success and failure instead of
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being opposite. We first look at our hypotheses and then analyze some of the interesting
effects of the control variables. Models (1)-(3) correspond to failure while (4)-(6)
corresponds to success, each of the three corresponding to the three hypotheses for the
two events, success and failure.
Our hypothesis about the effect of the signal of technology breadth finds support
in the analysis. We expected high concentration of forward citations (i.e., a signal of
SPT) to increase failure while no effect was anticipated for success. Models (1)-(3) reveal
positive and highly significant effects on Forward Citation Concentration on failure
hazard. Models (4)-(6) demonstrate no statistical significance of this variable on success.
The coefficient from model (3) implies that at the mean value of Forward Citation
Concentration the failure hazard rate increases by 28%, while the percentage increase in
the failure hazard rate for an increase from the mean value to one standard deviation
above it is 44%.
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Table 9. Variable Definitions (Chapter 3)
Variable

Description

Dependent Variables
(1) Failure

A dummy indicating that the firm had experienced a distressed sale
or had become defunct in a given year
A dummy indicating that the firm had experienced an IPO or trade
sale in a given year

(2) Success
Independent Variables
(3)
Forward
Citation
Concentration
(4) Alliance Concentration
Control Variables

Herfindahl measure of concentration of IPC classes that forward
citations originate from
Herfindahl measure of concentration of SIC of alliance partners

Patenting Related
(5) Patent Grant Flow
(6) Forward Citation Flow
(7) Self-Citations
(8) Number of IPC Classes
(9) Patent Grant Stock at t-1

Number of new patents granted to the firm in a given year
Number of new cites received by the firm in a year
Total number of self-cites received by the firm in a year
Total number of IPC classes from which a firm receives forward
citations
Stock of the firm’s patents at the start of a year

(10) Total Forward Cite Stock at t1
Exit Market Conditions

Stock of forward cites received by the firm at the start of a year

(11) IPO Heat

Intensity of IPO activity in the firm’s primary SIC code in a given
year
Number of targets acquired in the SIC in a given year

(13) Number of Targets in SIC
Investor Characteristics
(14) Total Number of Investors
(15) Number of Investors Investing
in All Rounds
(16) Prominent Investor
Financing Related

Number of distinct investors that invested in the firm over all rounds
Number of investors that invest in all rounds

(17) Number of Rounds Received

Number of rounds of funding received by the firm till the end of
study
Time in days from founding to receiving first round

(18) Time to First Round

Indicator of presence of investor that was in the Forbes Midas list

Initial Firm Quality
(19) Founding Team
Experience
Firm Strategic Action

Start-up

Sum of wireless start-ups founding team worked in prior to the focal
firm

(20) Number of Alliances

Number of alliances by the firm in a year

(21) Number of Acquisitions

Number of acquisitions by the firm in a year

Others
(22) Business Segment Sales in
Wireless
(23) Entry Year

Total sales of all public wireless companies in a given SIC code
Year of entry of the firm in the risk set
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Table 10. Summary Statistics and Correlations (Chapter 3)
Mean
S.D.
Min
Max
(1)
(1)
0.03
0.16
0.00
1.00 1.000
(2)
0.04
0.21
0.00
1.00 -0.036
(3)
0.17
0.25
0.07
1.00 0.070
(4)
0.34
0.34
0.06
1.00 -0.007
(5)
1.37
3.66
0.00
41.00 0.015
(6)
5.06
13.65
0.00
158.00 0.104
(7)
0.30
1.26
0.00
23.00 0.033
(8)
6.78
6.02
1.00
38.00 -0.036
(9)
3.80
10.34
0.00
112.00 0.077
(10)
17.53
76.83
0.00 1364.00 0.032
(11)
0.04
0.06
0.00
0.28 -0.053
(12) 137.37
195.44
0.00
662.00 -0.041
(13)
6.71
4.84
1.00
29.00 -0.029
(14)
0.88
1.01
0.00
8.00 0.035
(15)
0.68
0.47
0.00
1.00 -0.026
(16)
4.58
2.89
1.00
16.00 -0.045
(17) 645.96
665.62
0.00 3025.00 -0.018
(18)
0.59
1.22
0.00
8.00 -0.066
(19)
0.41
1.04
0.00
13.00 -0.052
(20)
0.04
0.23
0.00
5.00 -0.013
(21) 1.92e+06 3.31e+06
0.00 1.06e+07 0.022
(22) 1999.44
3.52 1990.00 2008.00 -0.056

(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)

(10)
1.000
-0.069
-0.056
0.196
-0.057
-0.010
0.079
0.057
-0.071
0.110
0.027
0.106
-0.195

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

1.000
0.052
0.003
0.045
0.083
0.016
-0.002
0.049
0.021
0.036
0.103
0.010
-0.002
0.046
-0.034
-0.067
0.018
0.012
0.132
0.008
-0.037

1.000
-0.048
0.109
0.127
0.083
0.147
0.166
0.092
-0.033
0.019
0.120
-0.047
0.033
0.105
-0.070
-0.055
0.117
0.059
0.023
-0.085

1.000
-0.029
-0.031
-0.041
-0.086
-0.074
-0.058
-0.037
-0.051
-0.099
0.048
-0.027
-0.116
0.013
-0.007
-0.106
-0.011
0.042
-0.011

1.000
0.508
0.688
0.395
0.390
0.198
-0.082
-0.066
0.148
-0.033
0.097
0.041
-0.044
-0.009
0.073
-0.009
0.107
-0.053

1.000
0.639
0.420
0.569
0.552
-0.084
-0.054
0.270
-0.048
0.053
0.123
-0.027
-0.080
0.102
0.017
0.183
-0.216

1.000
0.314
0.398
0.358
-0.058
-0.063
0.134
-0.022
0.028
0.051
-0.018
-0.024
0.077
-0.024
0.183
-0.120

1.000
0.427
0.300
-0.065
-0.123
0.323
-0.124
0.069
0.145
0.013
-0.086
0.026
-0.020
0.205
-0.245

1.000
0.761
-0.092
-0.082
0.212
-0.078
0.061
0.111
-0.000
-0.051
0.107
0.004
0.110
-0.141

(19)

(20)

(21)

(22)

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

1.000
0.748
0.072
-0.009
0.095
0.041
0.031
-0.033
0.047
0.008
-0.225
-0.096

1.000
0.040
0.026
0.120
0.036
-0.038
0.049
0.134
0.060
-0.240
0.074

1.000
-0.259
0.388
0.649
-0.240
-0.063
0.161
0.113
0.094
-0.274

1.000
-0.045
-0.433
-0.030
0.121
-0.001
-0.059
-0.019
0.276

1.000
0.219
-0.303
0.155
0.149
0.024
-0.049
0.082

1.000
-0.179
-0.011
0.084
0.063
0.072
-0.205

1.000
-0.118
-0.103
-0.029
-0.046
-0.429

1.000
0.045
-0.011
-0.032
0.359

Absolute correlations above 0.036 are significant at p < .10.

1.000
0.073 1.000
0.008 -0.028 1.000
0.042 -0.028 -0.141 1.000
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Table 11. Competing Risk Cox Proportional Hazard Regressions (Chapter 3)
(1)
VARIABLES

(3)

(4)

(5)
Success
H2b
0.449
(0.485)
-0.165**
(0.0769)

(6)

H3a
H3b
1.464**
-0.00961
0.594
(0.645)
(0.465)
(0.627)
Fwd Citation Conc X Fwd Citation Flow
-0.339***
-0.163**
(0.124)
(0.0768)
Fwd Citation Conc X Alliance Conc
0.987
-0.528
(1.575)
(1.495)
Alliance Concentration
-0.651
-0.768*
-1.014*
-0.184
-0.206
-0.0967
(0.436)
(0.452)
(0.610)
(0.338)
(0.342)
(0.456)
Patent Grant Flow
-0.127
-0.0515
-0.0536
0.208*** 0.239*** 0.240***
(0.105)
(0.115)
(0.115)
(0.0800)
(0.0829)
(0.0830)
Patent Grant Flow Square
0.00382
0.00186
0.00190 -0.00821** -0.00962** -0.00967**
(0.00275)
(0.00312)
(0.00313) (0.00419) (0.00447) (0.00448)
Forward Citation Flow
0.0481***
0.117***
0.118***
0.0206** 0.0536*** 0.0533***
(0.0133)
(0.0271)
(0.0271)
(0.00968) (0.0169)
(0.0169)
Patent Grant Stock at t-1
0.0442***
0.0600**
0.0606**
0.00373
0.00165
0.00164
(0.0160)
(0.0261)
(0.0263)
(0.0149)
(0.0160)
(0.0160)
Total Fw Cite Stock at t-1
-0.00339
-0.00481
-0.00489
-0.00354 -0.00264 -0.00264
(0.00366)
(0.00425)
(0.00425) (0.00345) (0.00315) (0.00315)
Self Citations
-0.278*
-0.401**
-0.403**
-0.149
-0.143
-0.144
(0.150)
(0.170)
(0.170)
(0.131)
(0.135)
(0.135)
Number of IPC Classes
-0.177*** -0.220*** -0.221***
-0.0391
-0.0561* -0.0550*
(0.0507)
(0.0566)
(0.0564)
(0.0266)
(0.0297)
(0.0298)
IPO Heat
-9.239
-8.713
-8.745
-0.438
-0.575
-0.539
(6.740)
(6.553)
(6.528)
(3.156)
(3.175)
(3.184)
Number of Targets in SIC
0.000313
0.000213
0.000240 0.00278*** 0.00274*** 0.00274***
(0.00134)
(0.00130)
(0.00129) (0.000748) (0.000746) (0.000747)
Total Number of Investors
-0.0406
0.0186
0.0168
-0.0101
0.00671
0.00569
(0.0461)
(0.0545)
(0.0549)
(0.0371)
(0.0384)
(0.0385)
No. of Investors Investing in all rounds
0.132
0.101
0.112
-0.0903
-0.0983
-0.0997
(0.152)
(0.150)
(0.150)
(0.133)
(0.132)
(0.132)
Prominent Investor
0.359
0.259
0.283
0.448
0.406
0.394
(0.355)
(0.371)
(0.372)
(0.296)
(0.298)
(0.300)
Number of Rounds Received
-0.134
-0.177*
-0.176*
-0.285*** -0.294*** -0.292***
(0.0871)
(0.0913)
(0.0916)
(0.0778)
(0.0780)
(0.0783)
Time to First Round
-0.000702*** -0.000744*** -0.000748*** -0.00131*** -0.00131*** -0.00132***
(0.000264) (0.000277) (0.000277) (0.000250) (0.000249) (0.000249)
Founding Team Startup Exp
-0.817**
-0.904**
-0.899**
0.235***
0.231**
0.231**
(0.361)
(0.379)
(0.379)
(0.0899)
(0.0905)
(0.0907)
Number of Alliances
-0.937**
-1.047*** -1.048***
-0.203
-0.233*
-0.234*
(0.404)
(0.386)
(0.387)
(0.126)
(0.129)
(0.129)
Number of Acquisitions
-0.408
-0.449
-0.470
0.868*** 0.866*** 0.874***
(0.937)
(0.974)
(0.977)
(0.233)
(0.237)
(0.239)
Biz Seg Sales in Wireless
3.85e-08
3.41e-08
3.64e-08 7.61e-08** 8.05e-08** 8.00e-08**
(4.38e-08) (4.48e-08) (4.51e-08) (3.75e-08) (3.77e-08) (3.77e-08)
Entry Year
-0.131**
-0.131**
-0.134** -0.184*** -0.176*** -0.176***
(0.0553)
(0.0568)
(0.0569)
(0.0527)
(0.0529)
(0.0528)
Observations
2070
2070
2070
2070
2070
2070
Log likelihood
-163.3
-157.4
-157.2
-263.5
-260.6
-260.5
Chi-square
94.44
106.2
106.6
104.9
110.8
111.0
Number of firms
283
283
283
283
283
283
Number of events
56
56
56
91
91
91
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Forward Citation Concentration

H1
1.021**
(0.507)

(2)
Failure
H2a
1.693***
(0.518)
-0.335***
(0.123)
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To test H2a & H2b we interacted Forward Citation Concentration with the
Forward Citation Flow. Model (2) and (5) show the results for this analysis. As supposed
we observe an asymmetrical effect on failure and success. High Forward Citation
Concentration (signal of SPT) and Forward Citation Flow (the curve with diamond high
knowledge diffusion rate) reduces likelihood of failure but at the same time also
diminishes success chances as shown by the negative and significant (although weak in
the case of success) effects on the two events. We plot the interaction effects in Figure 6
and Figure 7 below.
Figure 6 illustrates this interaction effect on failure at three levels of Forward
Citation Flow – i.e., at the mean, and at one standard deviation above and below the mean
of this variable. At low levels of Forward Citation Flow (the curve with diamond shaped
points), the relationship between Forward Citation Concentration and failure hazard is
monotonically increasing. At mean and high values of Forward Citation Flow (shown by
curves with square and triangle shaped points) the relationship reverses. Thus, at high
values of concentration (signal of SPT) the failure hazard decreases. Analogously, in
Figure 7 at high Forward Citation Flow the success hazard decreases (the curve with
triangle shaped points). Therefore, firms that receive signals conveying SPT have lower
failure as well as success hazard as high levels of knowledge diffuse out in a given year
pointing towards existence of persistence. As hypothesized we see asymmetric effect of
both failure and success chances being diminished when a signal of SPT is accompanied
with high rate of knowledge diffusion. Consequently, the interaction of these two factors,
high rate of forward citations and high concentration of those citations in few domains,
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provides evidence of a systematic causal factor that leads to neither success nor failure
events. Therefore, such firms stand the risk of persisting without any events that provide
investors the opportunity to exit.
Figure 6. Interaction Effect Technology Breadth & Diffusion H2a (Failure)
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In contrast, H3a & H3b are not supported in the regression analysis. The
interaction of Forward Citation Concentration with Alliance Concentration has no
statistical significance. The main effect of Alliance Concentration (included for
interpreting the interaction) is also not found to be significant. One explanation could be
that many of these alliances do not provide economic benefits; rather start-ups pursue
them to gain legitimacy and endorsement. For our analysis we did not look at different
types of alliances because Factiva does not categorize strategic alliances in the way SDC
does. However, scanning the deals we found very few licensing deals reported. Since
licensing deals are generally not publicly reported, our data on alliances may be skewed
towards those deals that provide intangible benefits rather than direct monetary
compensations.
We highlighted before that evidence of asymmetric effects, as we see in the case
of H2a and H2b, could be an important empirical tool to investigate non-events. In that
spirit, we finally analyze some of the interesting results in the effect of the control
variables on performance. The signaling value of patents is symmetric (i.e. decreases
failure and increases success rate) and beneficial for both failure and success as current
research predicts. The main effect of Forward Citation Flow (included to interpret the
hypothesized interaction effect) is indeed fascinating, demonstrating asymmetry. Higher
knowledge diffusion seems to benefit success while increasing failure chances. Thus,
forward citation flow has a net endorsement effect for successful firms, but has a net
competitive effect for failed firms. In Chapter 2 we theorized and found evidence that
forward citations from firms with the reputation to litigate cause start-up failure and
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explain partially the harmful effects. In additional analysis, not reported here, we find no
effect on success events when the citations come from alters with a reputation to litigate.
Those results, along with the systematically different effect of forward citation flow
between failed and successful outcomes lead us to speculate that a deeper understanding
of the actual content of the inventions beyond patent classes and prior-art citations would
enlighten us further on the exact mechanisms that lead to either deference or competition.
Further, longer gestation period (measured through Time to First Round) has an
asymmetric effect on the two dependent variables. They are good for survival, decreasing
failure, but not good for harvest, diminishing success. This could be due to inertial forces
setting in as the firm ages, diminishing the potential of VCs to influence or change
course. Initial founding team experience has symmetrical and beneficial effects on
performance much like the other signal of quality much discussed in the literature,
patents. Our study therefore reinforces the importance and reliability of these signals of
quality to overcome information asymmetry and prevent the lemon problem (Akerlof,
1970).
Finally, the number of alliances per year has an asymmetrical effect in that higher
alliances rate help survival but limit successful harvest opportunities; pointing towards a
substitution effect of alliances with successful exit. They might be making the start-up
less attractive as an acquisition candidate as well as limiting the growth potential.
Overall, these results provide evidence of a number of forces that may be conspiring to
create persistence by lowering success probability and increasing survival prospects.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We want to state upfront that our focus is not on low tech start-ups; rather we
focus on ventures that require extensive inputs from outsiders such as VC firms whose
expectations about success are high returns in a clear cut time horizon. In other words,
we do not consider low tech ventures, or ventures with minimal external inputs such as
capital and IPR, and commensurate expectations—including mom and pop restaurants,
street-side shoemakers, children’s lemonade stands or marginal real estate brokers with
little sales revenue.
Our goal in this paper was to look at success and failures of start-ups
simultaneously to indirectly catch a glimpse of what has been termed as ‘living dead’
firms. To achieve that we exploit asymmetric effects on two start-up outcome events,
success (achieving IPO or trade sale) or failure (dissolution due to bankruptcy, distressed
sale or closing up business). Extant literature has usually centered on either success or
failure, thus excluding the possibility to uncover forces that work towards both inhibiting
success and failure. We believe that this is an important contribution and can serve well
as an empirical tool to study non-events.
We theorized about a signal of quality of the inventions of a new venture that is
uncovered over time through their use by others in different domains. With the
assumption that a firm might not know a priori about all the possible applications of its
technology, we make the assertion that a signal of GPT will be good for survival although
success will depend on how they cope with challenges of rent dissipation through
diffusion of the knowledge and their ability to cope with the commercial challenges.
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We found evidence of asymmetry in causal effects of the signal of nature of
technology. Having a GPT did help survival, but had no predictive power for success.
The most fascinating result is the moderating effect of the forward citation flow that a
start-up receives on the signal of the nature of its technology. In both models of success
and failure, firms with high concentration of domains citing them combined with high
levels of forward citation per year face a lower probability of either succeeding or failing;
strong indication of persistence that VC’s have labeled ‘living dead’ (Bourgeois &
Eisenhardt, 1987; Ruhnka, Feldman, & Dean, 1992). Future research should explore
explicitly this twilight zone that has received scant attention till date.
A broader theoretical explanation of the asymmetric effect of high technology
concentration and high knowledge diffusion on performance can be found in the
competitive strategy literature. The simultaneous specificity and diffusion of technology
attenuates the differentiation possibilities within an industry thus leading to many middle
of the road performers. Decreased differentiation leads to broader niches albeit with
lower growth prospects that encourage persistence.Perhaps some of the intriguing results
appear in the control variables that we did not theorize about. First, we find that more a
firm’s inventions are used by others, the new venture’s survival and success prospects are
affected in contrasting manner. They inhibit survival but promote success. Forward
citation flows have been used to measure knowledge trail, deference as well as
competitive effects (Jaffe et al., 1993; Podolny & Stuart, 1995; Podolny et al., 1996).
Failures seem to bear the brunt of the harmful effects of rent dissipation through
knowledge diffusion and designing around while successes seem to enjoy the
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endorsement effects. The technology breadth via the interaction effect gives us clue on
the mechanisms in play but also raises further questions on why the amplification of the
respective harmful and beneficial effects occurs. An interesting research project would
probe further on the content of the inventions and why such a stark difference
materializes.
A second interesting finding is that longer gestation period before receiving VC
funding has unbalanced effect on performance. Survival chances increases when the time
taken to receive first round of funding is longer maybe because the routines and
capabilities of the firms get established however the downside is that success chances are
lowered pointing towards rigidities developed. This could also reflect some sort of VC
selection effect where exciting prospects are picked up early and nurtured to harvest. The
VC’s may find it harder to influence outcomes when practices, routines and capabilities
are more established. Again these issues merit further investigation.
Finally, the amount of annual alliances that a firm undertakes every year increases
survival but prevents successful outcome. While easy to explain the beneficial effects, the
adverse impact on harvest points towards the downsides of too many alliances; with more
alliances it is likely that the new venture partners with prospective buyers. It is probable
that with more alliance partners the value appropriation by the start-up is negatively
affected. The knowledge spillovers from alliances with powerful players with much
higher resources and ambition may decrease the growth prospects of the new firm. These
concerns could shed interesting insights and are worth further attention.
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Our study is not without limitations. It is set in a single context and applies only
to those firms that patent. This is not a big concern in high technology sectors where the
norm is to seek patent protection. In addition, the empirical method only allows us to
infer persistence indirectly. Identifying ‘living dead’ firms and analyzing them directly
would therefore be another interesting research project. Our criteria for success are also
specific to the context. Therefore replicating the study in other context and using other
success benchmark could help us verify generalizability. Limitations notwithstanding,
this study makes important contribution to our understanding of the entrepreneurship as
well as the broader performance literature.
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Chapter 4: Neither Success nor Failure: Effects of Founding Team Imprinting
and their Subsequent Disruption on the ‘Living Dead’ Outcome

‘It was not until I got into the VC business that I found out about the terrible,
dreadful "living dead" - a term used to describe companies that merely survive,
without future prospects. Normally fearless VCs fear the living dead. So do our
LPs (the people who invest in VCs) who worry that we might waste our time (and
their money) on a bunch of little companies that go nowhere.’
- Ho Nam, Altos Ventures, November 7, 2007

Entrepreneurs and their firms face turbulent times during their creation. The
overwhelming majority face a premature exit while a smaller subset enjoys enormous
rewards.17 From ecological (Hannan & Freeman, 1984) to conventional entrepreneurial
research (Gompers & Lerner, 2004), the twin foci of research have been on success and
failure as if the outlook for start-ups is confined to these mutually exclusive outcomes.
The prevailing literature notwithstanding, start-ups’ success versus failure does not
exhaust all possible outcomes; many new ventures neither fail nor succeed, persisting on
the edge of failure (or if one prefers a more positively toned framing, sustaining
themselves on the brink of success). Such firms are prevalent in many high-tech sectors,
yet they have been largely ignored by numerous strands of entrepreneurial research which
typically contrast between survival (avoiding willful dissolution, bankruptcy or distressed
sale) and success (investor harvest events via Initial Public Offering (IPO) or trade sale)
as logically possible outcomes.

17

Over a ten year period survival rate is 29% in the general population of new single-establishment
businesses according to US census data. More than 50% fail before the fourth year (Shane, S. A. 2008. The
illusions of entrepreneurship: The costly myths that entrepreneurs, investors, and policy makers live by:
Yale Univ Pr.).
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This paper investigates founding team characteristics and its effect on marginally
performing start-ups that neither succeed nor fail. The founding team of a new venture
provides important signals of quality that help venture capitalists identify and rank new
firms in terms of human capital endowment (Baum & Silverman, 2004), routines and
capabilities (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990), reputational capital (Shane & Cable,
2002), and legitimacy (Cohen & Dean, 2005). Proxies of quality such as the team’s
previous experience in founding other firms, experience in relevant industries and its size
provide information on different underlying routines and capabilities that might impact
the start-ups performance. In addition, loss of founding team members may signify
disruption of these routines or may hint towards problems within the new firm. We
analyze the effect of these factors on firms that neither fail nor succeed.
Since extant research revolves around liquidation and liquidity events (closing
down the business, IPO and acquisition) as indicators of new venture performance, our
knowledge of start-ups that are neither successful nor abject failures, but reside
somewhere between these two performance opposites, is limited. Accounting measures of
start-up performance usually are not feasible since start-ups are private companies that do
not disclose their income statements or balance sheets, explaining why research on such
marginally performing firms is sparse. Only two publications mention ventures

as

residing in the twilight zone between success and failure, through the label of ‘living
dead’ (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1987; Ruhnka et al., 1992). The term ‘living dead’—
attributed to Franklin “Pitch” Johnson, a noted Silicon Valley venture capitalist (VC)—
includes firms who neither provide stellar returns nor allow a quick write-off of the
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investments to the VC’s. The cited authors above also allude to ventures that do not meet
their investors’ expectations even if self-sustaining and economically viable.
We seek to study this largely ignored phenomenon of ‘living dead’ in the VC
context, contributing to entrepreneurship literature and more generally to the stream of
work on “permanently failing organizations” (Meyer & Zucker, 1989). We conceptually
define the category of ‘living dead’, a transitory state. Firms in this state persist for long
periods of time beyond the expectations of their investors, representing marginal
performance between success and failure. Success and failure are not two sides of the
same coin; rather they can be conceptualized as the two extremes of a continuum of new
venture performance (see Figure 1). Our research adds additional insights by explicitly
treating a part of the largely overlooked middle-ground, i.e., those firms that persist
beyond the norm.
The sparse literature on the topic has identified management as a key determinant
to enter this state apart from external factors. We theorize about the effect of initial
founding team characteristics such as experience and size, an important signal of quality
used by investors to select new ventures; these signals presumably reflect underlying
skills and routines of the team members as well as factors that shape the routines and
capabilities of the firm. VCs in most cases intervene and make changes to the
management team when confronted with the ‘living dead’ situation (Ruhnka et al., 1992).
Changes to the founding team, whether voluntary or forced, may prove disruptive given
strong imprinting effects that ecological studies have documented (Baron et al., 1999b;
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Stinchcombe, 1965). Therefore we also speculate on the effects of these disruptions on
‘living dead’ outcome in line with prior literature.
Our theoretical framework proposes beneficial effects of team members’ prior
experience on ‘living dead’ outcome. We consider two signals related to previous
experience—involvement in relevant product market or technology and founding of startups. The total experience of founding members, in both the areas, is conjectured to lower
the likelihood to enter the perceived limbo of ‘living dead.’ We also conjecture on the
non-linear effect of team size on ‘living dead’ outcome, speculating high coordination
costs when founding teams have two members, possibly representing two foci of power
that increase coordination costs and eventually increasing the odds of getting stuck in a
transitory state which we call “living dead.”

In the light of strong imprinting

(Stinchcombe, 1965), we speculate that a disruption of founding team endowed with prior
entrepreneurial experience, whether voluntary or imposed, is a shock that increases the
odds of the new firm ending as marginally performing and persisting entities.
We test our theory using a matched case-control approach on a sample of US
wireless ventures that received early stage venture capital financing. We identify ‘living
dead’ firms as cases of interest which we then match to similar firms from three control
groups—one that includes any firm that faced some event, liquidity or liquidating, after
founding

and two others with either successful or failed firms. We find that

entrepreneurial experience, a signal of quality that is frequently used by investors,
decreases the likelihood of ending up as a ‘living dead’ firm. Teams with such
entrepreneurs also decrease failure hazard but have no effect on success. Hence, our
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findings suggest that capabilities acquired through founding multiple ventures decreases
the chances of persistence and increase the chances of dissolution. Therefore, start-up
experience provides some predictive power for not getting stuck with investments for too
long a period of time. Teams with two founders are shown to be especially harmful,
being much more likely in ‘living dead’ firms when compared to successful firms.
Disruptions to the founding team, captured through the loss of members, do not generally
affect performance. However, when these changes occur in firms founded by
management with previous entrepreneurial experience, they increase the odds of ending
up as “living dead.” Loss of founding team members may occur due to VC interventions
through forced removal or voluntary departures18, suggesting changed expectations
regarding prospects of the start-up. Although we were unable to disentangle the two
effects, it is a useful finding for VC’s for whom ‘living dead’ firms could be an important
drag on resources and in their returns on investment.
In the following section, we elaborate on our theoretical framework We define the
concept of ‘living dead’, review the literature and state our research questions in the light
of the current literature on ‘living dead’ firms, and then derive hypotheses based on the
effect of initial team characteristics and losing members of this team on performance.

18

Other forms of loss such as death or retirement are not observed in our sample, which spans a relatively
short period of time.
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
‘Living Dead’ Firms Defined
The literature on VC-backed firms that neither achieve a liquidity event nor fail to
survive is very sparse. A sum total of two papers exist in the vast literature on venture
backed new enterprises (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1987; Ruhnka et al., 1992). Bourgeois
& Eisenhardt (1987) define these firms as ‘insufficiently successful to be taken public’,
not ‘clear enough failure to die’ and as those for whom success always appears to be ‘just
around the corner’ (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1987 ; pg. 143). Ruhnka et al (1992) in their
survey of venture capital managers find ‘living dead’ firms to be economically selfsustaining albeit unable to produce the level of sales, growth or profitability to produce
attractive rates of returns and exit opportunities for their venture capital investors. In
effect these are marginally performing firms that tend to persist, yet fail to meet the
expectations of the venture capitalists (Ruhnka et al., 1992). While marginally
performing new ventures in general have received some attention in the literature
(Gimeno et al., 1997), we do not know much about venture backed firms with such
performance primarily because of lack of data. Financial measures such as sales and
profits are not available for private firms in general and more so for VC-backed new
ventures.
‘Living dead’ can be conceptualized as a transitory state for venture funded firms
with marginal performance, a state from which they might eventually exit, even if much
longer than expected19. These expectations stem from the venture capitalists, who are
sought by the entrepreneurs to fuel their dream of founding ‘a high-technology company
19

Rhunka et al. (1992) estimate around 20.6% of a VC’s portfolio to belong to this category
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which will grow with sufficient speed and prosperity to present a “winning” image and
go public’ (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1987; pg. 143). This particular propensity and
aspiration of entrepreneurs also sets these VC-backed firms apart from other new
ventures which may continue to persist due to lifestyle choices (Bhide, 1996) and other
benefits, such as psychic income (Gimeno et al., 1997), that the entrepreneur may derive
from starting a company. We exclude from our purview small organizations that are
formed by lifestyle entrepreneurs, presumably in many cases providing their own
resources, to have their own independence (for example, setting up a small real estate
agency or a pizzeria) without the ambition or pressure of growing fast and succeeding
through an IPO or trade sale.
We contend that in a high-tech VC-backed context, the overriding consideration
for all parties is achieving a liquidity event for investors in a reasonable time-frame.
Venture capitalists usually invest in companies with expected fast growth rates—as a rule
of thumb, reaching sales of at least US$50 million within six years—and which then can
then be sold, either to a larger firm or through a public offering (Browning, 2009).
Without liquidity, venture capitalists can’t return profits to their original fund investors,
who typically give the VC’s a mandate for ten years (Browning, 2009). In addition, the
contractual arrangements between a VC and an entrepreneur also reflect this goal in that
entrepreneurs cede both control and liquidation rights to the investors (Kaplan &
Strömberg, 2004).
We define persistence as the continued survival of a firm without liquidity events
from birth to the end of the window of our study. In the absence of data on financial
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performance, common for private companies, start-ups are identified as ‘living dead’
when they persist with fulfilling the VC expectations of generating an exit event within a
reasonable time frame. Such expectations are derived from two industry wide norms.
First, the investment horizon of a ‘typical’ venture capital fund and second, the average
time that peer start-ups take to generate a liquidity event for investors. Thus only those
firms that survive without any exit within the time frame of the study for a duration that
exceeds these two norms are classified as ‘living dead’ firms. Furthermore, ‘living dead’
firms are a subset of all start-ups in the population that persist without success or failure
(see Figure 1).20 We conceptualize firms to enter this transitory state when the firm
persists beyond the norm, treating such a transition as a pseudo-event. Defining this third
outcome, which is a state instead of a concrete event, permits us to directly analyze such
firms without the empirical tool of indirect asymmetric effects on success and failure in
Chapter 3, which provides explanation for all persisting firms without considering time
spent in that state.
Literature Review & Research Question
Given the dearth of literature on ‘living dead’ firms, our primary research goal is
to investigate whether there is anything systematic about firms that are in this inherently
transitory yet persistent state21 as defined above. We defer to the sparse literature for

20

While, the phenomenon as well as our definition of ‘living dead’ is specific to venture capital, although
other scenarios are conceivable in which firms persist without meeting expectations of key stakeholders.
Meyer & Zucker’s (1989) ‘permanently failing organizations’ in which certain dependent actors supplant
pure economic interests of the owners and sustain inefficient organizations, could represent one such
situation.
21
Rational expectations lead us to believe that in the long run these firms should experience some exit
event, however many persist for extended periods, often beyond expectations. Hence we use the
contradictory yet suggestive term of transitory state. In addition since living dead is not an event, we think
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clues on factors that may lead a VC-backed firm to this transitory state. The current
literature points towards three main risk factors. First, a recent stream of work, building
on the behavioral theory of venture capital firms, points to the differential capabilities of
VC’s to manage unsuccessful investments, that is their ability or inability to write-off bad
investments (Guler, 2007). Such interpretation follows the literature on decisional
entrapment and the attendant rigidity that befalls agents who have overcommitted
themselves (compare Staw & Ross, 1987). Second, environmental factors such as growth
of the industry and exit market conditions are deemed salient (Ruhnka et al., 1992).
Finally, deficiencies in the management team of these firms are also identified as a major
influence (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1987; Ruhnka et al., 1992). We further examine these
three factors and discuss their relevance to our paper.
The termination capability of venture capitalists could condition the persistence of
a venture, especially if one assumes that such investments are outright failures. However,
the very nature of the transitory state that is ‘living dead’ does not necessarily connote
failure. While some ventures maybe ‘permanently failing’, for others success may be
‘just around the corner.’ The venture capital model entails the making of a number of bets
and thriving on a few highly successful outcomes (Gompers & Lerner, 2004; Ruhnka et
al., 1992; Sahlman, 1990). Besides, from a rational perspective, it might not make sense
to exit out of an investment that is not yet a complete failure, with exit opportunities
however far in the future.22 The monitoring costs to a VC for a late stage start-up is rather

it best to conceptualize it as a state. Empirically we create a pseudo-event of entering this state using a time
window for persistence.
22
In the words of a VC interviewed by the author, “the existence of ‘a gold nugget’ among these ‘living
dead’ firms is usually high.”
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trivial, thus negating any pressing need to divest (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001).23
Presumably, the proceeds from the highly successful portfolio firms serve to fulfill the
obligations of the VC’s to return money to their investors. In addition, entrepreneurs
eagerly seeking a VC exit maybe indicative of a lowball deal which the VC’s guard
against using a non-embarrassment clause (Wright, Thompson, & Robbie, 1996)24. A
non-embarrassment clause stipulates that if the management sells the company to a third
party at a higher price within 18 months of the exit then the VC can reclaim their share
from the proceeds. Therefore, given that ‘living dead’ firms are not outright failures, we
conclude that VC termination capability, that is, the ability to pull the plug on
investments, is not an important determinant leading to this transitory state.
Environmental factors comprise an important factor in deciding the fate of a
venture. Whether the market segment that a start-up develops products and services for
fulfills its initial promise of growth will definitely impact the life chances of a venture.
Likewise exit market conditions such as the number of IPO’s or M&A in the firms sector
will determine the odds of a liquidity event materializing (Sorenson & Stuart, 2008).
However, sector-wide conditions affect all ventures and certainly will not inform about
firm-level differences that impact performance. We therefore chose to focus our theory
primarily on the final determinant identified in this sparse literature, the founding
management team.
The literature on ‘living dead’ firms highlights management team characteristics
as the single most important factor in marginal performance (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt,
23

According to the VC’s interviewed, these persistent investments usually end up in a common trust that
has no management fees and hence no ongoing costs after the fund is wound up.
24
This explanation was suggested by the VC’s interviewed.
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1987; Ruhnka et al., 1992). Bourgeois & Eisenhardt (1987), in their in-depth case-study
of a ‘living dead’ firm, look at the strategic decision processes of the top management
team and find them unable to manage ‘a series of paradoxes—rational and quick analysis,
powerful CEO and powerful team of VPs, bold yet safe decisions’ (Bourgeois &
Eisenhardt, 1987; pg 157). Their result contrast with successful start-up management
teams, despite many other shared characteristics. Ruhnka et al. (1992) in their survey of
VC’s, pin-point management deficiencies as the major causal factor in most ‘living dead’
investments. The identified deficiencies include ‘paying insufficient attention to
competitive demands of the marketplace, or improperly positioning the product or market
strategy to respond to competitive shifts that had occurred since the venture got
underway’ (Ruhnka et al., 1992 ; pg 146). Key causes of the ‘living dead’ state were
‘inadequate

investee

management

and

adverse

market

and

competitive

conditions’(Ruhnka et al., 1992; pg. 147). Ruhnka et al. (1992) also survey VC strategies
to deal with ‘living dead’ investments and find replacing management to be a dominant
strategy apart from trying to sell or merge the firm with a bigger firm or repositioning the
venture. Replacing the management was found to be the usual first step before the
options to sell or reposition were contemplated. Building on these findings in the existing
literature, we shift our attention on the founding team and subsequent loss of its
members.
By focusing on the founding team we are also able to draw from the wider
literature about the effect of initial endowments of a start-up on either success or failure,
especially the strong imprinting effects that founders have on new ventures
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(Stinchcombe, 1965). The literature emerging from the Stanford Project on Emerging
Companies (SPEC) that studies top management teams and human resources practices
and their effect on high-tech new venture success, demonstrating imprinting and inertia
is especially relevant to our research (Baron et al., 1996, 1999a; Baron et al., 1999b,
2001; Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004; Burton et al., 2002; Hannan et al., 1996).
Interestingly, other research has likewise highlighted the importance of founding team
background as a signal of quality and its positive effect on start-up IPO chances
(Beckman, 2006; Beckman & Burton, 2008; Burton et al., 2002; Hallen, 2008; Higgins &
Gulati, 2006). Similarly, the effect of founding team characteristics on impeding failure
has also been documented (Delmar & Shane, 2006; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990;
Geroski, Mata, & Portugal, 2010). Therefore, we should ask the question whether these
signals of quality affect the likelihood of ‘living dead’ outcomes relative to successful
and failed firms. Next, given the paradoxical facts of strong imprinting effects
highlighted in the literature and the common practice of VC’s intervening and replacing
founders begs the question whether changes in management forestalls the transitory state
of ‘living dead.’ Or put differently, does loss of team members, whether forced or
voluntary, affect the likelihood of subsequent ‘living dead’ status.
In the following paragraphs we elaborate on different signals of quality inferred
from the founding team that investors use to evaluate new ventures, and hypothesize
about their effect on ‘living dead’ state. As the start-ups progress, expectations on the
possibility of an exit event may change. We portray such alterations in expectations as
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stimuli that lead to disruptions in the founding team (see Figure 8 for an illustration25).
This could occur either as an intervention by the investors or as the entrepreneur leaving,
perhaps by way of response to something gone awry. We hypothesize about the
consequences of these disruptions on the likelihood of becoming a marginally performing
entity.
Figure 8. Founding Team Disruption Mechanism

Founding Team - Signal of Quality
Prior research has established the importance of founding team composition and
the signal it sends to investors about the venture’s quality. The strength of the founding
team sends an important signal to investors and other potential partners about its viability
given the uncertainty of its permanence at birth (Geroski et al., 2010). In addition, prior
experiences of founders are conducive to organizational success (Beckman et al., 2007;
Hallen, 2008; Higgins & Gulati, 2006; Hsu, 2007).

Research has also shown the

importance of founding team size to predict start-up outcomes, such as IPO or growth
rates (Beckman et al., 2007; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). In the following sections

25

This just a caricature of unobserved changes manifesting in loss of founding members that are visible to
the researcher. We do not imply that this is the only way or it represents a definite causal mechanism.
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we develop arguments on the imprinting effects of previous experience and founding
team size on the ‘living dead’ outcome.
Previous Experience – Startup & Relevant Domain Experience
Following Stinchombe’s (1965) seminal piece, scholars have investigated the
prehistory of startups, especially the effect of established firms through spin-offs and
prior experience (Boeker, 1989; Boeker & Karichalil, 2002; Hannan et al., 1996;
Romanelli, 1989). Although mostly focused on the motivations of entrepreneurs to enter
an industry and on transfer of “genetic” materials from established firms (Agarwal et al.,
2002; Bhide, 1994; Burton et al., 2002; Gompers et al., 2006; Phillips, 2002), a few
studies have explored the impact of such inheritance on entry and survival through the
distinction between de-novo and de-alio entrants (Klepper, 2002; Klepper & Simons,
2000). These studies base their argument on the inheritance of routines relevant to the
start-up that enable entrepreneurs to better navigate the turbulent journey that they face.
We distinguish two different aspects to the routines acquired through prior experience—
experience with founding start-ups (corresponding to higher-order routines) and relevant
domain experience (corresponding to lower-order routines) (e.g. Knott, 2003).
We begin with the assumption that a start-up’s founding team members have
endowments whose effect might stretch beyond its adolescence (Brüderl & Schüssler,
1990). These endowments as identified above are mostly general and industry-specific
human capital. The former includes involvement in prior start-ups often referred to as
serial, renascent or habitual entrepreneurship (Eesley & Roberts, 2009; Gompers et al.,
2006; Nanda & Sørensen, 2010; Plehn-Dujowich, 2009). Serial entrepreneurs bring to
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their firm various assets, some tangible and other intangible. Tangible assets such as cash
and commercial paper are often inadequate for bringing the venture beyond the initial
years of existence (Nanda & Sørensen, 2010). Intangible endowments entails
organizational qualities, learned or acquired during the startup’s founding times when the
role of the founder is paramount (Baron & Ensley, 2006; Greenberg, 2010; Stinchcombe,
1965). Compared to the de-novo founder, serial entrepreneurs carry into the venture their
prior experiences in starting ventures. Such experiences render a venture more successful
as indicated by the likelihood of an IPO (Gompers et al., 2006) and by receiving VC
funding (Burton et al., 2002; Hsu, 2007). Gompers et al. (2006) show that serial
entrepreneurs are more likely to succeed than first time entrepreneurs, inferring that a
large component in entrepreneurship and venture capital can be attributed to learned
higher-order routines. They identify one of these routines as ‘market timing’, the ability
to start a business in the right industry at the right time. We argue that seasoned
entrepreneurs also have the ability to time their exit, whether through a successful sale or
disengaging from a hopeless venture.
Thus, entrepreneurs with previous experience in founding new firms may have
developed necessary higher-order start-up routines through their previous dealings in the
venture capital context. First, they presumably have contacts with potential financiers and
the social capital to access financial resources. Second, they may also have the edge over
novices in assembling requisite human resources either through leveraging the skills of
teams from past ventures or through improved understanding of start-up recruitment
processes. Third, they may be better prepared to navigate the critical growth phase of the
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firm through bold but safe decision-making abilities (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1987).
Finally, and more crucially, they might have developed an ability of timing both entry
into and exit from ventures (Gompers et al., 2006). Previous experience in a start-up
environment cultivate the routines and capabilities through learning by doing (Eesley &
Roberts, 2009) that underlie the decision-making required in such a context and which in
their case study of a ‘living dead’ firm Bourgeois & Eisenhardt (1987) separates it from
successful firms. This experience and learning might also lead teams with serial
entrepreneurs to recognize a bad bet early and hence actively seek closure of ventures
without successful prospects. Thus, presence of serial entrepreneurs lead to higher
success as well as failure likelihood. Hence, we hypothesize:
H1. The higher the initial endowment of a firm with founders that have previous
start-up founding experience (or serial entrepreneurs), the lower the odds for it to
become a ‘living dead’ when compared to both successful and failed firms.
The previous hypothesis dealt with prior experience in founding companies.
While start-up experience relates to capabilities involving higher-order routines, decision
making also involves industry specific tasks and lower-order routines such as product and
marketing strategy, forming the right alliances and getting customers. Relevant domain
experience of the founding team at birth enhances the transfer of skills and capabilities
that boosts the decision making ability as well as communicating legitimacy of the team.
Being embedded in a relevant industry context could also provide easier access to
strategic partners, customers and employees through prior contacts and networks. While,
these lower-order routines and capabilities may translate to better survival chances, they
will not guarantee success in the long run (Winter, 2003). Therefore, our second
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hypothesis contrasts ‘living dead’ firms to failed firms as no effect is expected for
comparison to successful firms. Specifically:
H2. The higher the initial endowment of a firm with founders that have previous
relevant industry experience, higher the odds for it to become a ‘living dead’
when compared to failed firms.
Team Size & Decision Making
Two oft studied dimensions of founding teams have been team size and its
diversity. Findings in extant literature highlight benefits of size and heterogeneity such as
fostering innovation and creativity, as well as costs such as conflict and dissension (e.g.
Beckman et al., 2007; Pennings & Wezel, 2010). A meta-analysis of the relationship
between team design features and team performance finds mixed results for team size
effect on performance (Stewart, 2006). Extant research on new venture founding team
size show beneficial effects of team size on growth and IPO outcomes (Beckman et al.,
2007; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). However, teams have to contend with
coordination costs as they get bigger and diverse, which is especially salient for ‘living
dead’ outcomes. Bourgeois & Eisenhardt (1987)

found that fast but bold decision

making with quick consensus among powerful management team members is an
important feature that ‘living dead’ firms lacked vis-à-vis successful start-ups. Delmar &
Shane (2006) find no effect of founding team size on survival. Therefore, we develop our
hypothesis on team size compared to successful firms and not when the comparison
group comprises failed firms.
The interplay of the benefits and costs of team size suggests a non-linear
relationship, with optimal design achieved at some moderate-level of team size.
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However, founding teams typically consist of one or two members with teams larger
than three members a rarity (Ruef, Aldrich, & Carter, 2003).26 Hence, we hypothesize
about these smaller groups that drive performance rather than the rarely occurring large
groups. Teams that have a single founder may be less susceptible to delays and face
lower coordination costs than teams that have multiple founders due to the following two
reasons. First, single member teams are presumably guided by a single focused vision,
that of the founder. Second, they do not face the problem of multiple leaders and
coordination challenges that might present. Both these factors speed up decision making
and achieving consensus. In contrast, multiple member teams while adding more
resources and capabilities will add coordination costs. Within founding teams with more
than one member the problems of lack of consensus leading to gridlocks may be the
greatest when there are two founders due to the need of consensus. Since, strategic
decisions might require the blessings of both the founders, the prospects of the firm may
be harmed through delaying bold decision making. Such problems will not arise with
three member teams, where a simple majority might break deadlocks.27 Thus our third
hypothesis:
H3. Firms with two founders will have higher odds to become a ‘living dead’
when compared to successful firms.
Changing Expectations of Liquidity Event
We developed arguments in the previous section on important dimensions of the
founding team that signal its quality and affect the likelihood of entering the transitory

26

Our sample resembles the general population with 84% of the firms with one or two founders. Including
three member teams cover 95% of our sample
27
We do not take into consideration effects of founding team sizes greater than three because they are rare.
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state of ‘living dead’. Once the founders have assembled the requisite resources, both
financial and human, the firm embarks on its course towards going public with expected
pay-offs. VC expectations, whether reasonable or unreasonable have important
implications for the trajectory of the start-up (Browning, 2009). In some cases successful
liquidity events materialize, while in other cases shareholders realize the futility of their
pursuit, resulting in the dissolution of the firm. In the remaining cases, i.e. those that are
neither clear failures nor successful enough to achieve an IPO, investors and founders fail
to meet their initial expectations. The exact time when such a recalibration of expectation
occurs is inaccessible to the outsider, who can only surmise its manifestation through
salient changes in the firm. One such event of importance is the departure of members of
founding team.
Changes in the founding team may be voluntary or through the intervention of the
VC, as members of the core team either leave or are replaced.28 Founders may leave on
their own accord not satisfied with the progress of the company. They might be
dissatisfied with the demands of the investors to whom they had ceded control rights
when obtaining financing (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2004), especially when future prospects
don’t meet expectations. This is consistent with ‘old guard disenchantment’ observed in
employee turnovers in high-tech firms (Baron et al., 2001). A more likely scenario,
according to Ruhnka et al. (1992), is that investors will change the management team in
their effort to turnaround the fledgling company. Beckman et al. (2007) explored the
impact of turnover on IPO chances and found that losing founding team members was

28

Changes may also occur through retirement or death. Our twenty-year window does not show either. On
a larger time-frame these causes which also lead to loss of routines and capabilities might become salient.
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detrimental to success. Such disruptions are

harmful leading to loss of

important

resources and capabilities (Chandler, Honig, & Wiklund, 2005). However, these negative
effects can be ameliorated by hiring other top management executives although such
changes usually require time and effort (Beckman et al., 2007). Thus, the main effect of
these losses is an empirical question depending on the specific situation of the start-up
affected. However, when such changes occur to teams with members who are serial
entrepreneurs, the consequences can be dire.
Disruptions in Founding Teams & Prior Entrepreneurial Endowment
We examine the consequences that loss of founding team members have on the
previously hypothesized imprinting effect of entrepreneurial experience endowment in
the founding team.

Organizational theories, especially from ecological perspectives

(Hannan & Freeman, 1984), emphasize the disruptive effects of change. This holds
especially for changes in founding members of a nascent firm where such transformations
may trigger loss of vital routines and capabilities. Research on the inter-firm mobility of
knowledge workers has highlighted the importance of such losses (Corredoira &
Rosenkopf, 2010; Groysberg et al., 2004; Marx et al., 2009; Wezel, Cattani, & Pennings,
2006). For example Wezel et al. (2006) find that the loss of partners in Dutch accounting
firms leads to higher likelihood of failure due to loss of higher-order routines. The effect
of these losses would depend on who replaces the outgoing founders. Beckman et al.
(2007) find that incoming executives with strong industry experience can help firms
overcome these losses and speed up IPO. Their findings do not distinguish between first
time entrepreneurs and experienced ones. We argue that given the higher-order routines
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associated with serial entrepreneurs, especially the ability related to timing and decision
making, the loss of team members in ‘living dead’ cases may be insurmountable.
Therefore, we expect ‘living dead’ firms to show higher likelihood of having teams with
high aggregate entrepreneurial experience that also lose core members due to the
following two reasons. First, in the case of failed firms, the ability of these entrepreneurs
to recognize a bad prospect and take quick action may lead to dissolution before any
change occurs in the team. Second, in the case of successful firms, changes in teams with
serial entrepreneurs may be infrequent due to the ability to recognize and deliver on good
opportunities. Thus we expect:
H4. The interaction effect of the initial endowment of serial entrepreneurs with
changes in founding team will increase the odds of ‘living dead’ outcome when
compared to both failed and successful firms.
EMPIRICAL SETTING AND METHODOLOGY
Industry Context and Data
Our study is based in the wireless sector during the period 1990-2009. Rapid high
growth potential and a variety of opportunities resulting from deregulation and
technological discontinuities spurred entrepreneurial activity and venture capital funding.
Unlike sectors such as pharmaceuticals and biotechnology which require risky R&D
investments that might take decades to pay off, wireless innovations take much less time
to bring to market. The core standards (e.g., GSM, CDMA and UMTS) are managed by
powerful industry incumbents with an average of ten years between major generational
changes. Major generational cycles have sub-cycles of five years of less (Ansari &
Garud, 2009). With our choice we of the sector we try to rule out an important
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explanation of the ‘living dead’ phenomenon—long development of technology and
growth cycles such as in the biotechnology sector.
We collected data on VC-funded firms in the U.S. wireless sector that were
founded between the years 1990 and 2009. We include those new firms that received at
least one round of early-stage VC funding because entrepreneurs that seek such funding
have to facilitate the exit of the VC within their investment horizon, normally 10 years
(Gompers & Lerner, 2004; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2004). Thus achieving IPO or a trade
sale is an important success criterion for such a start-up, which may not be so for other
types of new ventures that do not seek venture financing (Browning, 2009). The
population consists of 428 firms as documented by VentureXpert, the leading source of
information about venture capital from Thomson Research, commonly viewed as the
most comprehensive and widely used database for research on venture-funded companies
(Kaplan & Schoar, 2005).
Obtaining data on the management teams of private companies was extremely
challenging. VentureXpert provides some data on the management teams but it is neither
longitudinal nor complete. There was no single source with structured data that we could
rely on. However, with the advent of the Internet it has become almost mandatory for
companies to have a web page about their products, and corporate information such as
the management team biography. Therefore websites became the primary source of
information of data regarding founding team members. The Internet changes constantly
only giving us a snapshot of each website at any given point, however thanks to the
Wayback machine (http://web.archive.org), starting from 1996 the Internet archive has

129
been storing all publicly available websites (Notess, 2002). This allowed us to also
observe changes in founding team over time. The Wayback machine gave us the bulk of
the data on management teams.29 Remaining data not available from the Internet archive
were gathered using two sources: LinkedIn (http://www.linkedin.com), and ZoomInfo
(http://www.zoominfo.com). LinkedIn is a business networking service that professionals
use to job search and provides data on self-reported resumes of executives. Zoominfo is a
free people search engine that scours the Web for information about people. ZoomInfo
uses a combination of various technologies to crawl the Web (websites, press releases,
electronic news services, SEC filings, etc.) and then organizes all the information about
people into a readable, sensible format.
Other sources of data include Derwent, a database of global patents maintained by
Thomson since 1969. SDC Platinum, Factiva, and the historical websites of firms in our
sample relying on the Wayback machine were used to source data related to alliances.
SDC, Zephyr, Factiva, and Hoovers provided merger and acquisition and IPO
information. Finally, COMPUSTAT was accessed for segment data on publicly listed
wireless firms.
Dependent Variable
Our goal in this study involved identifying ‘living dead’ firms and comparing
them to other firms that don’t persist, providing some liquidity event to their investors by
either failing or succeeding. Failure is identified as a dummy that is set to one when a
firm experiences dissolution, bankruptcy or distressed sale. Success is a dichotomous
29

The data collection took over a year. The first step involved the use of automated scripts to download the
information. Then 3 RA’s manually checked the information, supplemented missing data and coded the
biographical information. RA’s were given jobs that overlapped to ensure reliability.
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variable set to one when a start-up goes public or is sold. Living dead is a binary variable
that is set to one for all those start-ups that persist during the duration of the study
without any form of exit events for more than two measures of expectation, whichever is
greater. First, the average time to experience any form of liquidity or liquidating event,
which in our case is 5.5 years. Second, the typical duration for which a venture fund is
constituted. The vast majority of VC funds have a life of ten years with possibilities of
one year extensions up to a maximum of three years (Sahlman, 1990). We therefore
define a firm to have entered the transitory state of living dead in the tenth year of
persistence for our analysis.30 Below in Table 12 we summarize the number of cases of
‘living dead’ obtained by varying the number of years of minimum persistence. We have
a total of 184 firms that experienced no events and were censored at the end of the study.
The cases are drawn from this pool of firms based on their age. In addition we also report
the number of firms that experienced a failure or success events within a duration less
than or equal to the years of persistence used to define ‘living dead.’ For example, using
the criterion of at least 10 years of persistence, we have 56 ‘living dead’ firms in our
sample, while there are 124 firms that experienced a success event with age less than or
equal to 10. For the same age 103 firms had failure events.31 We can see from the table
that the number of firms experiencing some event reduces considerably after 10 years.

30

Robustness check using values of persistence from seven to eleven years were also performed. We could
not do analysis on twelve and thirteen years as the typical fund extension period would suggest as those
criteria do not generate enough cases with our twenty year window. With a larger window such analysis
would be feasible.
31
There are 244 firms with either success or failure events in our population. For a time period of 10 years
in the sample 227 firms have experienced any event. The remaining 17 firms had events after the age of
10.
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Table 12. ‘Living Dead’ Cases – Minimum Years of Persistence

Years of Persistence

Number of Cases
(Out of 184)

Number of Failures
(Firm Age <= Years of
Persistence)

Number of Success
(Firm Age <= Years of
Persistence)

7

99

77

92

8

83

91

110

9

69

98

117

10

56

103

124

11

34

104

125

12

20

104
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Independent Variables
Founding Team - Signal of Quality
Prior Entrepreneurial Experience
We use this variable to capture the endowment of the start-up with serial
entrepreneurs at founding. We identified the number of companies that each member of
the founding team had previously founded and then used the sum as an indicator of signal
of previous entrepreneurship experience. This variable ranges from a value of 0 to 4 with
an average value of 0.6.
Previous Wireless Experience
To measure the wealth of sector related experience at founding, we counted the
number of firms related to wireless that founders had worked for during their career prior
to founding the start-up. Firms were identified as wireless using their SIC code and from
information from the biographical sketch that often stated the related nature of the
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previous experience of the founder. A typical firm in our sample had founders with 1.4
related firm experiences prior to founding with a range from 0 to 7.
Two Founders
A dummy set to one when a company was founded by two persons is used to
isolate the effect on two member teams on ‘living dead’ outcome. 31% percent of the
firms in the population had two founders.
Founding Team Size
To control for founding team size we use a simple count of the number of
members in the team at founding. Teams ranges from a size of 1 to 7 with an average of
1.7 and a standard deviation of 0.9.
Founding Team Changes
Founding Team Member Loss
This dichotomous variable was set to one if the founding team lost any of its
members at any point from founding to liquidity, liquidating event or reaching ‘living
dead’ stage. The reasons for such changes are unobservable and the exact time of change
is very noisy which led us to use such a coarse measure. Only 25% of all start-ups lose a
member of the founding team. We interact this variable with Prior Entrepreneurial
Experience to test our final hypothesis.
Research Design
Matched Case-Control Study
The ‘living dead’ outcome is a non-event. Moreover, it is not just persistence but
tenacity to exist without exit events for an extended period of time. Since we identify
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these outcomes and then retrospectively look at factors that may have led to this state, we
use a case-control research design. This is a commonly used method in epidemiology
with the cases of interest based on their outcome (see Figure 9 for a schema of the study).
Specifically, we use a matched case-control design (Schlesselman & Stolley, 1982). The
method consists of matching cases to controls (on a 1: 1 or 1: k basis based on the data)
on confounding factors other than the risk factors of interests, i.e., the independent
variables. We carry out matching with three different control groups—successful
companies, failed companies and all companies with a liquidity event (i.e., both
successful and failed companies). Once the preprocessing with matching is done, the
matched sample is used to calculate the odds ratios of the risk factors to test the
hypotheses put forward.
Figure 9. Matched Case-Control Design
1990

Exposure

Without Exposure

Without Exposure

n Controls

n Cases

Sample n/(N-n) %

Sample 100%

Non Cases

Cases
"Living-Dead"
n

N-n
Now

Exposure

Population: VC Funded Wireless Firms : N

134

Matching Strategies
Start-up performance is influenced by many factors, which implies that there are
many confounding factors apart from the hypothesized founding team characteristics that
could influence the living dead outcome. Hence, an exact match on few covariates as is
normal in many epidemiological case-control studies is not practical. We therefore use
optimal matching, a type of propensity score matching (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983).
Rather than attempting to match on all covariates individually, propensity score matches
on the most important scalar summary of the covariates to obtain good balance of all of
the covariates. This method is often used for generating control groups in case-control
studies (Bergstralh & Kosanke, 1995; Cologne & Shibata, 1995; Hansen, 2007; Ming &
Rosenbaum, 2000; Rosenbaum, 1989). We use conditional logistic regression that
predicts the living dead outcomes using all covariates that are not a direct consequence of
exposure to the risk factors (see Table 13 for a list and definition).
Several techniques are available for propensity score matching (Rosenbaum &
Rubin, 1985). Gu & Rosenbaum (1993) provides a comprehensive comparison of the
methods. We use the optimal matching algorithm minimizes a global measure of balance
(Rosenbaum, 2002). Rosenbaum (2002) argues that the collection of matches found using
optimal matching can have substantially better balance when there is intense competition
for controls, a situation similar to our study where there are limited amount of controls to
choose from. Gu and Rosenbaum (1993) find that optimal matching does better at
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reducing the distance between pairs although they pick similar controls as other methods
(Gu & Rosenbaum, 1993 ; pg. 413):
‘...optimal matching picks about the same controls [as greedy matching] but does
a better job of assigning them to treated units.’
We use Matchit (Ho, Imai, King, & Stuart, 2004), a package available in the R
language (Ihaka & Gentleman, 1996) for statistical computing. The optimal matching is
performed using the optmatch package in R (Hansen & Hansen, 2006). We create
different datasets of matched samples, evaluate the balance achieved and then carry out
the final analysis to obtain the odds ratio.
Odds Risk Estimation Method - Conditional Logit
We use a conditional logit regression (STATA command clogit) to obtain the
odds ratio of the risk factors. This is the standard approach in matched studies. When we
have pairs matched and wish to estimate association of a within-pair exposure and
outcome then each pair has a different intercept (or baseline risk), which is a “nuisance”
parameter—we do not care about them, and we cannot estimate them. So, they are
“conditioned out” of the analysis in order to address the problem of heterogeneity in the
baseline risk. In this approach, each observation (the matched pair) gets a value for each
of the different potential options available. So mathematically:
log  / =



−

 



 ,

where zij is a set of outcome-varying covariates and the coefficient α measures the
odds of the covariates occurring for the two outcomes.
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Table 13. Variable Definitions (Chapter 4)
Variable
Dependent Variables
Living Dead
Independent Variables
Prior Entrepreneurial Experience
Previous Wireless Experience
Two Founders
Founding Team Size
Founding Team Member Loss
Matching Variables

Description
A dummy indicating firm has persisted for 10 or more years
without liquidity event
Number of firms founded by all the founders at founding
Number of wireless related firms worked before founding
A dummy that is set to 1 if team size is 2
Number of founders as a count
A dummy that identifies any change in founding team

Patenting Related
Forward Citation Concentration

Concentration of the forward citations received across IPC classes

Number of Patents

Stock of the firm’s patents

Number of Forward Citations

Stock of forward cites received by the firm

Exit Market Conditions
IPO Heat
Number of Targets in SIC
Investor Characteristics

Intensity of IPO activity in the firm’s primary SIC
Average number of targets acquired in the SIC

Total Number of Investors

Number of distinct investors that invested in the firm over all
rounds
Number of investors that invest in all rounds

Number of Investors Investing in All
Rounds
Prominent Investor
Financing Related
Number of Rounds Received
Time to First Round

Indicator of presence of investor that was in the Forbes Midas list
Number of rounds of funding received by the firm till the end of
study
Time in days from founding to receiving first round

Firm Strategic Action
Number of Alliances

Number of alliances by the firm

Number of Acquisitions

Number of acquisitions by the firm

Others
Business Segment Sales in Wireless
Entry Year

Total average sales of all public wireless companies in a given
SIC code
Year of entry of the firm in the risk set
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Unmatched Analysis: Competing Risk Cox Proportional Hazard
Matching techniques involve eliminating observations to remove bias. Moreover,
case-control studies do not directly account for changes in the covariate values over time.
Therefore, we supplement our matched case-control design with an unmatched analysis
using a competing risk cox proportional hazard model. Cox regressions have been widely
used in matched case-control studies (Breslow, 1982; Gail, Lubin, & Rubinstein, 1981;
Goldstein & Langholz, 1992). We assume living dead outcome to be an event. The fact
that this is a pseudo-event that deterministically occurs after a fixed time does not create
estimation problems because the partial likelihood function takes into account the
ordering of events, but not their actual duration. Furthermore, the baseline hazard rate is
unspecified and could very well be zero during the gaps between events. We use this
analysis as a backup and not the main analysis because of the assumption of treating a
transitory state as a concrete event.
RESULTS
Preprocessing - Matching
Living Dead (Cases) vs. Exit Events (Controls)
We have 56 cases of ‘living dead’ firms and a total of 244 firms that experience
liquidity or liquidating events (i.e., both success and failure). In the first comparison, all
244 firms that experience some events constitute a pool to create the control group for the
56 identified cases. We match cases to control in 1:1, 1:2 & 1:3 proportions, i.e., each
case is matched with 1,2 & 3 ventures from the pool of both successful and failed firms.
Table 14 provides the balance comparisons for all the three cases after propensity score
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matching. The 1:1 matching gives the best balance for our matching as inferred using the
mean differences of the variables used for matching between the cases and the controls.
Living Dead (Cases) vs. Success Events (Controls)
Next, we compare our cases to successful firms by matching to a control group
drawn from 135 firms that experience success events. We match cases to control in 1:1,
& 1:2 pairing. Table 15 provides the balance comparisons for one to one and one to two
matching. Again the 1:1 matching gives slightly better balance of the means.
Living Dead (Cases) vs. Failed Events (Controls)
Finally, we use the 109 failed firms as the control group for matching to the cases.
We can only do a 1:1 match which is shown in Table 16.

Table 14. Matching Balance – Control Group All Exit Events

Mean Cases
Entry Year
IPO Heat

1998.18

Before Matching
Mean
SD Control Mean Diff Mean Cases
Control
1998.45
3.25
-0.27
1998.18

After Matching
Mean
SD Control Mean Diff
Control
1998.25
3.78
-0.07

0.03

0.05

0.05

-0.02

0.03

0.03

0.04

0.00

Number of Targets in SIC

109.67

158.31

194.25

-48.64

109.67

110.41

170.56

-0.74

Total Number of Investors

7.46

5.73

4.14

1.73

7.46

6.50

4.60

0.96

Number of Rounds Received

5.29

3.77

2.77

1.51

5.29

4.98

3.71

0.30

799.11

516.86

664.22

282.24

799.11

817.63

1027.08

-18.52

No. of Investors Investing in all rounds

0.54

1.00

1.16

-0.47

0.54

0.66

0.75

-0.13

Prominent Investor

0.63

0.61

0.49

0.02

0.63

0.64

0.48

-0.02
-0.04

Time to First Round

Forward Citation Concentration

0.21

0.21

0.29

0.00

0.21

0.25

0.31

Number Of Patents

16.04

5.69

14.03

10.34

16.04

12.11

24.93

3.93

Number of Forward Cites

81.55

24.71

61.06

56.84

81.55

46.61

101.07

34.95

Number of Alliances

4.89

1.72

3.02

3.17

4.89

3.48

4.91

1.41

Number of Acquisitions

0.43

0.41

1.09

0.02

0.43

0.43

1.11

0.00

Biz Seg Sales in Wireless

1940993.98

2183735.98 3225971.79 -242742.00 1940993.98 1840650.03 2987234.85 100343.95
Sample Sizes Control
All
Matched
Unmatched
Discarded

Treated
244

56

56

56

188

0

0

0
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Entry Year
IPO Heat

Mean
Cases
1998.18

Before Matching
Mean
SD Control Mean Diff
Control
1998.45
3.25
-0.27

Mean
Cases
1998.18

After Matching
Mean
SD Control Mean Diff
Control
1998.51
3.59
-0.33

0.03

0.05

0.05

-0.02

0.03

0.04

0.04

-0.01

Number of Targets in SIC

109.67

158.31

194.25

-48.64

109.67

126.07

180.34

-16.39

Total Number of Investors

7.46

5.73

4.14

1.73

7.46

6.49

4.62

0.97

Number of Rounds Received

5.29

3.77

2.77

1.51

5.29

4.80

3.36

0.48

799.11

516.86

664.22

282.24

799.11

681.47

838.53

117.63

No. of Investors Investing in all rounds

0.54

1.00

1.16

-0.47

0.54

0.65

0.74

-0.12

Prominent Investor

0.63

0.61

0.49

0.02

0.63

0.63

0.49

0.00

Forward Citation Concentration

0.21

0.21

0.29

0.00

0.21

0.23

0.31

-0.02

Number Of Patents

16.04

5.69

14.03

10.34

16.04

8.69

18.93

7.35

Number of Forward Cites

81.55

24.71

61.06

56.84

81.55

37.05

78.55

44.50

Number of Alliances

4.89

1.72

3.02

3.17

4.89

2.69

3.93

2.21

Number of Acquisitions

0.43

0.41

1.09

0.02

0.43

0.52

1.32

-0.09

Time to First Round

Biz Seg Sales in Wireless

1940993.98 2183735.98 3225971.79 -242742.00 1940993.98 1747242.35 2897914.44 193751.63

Sample SizesControl

Treated

All

244

56

Matched

112

56

Unmatched

132

0

0

0

Discarded

Entry Year
IPO Heat

Mean
Cases
1998.18

Before Matching
Mean
SD Control Mean Diff
Control
1998.45
3.25
-0.27

Mean
Cases
1998.18

After Matching
Mean
SD Control Mean Diff
Control
1998.58
3.43
-0.40

0.03

0.05

0.05

-0.02

0.03

0.04

0.04

-0.01

Number of Targets in SIC

109.67

158.31

194.25

-48.64

109.67

133.32

180.50

-23.64

Total Number of Investors

7.46

5.73

4.14

1.73

7.46

6.14

4.43

1.33

Number of Rounds Received

5.29

3.77

2.77

1.51

5.29

4.32

3.00

0.96

799.11

516.86

664.22

282.24

799.11

596.39

738.24

202.72

No. of Investors Investing in all rounds

0.54

1.00

1.16

-0.47

0.54

0.70

0.79

-0.17

Prominent Investor

0.63

0.61

0.49

0.02

0.63

0.63

0.49

0.00

Forward Citation Concentration

0.21

0.21

0.29

0.00

0.21

0.22

0.32

-0.01

Number Of Patents

16.04

5.69

14.03

10.34

16.04

7.21

16.12

8.82

Number of Forward Cites

81.55

24.71

61.06

56.84

81.55

31.10

70.05

50.45

Number of Alliances

4.89

1.72

3.02

3.17

4.89

2.20

3.45

2.70

Number of Acquisitions

0.43

0.41

1.09

0.02

0.43

0.47

1.19

-0.04

Time to First Round

Biz Seg Sales in Wireless

1940993.98 2183735.98 3225971.79 -242742.00 1940993.98 2059285.33 3178319.07 -118291.36
Sample sizes Control

Treated

All

244

56

Matched

168

56

Unmatched

76

0

Discarded

0

0
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Table 15. Matching Balance – Control Group Success Events

Entry Year
IPO Heat

Mean
Cases
1998.18

Before Matching
Mean
SD Control Mean Diff
Control
1998.53
3.24
-0.35

Mean
Cases
1998.18

After Matching
Mean
SD Control Mean Diff
Control
1998.21
3.45
-0.04

0.03

0.06

0.06

-0.03

0.03

0.04

0.04

-0.01

Number of Targets in SIC

109.67

206.18

214.06

-96.51

109.67

144.36

184.88

-34.68

Total Number of Investors

7.46

6.21

4.51

1.26

7.46

6.86

5.39

0.61

Number of Rounds Received

5.29

4.09

2.96

1.20

5.29

5.07

3.63

0.21

799.11

503.76

706.19

295.35

799.11

662.32

948.45

136.79

No. of Investors Investing in all rounds

0.54

0.90

1.14

-0.36

0.54

0.63

0.73

-0.09

Prominent Investor

0.63

0.68

0.47

-0.06

0.63

0.68

0.47

-0.05

Forward Citation Concentration

0.21

0.22

0.28

0.00

0.21

0.23

0.30

-0.02

Number Of Patents

16.04

5.84

11.22

10.20

16.04

8.91

14.80

7.13

Number of Forward Cites

81.55

24.73

60.18

56.83

81.55

41.39

78.06

40.16

Number of Alliances

4.89

2.27

3.62

2.63

4.89

3.38

4.78

1.52

Number of Acquisitions

0.43

0.65

1.37

-0.22

0.43

0.64

1.49

-0.21

Time to First Round

Biz Seg Sales in Wireless

1940993.98 2496008.45 3404568.04 -555014.48 1940993.98 1616070.05 2676853.93 324923.93
Sample Sizes Control
All

Entry Year
IPO Heat

Mean
Cases
1998.18

Treated
135

56

Matched

56

56

Unmatched

79

0

Discarded

0

0

Before Matching
Mean
SD Control Mean Diff
Control
1998.53
3.24
-0.35

Mean
Cases
1998.18

After Matching
Mean
SD Control Mean Diff
Control
1998.52
3.48
-0.34

0.03

0.06

0.06

-0.03

0.03

0.05

0.04

-0.02

Number of Targets in SIC

109.67

206.18

214.06

-96.51

109.67

181.79

205.18

-72.12

Total Number of Investors

7.46

6.21

4.51

1.26

7.46

6.33

4.71

1.13

Number of Rounds Received

5.29

4.09

2.96

1.20

5.29

4.43

3.10

0.86

799.11

503.76

706.19

295.35

799.11

561.96

753.09

237.15

No. of Investors Investing in all rounds

0.54

0.90

1.14

-0.36

0.54

0.71

0.78

-0.18

Prominent Investor

0.63

0.68

0.47

-0.06

0.63

0.67

0.47

-0.04

Forward Citation Concentration

0.21

0.22

0.28

0.00

0.21

0.22

0.28

0.00

Number Of Patents

16.04

5.84

11.22

10.20

16.04

6.44

12.02

9.60

Number of Forward Cites

81.55

24.73

60.18

56.83

81.55

28.80

65.23

52.75

Number of Alliances

4.89

2.27

3.62

2.63

4.89

2.50

3.86

2.39

Number of Acquisitions

0.43

0.65

1.37

-0.22

0.43

0.65

1.43

-0.22

Time to First Round

Biz Seg Sales in Wireless

1940993.98 2496008.45 3404568.04 -555014.48 1940993.98 2412099.30 3344920.57 -471105.32

Sample

sizes:

Sample sizesControl

Treated

All

135

56

Matched

112

56

Unmatched

23

0

Discarded

0

0
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Table 16. Matching Balance – Control Group Failure Events
Before Matching
After Matching
Mean Cases Mean Control SD Control Mean Diff Mean Cases Mean Control SD Control Mean Diff
Entry Year

1998.18

1998.35

3.28

-0.17

1998.18

1998.71

3.24

0.03

0.04

0.05

-0.01

0.03

0.02

0.03

0.01

Number of Targets in SIC

109.67

99.02

147.08

10.66

109.67

79.76

124.37

29.91

Total Number of Investors

7.46

5.14

3.57

2.33

7.46

4.88

3.38

2.59

Number of Rounds Received

5.29

3.39

2.47

1.90

5.29

3.89

2.75

1.39

799.11

533.10

611.08

266.01

799.11

683.36

723.38

115.75

No. of Investors Investing in all rounds

0.54

1.14

1.17

-0.60

0.54

0.77

0.76

-0.23

Prominent Investor

0.63

0.51

0.50

0.11

0.63

0.46

0.50

0.16

Forward Citation Concentration

0.21

0.20

0.30

0.01

0.21

0.21

0.29

-0.08

Number Of Patents

16.04

5.51

16.93

10.52

16.04

8.50

22.85

7.54

Number of Forward Cites

81.55

24.70

62.42

56.86

81.55

31.63

78.32

49.93

Number of Alliances

4.89

1.05

1.83

3.85

4.89

1.55

2.31

3.34

Number of Acquisitions

0.43

0.11

0.42

0.32

0.43

0.20

0.55

0.23

Biz Seg Sales in Wireless

1940993.98

1796976.49

IPO Heat

Time to First Round

Sample sizes
All

2959919.14 144017.49 1940993.98
Control

1598206.69

-0.54

2810317.72 342787.29

Cases
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56

Matched

56

56

Unmatched

53

0

Discarded

0

0

Odds Ratio – Result from Conditional Logit Regressions
After creating the matched sample we obtained the odds risks associated with our
hypothesized independent variables (or risk factors) using a conditional logit
specification. The results are summarized in Table 17. Models (1)-(3) report the results
for comparison with firms experiencing any events, models (4)-(5) present the results
matching ‘living dead’ firms to successful firms, and model (6) show the results of
contrast to failed firms. We report both the coefficients and the odds ratio below.
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Table 17. Conditional Logit Regression for Odds Ratio Calculation
(1)
DEP VARIABLE livingdead
Success+
Controls matched from Failure
Matching Ratio
1:1
Prior Entrepreneurial
-0.916*
Experience
(0.474)
Previous Wireless
0.0369
Experience
(0.267)
Two Founders
1.112**
(0.491)
Founding Team
0.216
Member Loss
(0.534)
Prior Entrep Exp X
2.143**
Founding Member Loss (0.894)
Founding Team Size
-0.393
(0.359)
Observations
112
Number of firms
112
Psuedo R2
0.238
Log likelihood
-29.57
Chi-square
14.07

OR
0.4
1.038
3.041
1.241
8.526
0.675

(2)
livingdead
Success+
Failure
1:2
-1.119***
(0.408)
0.0795
(0.233)
1.016**
(0.401)
0.560
(0.442)
1.441**
(0.623)
-0.383
(0.342)
168
168
0.247
-46.35
22.75

OR
0.327
1.083
2.762
1.751
4.224
0.682

Conditional Logit Regressions
(3)
(4)
(5)
livingdead
livingdead
livingdead
Success+
Success
Success
Failure
1:3
OR
1:1
OR
1:2
-0.802*** 0.45
-0.653 0.521 -0.797*
(0.286)
(0.439)
(0.468)
0.0950 1.100 -0.316 0.729 -0.0117
(0.251)
(0.299)
(0.220)
0.743*
2.1
1.118* 3.06 0.939**
(0.411)
(0.634)
(0.422)
0.743
2.103 0.415 1.514 0.861*
(0.453)
(0.589)
(0.515)
1.353*** 3.87
1.261* 3.53 1.371**
(0.509)
(0.764)
(0.684)
-0.388 0.678 -0.166 0.847 -0.290
(0.303)
(0.364)
(0.350)
224
112
168
224
112
168
0.197
0.250
0.208
-62.38
-29.10
-48.75
21.91
19.04
18.75
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses

(6)
livingdead
Failures
OR
0.45

1:1
-0.822*
(0.424)
0.988 0.785
(0.534)
2.56
0.972
(0.726)
2.37
0.510
(0.630)
3.94 2.746**
(1.073)
0.748 -1.216**
(0.483)
112
112
0.340
-25.63
11.90

OR
0.44
2.192
2.643
1.665
15.58
0.296

Hypothesis 1 posited that having founders with prior entrepreneurial experience
would be beneficial and prevent firms from entering the ‘living dead’ state. We find
support for it in all the models that compare ‘living dead’ firms to the three control
groups, except in the case of 1:1 matching with successful firms. Models (1) – (3) report
the coefficients and odds ratio for the comparison with all firms with any event. Having
accumulated entrepreneurial experience at founding reduces the odds of becoming a
living dead by 60-67% when compared to all other firms with an exit event. The results
are consistent across all three matching criteria, supporting our hypothesis about the
benefits of having founders with previous entrepreneurial experience to reduce
persistence. The results for comparison with successful firms are reported in models (4)
and (5). H1 again finds support in one of the two matching criteria, albeit at a weaker
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level of significance (p-value < 10%). The reduction in odds risk is similar (around 55%
reduction) to that found in the previous comparison. Model (6) summarizes the results for
comparison with just failed firms. H1 receives support at 5% significance with a
reduction in odds risk of 56% in the presence of entrepreneurial experience endowment.
We therefore interpret these results to support our hypothesis on prior entrepreneurial
experience and its effect on ‘living dead’ outcome.
The second hypothesis conjectured positive association of previous industry
related experience with ‘living dead’ outcome when compared to failed firms. We do not
find any support for the effect of industry specific experience. In addition, as argued we
find no significant effects when compared to successful firms. Presumably, most
entrepreneurs have related experience and hence we detect no differences in the odds
ration among the three categories of firms.
The hypothesis on two member founders, H3, finds consistent support when
compared with successful firms as well as all firms with some exit event. For the matched
sample with both success and failed events, the odds risk of ‘living dead’ is almost 3
times when compared to firms with exit event. The comparison with successful firms
yield odds ratio between 2 and 3 with significance at a weak 10% level. As expected
there is no difference when contrasted with failed firms. The result of this hypothesis is
perhaps the most intriguing and interesting finding of this study, signaling some form of
hindrance to swift decision making in teams where consensus as well fast action is vital.
The fourth hypothesis, which tested the interaction effect of loss of founding team
members and prior entrepreneurial endowment at founding, finds consistent support
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across all the comparisons. The odds ratio when compared to failed firms is very high
(15.58), indicating that very few failed firms that have founders with previous start-up
experience lose their members lending credence to our arguments on the abilities of serial
entrepreneurs.
Competing Risk Cox Proportional Hazard Model
Table 18 reports the results from a competing risk Cox model for the three
outcomes. Results are in line with those obtained in the matched case-control analysis.
Model (3), corresponding to the pseudo-event of ‘living dead’ shows that there is weak
support for H1 at p-value less than 10%. The hazard rate of ‘living dead’ reduces by 52%
in the presence of a unit of entrepreneurial endowment at founding. Our argument on
previous founding experience leading to early realization of bad bets also finds weak
support in model (2). Failure rate increases with entrepreneurial endowment with a 36%
increase in the hazard of failure.
Hypothesis 2 does not find support, although the effect of previous wireless
experience in model (2) on failure hazard lends support to our argument of industry
specific experience being necessary lower-order routines that helps survival. Previous
wireless experience reduces failure rate by 26% and is significant at 5%. Contrary to
expectations, H3 is not supported in this analysis with a p-value for the ‘living dead’
outcome at around 15%.
H4 is supported at the 5% level. Thus losing team members when endowed with
previous founding experience signifies loss of higher-order capabilities that have harmful
consequences. This line of argument is bolstered by the effects of this interaction on
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success and failure through asymmetric effects as in Chapter 3. This interaction inhibits
success as well as failure in line with the empirical result that the hazard of ‘living dead’
also increases.
Finally, we discuss the effects of control variables on the three outcomes. The
results for success and failure follow the same pattern as observed earlier in Chapter 2 &
3. However, the intriguing result is that none of these variables have any effect on the
‘living dead’ event. The Entry Year variable is the only control variable that is
significant, increasing the ‘living dead’ hazard by 30%. Thus later a start-up is founded,
more likely it is to enter this transitory state, which ties in with the arguments on “market
timing” (Gompers et al., 2006). It is also consistent with Ruhnka et al.’s (1992) finding
that missing market opportunities is an important cause for the ‘living dead’ state.
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Table 18. Competing Risk Cox Proportional Hazard Analysis (Chapter 4)
(1)
Success
Prior Entrepreneurial Experience
-0.0221
(0.152)
Previous Wireless Experience
0.208
(0.153)
Two Founders
-0.160
(0.206)
Founding Team Member Loss
-0.213
(0.265)
Prior Entrep Exp X Founding Team -0.561*
Member Loss
(0.337)
Founding Team Size
-0.0670
(0.172)
Forward Citation Concentration
-0.319
(0.422)
Patent Grant Flow
0.00694
(0.0268)
Forward Citation Flow
0.00545
(0.00737)
IPO Heat
-3.247
(2.725)
Number of Targets in SIC
0.00360***
(0.000653)
Total Number of Investors
-0.0329
(0.0322)
No. of Investors Investing
-0.0180
in all rounds
(0.101)
Prominent Investor
0.317
(0.212)
Number of Rounds Received
-0.143***
(0.0544)
Time to First Round
-0.000962***
(0.000184)
Number of Alliances
-0.202*
(0.117)
Number of Acquisitions
0.790***
(0.180)
Biz Seg Sales in Wireless
1.03e-07***
(2.81e-08)
Entry Year
-0.0973***
(0.0369)
Observations
2958
Log likelihood
-653.7
Number of events
135
Number of firms
428
Chi-square
120.4

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

HR
0.978
1.231
0.852
0.808
0.571
0.935
0.727
1.007
1.005
0.0389
1.004
0.968
0.982
1.372
0.867
0.999
0.817
2.204
1
0.907

(2)
(3)
Failure
HR
Living Dead HR
0.308*
1.36
-0.738* 0.478
(0.164)
(0.395)
-0.302**
0.739
-0.0909 0.913
(0.136)
(0.235)
-0.0638
0.938
0.460
1.584
(0.238)
(0.325)
-0.541*
0.582
0.0618
1.064
(0.324)
(0.419)
-0.677*
0.508
1.029** 2.797
(0.391)
(0.497)
0.190
1.209
0.0621
1.064
(0.138)
(0.306)
0.271
1.311
-0.289
0.749
(0.438)
(0.627)
-0.0869**
0.917
-0.00510 0.995
(0.0430)
(0.0289)
0.0244***
1.025
0.0156
1.016
(0.00669)
(0.0142)
-14.06*** 7.81E-07
-2.434 0.0877
(4.869)
(6.373)
0.00174*
1.002 -0.000785 0.999
(0.000903)
(0.00131)
0.0127
1.013
-0.0397 0.961
(0.0387)
(0.0505)
0.120
1.127
-0.229
0.796
(0.103)
(0.247)
-0.261
0.770
-0.488
0.614
(0.230)
(0.395)
-0.195***
0.823
0.0126
1.013
(0.0637)
(0.0681)
-0.00108*** 0.999 -5.32e-05 1.000
(0.000213)
(0.000242)
-0.934***
0.393
0.180
1.197
(0.314)
(0.127)
-1.135
0.322
-0.983
0.374
(0.929)
(0.683)
-6.66e-09
1.000 -3.72e-08 1.000
(3.16e-08)
(6.89e-08)
-0.125***
0.882
0.262***
1.3
(0.0351)
(0.0919)
2958
2856
-520.6
-200.5
109
56
428
428
126.9
47.99
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our investigation of ‘living dead’ firms provides some interesting findings
relevant to venture funded companies and their founders. We find that serial
entrepreneurs, as members of a founding team, reduce the chances of entering the
transitory ‘living dead’ state when compared to other firms, both successful and failed. In
addition, they increase the chances of dissolution. A VC-funded firm, financially
speaking, is better-off if it does not persist. Entrepreneurs with prior experience starting
new firms seem to be better equipped to achieve closure for investors. The higher-order
routines that learning by doing entails, endows such entrepreneurs with skills that have a
strong imprinting effect, which in turn increases the likelihood of failure and diminishes
the chances of becoming a marginally performing firm.
We infer, therefore, that previous experience with founding new ventures at birth
presents a signal that investors and other partners should heed when evaluating nascent
firms. While not a predictor of success, they may help VC’s to avoid getting stuck with
marginally performing firms. Firms with serial entrepreneurs are also prone to fail
probably reflecting their ability to recognize and terminate firms that may not lead to the
expected liquidity event.
Prior relevant domain experience does not have any predictive power for marginal
firms, perhaps because these marginally performing firms might actually need different
perspectives and world-view than just industry-specific experience. This opens new
avenues of research to explore issues such as bringing in an outsider for possible
turnaround.
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A founding team of two members is found to increase the odds of ‘living dead’
outcome compared with successful firms. This supports current literature that posit
decision making ability as a key difference between successful and ‘living dead’ firms. In
this respect ‘living dead’ firms resemble failed firms more than those that succeed. A
team size of two may be a indicator for poor decision making ability of a founding team.
Future research should probe this aspect by investigating the micro mechanisms
underlying this very intriguing finding.
Finally, the effects of loss of founding team members are interesting from a
prescriptive point of view. Disrupting the founding team has no effect on the three
outcomes. This may be due to the limitations of our data. First, we do not know when the
change occurred. Second, we also do not know who replaced these founding members.
Both are important factors to consider when analyzing the effect of the loss of founding
team members. Despite these limitations, we interpret this as indicating that on average
changes to teams are neither harmful nor beneficial. We cannot distinguish between
interventions by VC’s to change founders and voluntary departures because these are
opaque to the outsider. Future research could try to collect data on the exact nature of the
loss of founders using surveys. While, the absence of any effect of changes might signal
that VC’s are justified in forcing changes, our findings also calls for caution. The
moderating effect of changes on the imprinting effect of prior entrepreneurial experience
is especially illuminating. The likelihood of becoming a ‘living dead’ grows substantially
if changes in founding team with serial entrepreneurs occur. Disrupting founding teams
with serial entrepreneurs seem ill advised with dire conditions surrounding the startup
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getting even worse. So, an important insight for investors is to carefully analyze these
changes—voluntary exit may be signs of trouble in the business and active interventions
can be counterproductive.
Our pioneering study has a number of limitations. As noted, the results do not
hold for small businesses whose creation was due to lifestyle choice without the ambition
of growing fast and going public with venture capital as fuel. The findings are restricted
to firms whose founders aspire to build a successful high-tech organization that grows
rapidly, culminating in a high profile IPO or acquisition—setting a high expectation that
induces an entrepreneur to seek venture capital funding. VC funding forms an important
boundary condition for the analysis and interpretation of our findings. A major limitation
stems from the concept of ‘living dead’. ‘Living dead’ entails a transitory state and its
empirical or phenomenological circumscription is challenging. Some firms classified as
‘living dead’ may be on the path to success while others that did not meet investor
expectations and were shut down are excluded. In our data, we cannot observe these
cases, yet all things considered our definition of ‘living dead’ should empirically capture
the most problematic cases and is a conservative definition.
Next, since this is a transitory state, firms will eventually be selected out.
Robustness to changing the criteria to define this state in our study is a good signal.
However, the concept is sensitive to how we conceptually define this state and should be
explored in other contexts. Last, understanding this phenomenon with large sample
empirical analysis is limiting due to the unobserved nature of the real expectations of the
investors, which might explain why only two studies exist. We should try to investigate
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the ‘living dead’ state further invoking multiple methods. Given the transient nature of
the phenomenon, simulation methods represent one possible avenue of future research.
This could allow us to tease apart some of the mechanisms and understand the sensitivity
of the transitory state to expectations and changes. To conclude, although with many
limitations, this novel attempt contributes to our understanding of marginal performance
and opens up further avenues for research.
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Chapter 5:

Conclusions

This dissertation sought to shift the attention from success, i.e., the sale of a VCfunded high-tech firm either to another company or on the stock exchange, to failure and
persistence. These performance outcomes were investigated through the lens of three
different signals of quality: 1) patents, 2) technology breadth, and 3) founding team
characteristics. Quality is multi-dimensional, typically unobserved and unknown ex-ante.
In addition, considerable uncertainty surrounds the quality of a new venture. Therefore,
the information emanating from a variety of signals, serving as proxy for quality, permits
evaluators to sort start-ups based on desired criteria. For example, patents may be used to
identify and rank innovative capabilities of firms, while founding team characteristics
may provide information on the viability of ventures based on the reputation of the
founders.

This dissertation enlightens us on the effects of such quality signals on

entrepreneurial outcomes such as failure and persistence.
Chapter 2 developed and tested mechanisms that lead to failure as an unintended
consequence of patenting. Patents are used by start-ups to bridge the information gap
with investors, yet they also disclose proprietary information and technology position,
and expose firms to undesired spillovers. I show that firm failure rates increase as their
inventions are used at a higher rate by others; increasing even more so when citing firms
have a track record of litigiousness. Start-ups also are more likely to fail if their
technologies do not conform to the core activities sanctioned by incumbents. Chapter 3
exploits asymmetric effects of factors on success and failure to reveal start-up
persistence. Theoretically, it builds on the insights of Chapter 2 by analyzing another
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signal of quality (technology breadth) generated when firms patent and other
organizations subsequently use these inventions in new application domains. Results
demonstrate mechanisms that impede success and failure outcomes simultaneously,
thereby exposing factors that increase the likelihood of persistence. Firms endowed with
a specific technology that experiences widespread diffusion are at a higher risk of
persisting without experiencing any liquidating or liquidity events.
Finally, Chapter 4 explicitly analyzes the third outcome, persistence, by
examining the ‘living dead.’ Conceptually, the ‘living dead’ outcome is a transitory state
to which a start-up is defined to enter when it persists beyond VC expectation norms such
as typical investment horizon of investors. Drawing on the imprinting literature, I develop
and test hypotheses on the effects of various signals of quality that founding team
characteristics emit. Teams endowed with serial entrepreneurs signal underlying start-up
related higher-order capabilities acquired through learning by doing in their prior career,
and are empirically shown to decreases the odds of becoming one of the ‘living dead.’
Besides, these teams, endowed with previous founding experience, show higher failure
rate, although the likelihood of success is not affected. Thus, the presence of serial
entrepreneurs may serve as a signal of quality for investors needing quick closure on exit
prospects. Intriguingly, two founders are found to increase the odds of marginal
performance. Additionally, loss of members of a team that comprises serial entrepreneurs
is shown to be a shock that also increases the odds of becoming a ‘living dead’.
Table 19 summarizes the hypotheses and empirical findings from the three
chapters. As seen in the column on consequences, this dissertation provides a rich picture
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on the benefits and hazards of quality signals. Start-ups use a repertoire of signals to
overcome information asymmetry; since signals are equivocal and often time-varying
their impact on performance is checkered, in contrast to the prevalent portrayal of their
benefits. Signals provide information to resource providers and to rivals, and hence are
double-edged. This dissertation provides some evidence on the harmful side-effects of
signals beyond the benefits espoused in the literature, adding to the body of literature on
signaling in entrepreneurship.
Table 19. Summary of hypothesis and empirical results
Ch. Hypo.
2

1

2

2

2

3

2

Signaling
Consequence
Beneficial with
decreasing returns

Dependent
Variable

Independent Variable

Proposed
Relationship

Result

Failure

Patents granted annually

Curvilinear

Supported

Negative

Supported

Positive

Not supported

None

NA

Harmful

Positive

Supported

Harmful

Positive

Supported

GPT Beneficial

Negative

Supported

Negative

Supported

Positive

Not supported

Negative

Not supported

Negative

Supported

Negative

Not supported

Closeness centrality in technology
activity network
Crowding in technology citation
Failure
network
Annual forward citations fromother
Failure
firms
Litigation reputation weighted
Failure
annual forward citations
Concentration of annual forward
Failure
citations
Interaction of annual forward
Failure
citation and its concentration
Interaction of annual forward
Success
citation and its concentration
Interaction of annual forward
Failure
citation concentration and alliance
concentration
Interaction of annual forward
Success
citation concentration and alliance
concentration
Serial Entrepreneur endowment at
Living Dead
birth
Prior relevant domain experience of
Living Dead
members of teamat birth
Failure

Benefits of conformity

2

4

3

1

3

2a

3

2b

3

3a

3

3b

4

1

4

2

4

3

Living Dead

Two Founders

Negative

Supported

Harmful

4

4

Living Dead

Interaction of Serial entrepreneur
endowment and Loss of any
founding member

Positive

Supported

Harmful

SPT & High Citations
Beneficial
SPT & High Citations
Harmful

Beneficial
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Overall, this dissertation makes both a theoretical and empirical contribution to
the existing literature on performance of new ventures (see Table 20). On the theoretical
side, it conceptually defines and treats a third outcome, persistence, beyond the more
typical conceptions focusing either on success or failure. It identifies mechanisms related
to signals of quality used by start-ups that affect the chances of not succeeding through
achieving liquidity for investors. It adds to the menu of signals of quality that are at the
disposal of new firms and their evaluators. Specifically, technology breadth, as signaled
over time, conveys significant information on the prospects of a start-up, besides the
already established signals obtained through patent endowment and founding teams.
Finally, it highlights a new competitive mechanism manifested through the litigation
reputation of firms that use the start-ups inventions as building blocks of their R&D
program. Designing around and litigation threats are important harmful side effects of
patenting that increase mortality rates of new firms.
This research is among the few to empirically investigate marginal performance.
It is also pioneering in analyzing ‘living dead’ outcomes using large-sample quantitative
methods. Another significant empirical contribution is the exploitation of asymmetric
effects to uncover persistence. While research to date has separately analyzed success and
failure, their joint analysis is rare. The empirical tool of competing risk event-history,
therefore, provides a powerful method to analyze ‘non-events’ such as persistence.
Finally, it contributes to the patent literature by clarifying the role of patent citations as a
flow—parsing out the conflated mechanisms of endorsement and competition through
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interaction with technology breadth and through simultaneous analysis of success and
failure.
The results from this dissertation have implications for practice as well, providing
insights to entrepreneurs and VCs. Our study reinforces the importance of secrecy and the
dilemma entrepreneurs face due to disclosure when using signals that divulge proprietary
information. Litigation reputation of other firms and scope of their technologies are
important dimensions to pay attention when managing dilemmas, especially in
anticipating and positioning the start-up. For VCs, betting on serial entrepreneurs is a
good strategy if either liquidity or liquidating events is desired. In addition, investors
must be attentive to founding team size and losses of founding team members—voluntary
exit may be signs of trouble in the business and active interventions can be
counterproductive.
Table 20. Dissertation Highlights
Outcome(s)

Chapter 2
Failure

Signal

Patents

Chapter 3
Failure
&
Success
simultaneously
Technology Breadth

Chapter 4
Living Dead

Causal Asymmetry

Living Dead

Signal of specificity and high
knowledge
diffusion
decreases chances of failure
but at the same time also
reduces success probability pointing the path to ‘living
dead’
Competing Risk Cox

Strong
imprinting
effects
of
serial
entrepreneurs. Loss in
such teams leads to
higher likelihood of
'living dead'.

Founding team

Main Contributions
Conceptual
Theoretical Mechanisms

Empirical

Separating Stock &
Flow
Litigation Reputation
of Firms building on
inventions increase
failure
rate
designing around and
threat of litigation
Cox
Proportion
Hazard + Matching
for selection on
observables

Matched Case-Control
Study
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This dissertation is not without limitations. I have analyzed a single industry in a
contrasting setting to existing single-industry studies on new ventures. However, single
industry studies pose concerns to the generalizability of the results. Future research
should replicate the study in other settings as well as test the hypotheses in a more
general sample of VC-funded start-ups. The concept of performance is specific to the
VC-context. Many new ventures are founded for reasons other than a lucrative sale. It
would be important to define marginal performance with respect to other benchmarks for
new ventures as well in other settings where firms persist despite expectation failure of a
key stakeholder.
The results on the effect of prior-art citations, in both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3,
are intriguing and present opportunities for future research. The basic message echoes the
current literature in that who cites your inventions has important implications for
performance. Research in organization theory has shown that the status of citing firms
increase performance due to implied deference. This dissertation shows that the citing
firm’s litigation reputation has important consequences and is more strongly associated
with failure. An interesting research path would be to investigate both these
characteristics of firms together—to what extent are status and litigiousness correlated,
and can we isolate their respective effects on performance? In addition, the track record
of litigation is assumed to proxy the competitor’s tendency to contest fiercely, resorting
to designing around and even litigate. Further research should provide concrete evidence
to back up that assumption and bolster the findings presented herein.
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In Chapter 3 several interesting asymmetric effects were found that could serve as
the basis of other research projects. First, longer gestation periods before venture
financing seem to increase persistence, leading us to speculate that although nascent
firms are deemed to be less susceptible to inertia, such forces do start to make their
presence felt quite early as routines and capabilities are established. Therefore, the ability
of investors to add value through molding these routines and capabilities may be limited
to a certain window after birth. How VC’s add value is a rich area of research, and could
be further enriched through understanding when VC’s add value. Second, alliance rates
were found to inhibit success and failure, implying that there are limits to the benefits of
alliances. The results indicate that start-ups can increase survival prospects by pursuing
many alliances, yet they limit the chances to achieve an IPO or to be acquired. So
alliances may be limiting growth prospects as well as acting as substitutes for
acquisitions. These are important issues that merit further investigation with implications
not only for entrepreneurship, but corporate strategy as well.
Finally, in Chapter 4 I treated ‘living dead’ as a transitory state where firms
persist beyond expectations. Yet success (as indicated by the new venture going public) is
also an event leading to another transitory state—the firm becomes a public firm with
changed owners, a different set of expectations, and an uncertain future. In other words,
the fate of these firms is not final when IPO occurs. An interesting project would study
marginal performance after IPO, with the benefit of publicly available financial data. Do
the theories developed in this dissertation also apply in such cases? What are the drivers
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of success and failure there? These are some interesting questions that can enrich our
understanding of the phenomenon of marginal performance.
Perhaps the most interesting finding of this dissertation relates to the high odds of
finding two founders in ‘living dead’ firms. I attribute this effect to coordination costs
that impede fast but rigorous and consensual decision making—perhaps a too simplistic
explanation in the absence of detailed information on personality characteristics and
interactions between the two founders. This issue deserves much more attention,
especially to understand mechanisms that lead to such coordination costs. Why do two
founders have a detrimental effects in ’living dead’ state but not in successful or failed
firms? This finding throws up more questions than it answers and provides a rich avenue
for future investigations.
To conclude, this dissertation contributes to the literature on new venture
performance by extending existing theory, conceptualizing a third performance outcome
besides success and failure, and providing empirical evidence for persistence and harmful
consequences of signaling.

In addition, further research areas such as marginal

performance after IPO, the timing of VC non-financial value-add, and limits to benefits
of alliance, are identified to add to the knowledge on new venture performance. Together
they provide me with a rich road map to pursue my research interests as I embark upon
my journey as a scholar.
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